

Operational Plan (Main part)

Amendment No. 3

RAPID BORDER INTERVENTION AEGEAN 2020

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Approved by

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Signature

Fabrice Leggeri
Executive Director

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1. INTRODUCTION

This Operational Plan, composed of the Main part and Annexes, was agreed with the authorities of the host Member State² (MS).

After receiving a request from Greece on 01/03/2020, pursuant to Article 37(2) of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation (hereinafter the ‘Regulation’), the Frontex Executive Director decided to launch on 2 March 2020 a Rapid Border Intervention in order to enhance the security of the EU sea external borders. The aim of the activity is to provide an additional technical support for the maritime surveillance in order to tackle the specific and disproportionate challenges related to illegal immigration in Greece.

The deployment of the Rapid Border Intervention does not replace the support provided to Greece by the ongoing JO Poseidon 2020, which will continue as planned.

The Rapid Border Intervention focuses on the maritime border surveillance while the support to migration management and debriefing activities are regulated in the OPLAN of the JO Poseidon 2020.

The Operational Plan, marked as [redacted] may only [redacted]
[redacted]

Following its approval the Operational Plan shall be immediately distributed by Frontex to the host and participating MS via Frontex-One-Stop-Shop (FOSS).

The Operational Plan may be amended in order to correspond with the new operational developments of the exceptional circumstances justifying the Rapid Border Intervention.

Updates related to the participation in the rapid border intervention (Main part, chapter 5.3.) and the Initial Plan of Deployed Resources (Annex 7) are not deemed amendments to the Operational Plan.

The Handbook referred to in the Operational Plan contains the guidelines and complementary information in regard to Frontex operational activities, services and products, reporting platforms and other joint maritime operations’ related matters. References to the Handbook are made in the Main part and Annexes of the Operational Plan. Handbook to the Operational Plan is uploaded on FOSS.

2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Frontex

The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (‘Frontex’), based on the Regulation, ensures, together with national authorities responsible for border management, including coast guards to the extent that they carry out border control tasks, the effective implementation of European integrated border management with a view to managing the crossing of external borders efficiently. Frontex is responsible for organising the appropriate technical and operational assistance for the EU Member States including assist Member States in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance at the external borders by launching rapid border interventions at the external borders of those Member States facing specific and disproportionate challenges, taking into account that some situations may involve humanitarian emergencies and rescue at sea in accordance with Union and international law. Based on the request of a

² For the purposes of the present document, the term “Member State” includes also the States participating in the relevant development of the Schengen acquis in the meaning of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and its Protocol (No 19) on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union, that is, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland.

[REDACTED]

Member State faced with a situation of specific and disproportionate challenges the Agency may deploy a rapid border intervention by deploying European Border and Coast Guard teams and technical equipment at the external borders. Regulation prescribes that Frontex shall provide technical and operational assistance to Member States and third countries, in support of search and rescue operations for persons in distress at sea which may arise during border surveillance operations at sea. The main legal framework, objectives, tasks and responsibilities of Frontex are laid down in the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation.

2.2. EU and international law

The following non-exhaustive legal framework applies to the implementation of the activities foreseen in the present Operational Plan:

- Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624.
- Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code).
- Regulation (EU) 656/2014, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.
- Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).
- Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC.
- Directive 2016/680/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.
- Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection.
- The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
- The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
- The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea.
- The International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue.
- The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.
- The United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.
- The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
- The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
- The United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
- The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
- The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.
- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.



2.3. Fundamental Rights

2.3.1. Frontex's obligations

Frontex guarantees the protection of fundamental rights in the performance of its tasks in accordance with the relevant EU law, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the relevant international law, including the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, the respect for fundamental rights, in particular the access to international protection, and the compliance with the principle of non-refoulement, and taking into account the recommendations of the Frontex Consultative Forum on fundamental rights.

2.3.2. Obligations of all persons involved in operational activities coordinated by Frontex

All persons involved in Frontex operational activities are obliged to maintain the highest standards of integrity, ethical conduct, professionalism and respect for fundamental rights. They are expected to meet obligations imposed upon them by the provisions of the present Operational Plan and are obliged to comply with the rules of their mandates. They are obliged to comply with European law, international law, fundamental rights and also the national law of the host Member State.

2.3.3. Complaints Mechanism

Any person who is directly affected by the actions or failure to act on the part of staff involved in a joint operation, pilot project, rapid border intervention, migration management support team deployment, return operation or return intervention or an operational activity of the Frontex in a third country, and who considers him or herself to have been the subject of a breach of his or her fundamental rights due to those actions or that failure to act, or any party representing such a person, may submit a complaint in writing to Frontex.

The Code of Conduct is available as Annex 1.

General instructions on how to ensure the safeguarding of fundamental rights during the operational activity including complaints mechanism are provided in Annex 2.

3. DESCRIPTION AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

Background

Turkey has been one of the most important entry points for migrants, who intend to reach the European Union (EU) and, as of the end of October 2019, Turkey's Ministry of Interior estimated that around 4.9 million migrants are in Turkey, of which over 3.6 million are Syrians.

In 2019, the Eastern Mediterranean route - which is comprised of the Greek and Bulgarian land borders and the Greek sea borders with Turkey, as well as the route from Turkey to Cyprus - registered a 46% increase, with more than 82 000 migrant detections, and ranked first among all the migratory routes. The very intense migratory pressure on the Greek Aegean islands mainly contributed to this major increase despite the 40% decrease on the Greek land border with Turkey and notwithstanding the significant number of preventions reported by the Turkish authorities both at sea and on the land borders, to a large extent resulting also by the early warnings transmitted to the latter from the Hellenic Authorities.

In 2019, 29 020 Afghan nationals arrived on the Greek Aegean islands, which equates to a 200% increase compared to 2018 (when there were 9 646 Afghan arrivals). [REDACTED] continued to be the main target of mixed migratory flows. In total 28 584 persons were apprehended [REDACTED], accounting for 40.9% of the total registered in the operational area. Of the total number of migrants, [REDACTED]

Commented [KB1]: Information cannot be released as it refers to details crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the European Union which is used by Frontex to conduct its operational activities and to develop risk analyses. The disclosure of this information would hamper the effectiveness of Frontex operations and jeopardise the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities at the external borders. It would thus benefit criminal networks especially those involved in people smuggling and trafficking in human beings, which would put the life of migrants in danger. Hence, the disclosure of the information pertaining to this variable would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and has to be refused based on Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In 2019, 23 persons have reportedly lost their lives whereas another 13 have also perished in January 2020 while crossing the sea. According to IOM reports (which also include figures from Turkish sources), in 2019, 71 fatalities were registered in the Eastern Mediterranean (132 during the implementation of the JO Poseidon 2019).

Latest developments

On 28 February 2020, after a military escalation in Idlib region in Syria, the Turkish authorities discontinued migration controls in the Aegean region at land and sea borders. Immediately, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

According to operational sources, [REDACTED] Additionally, the very stormy weather in the Aegean Sea on 28-29 February prevented migrants from departing for Greece.

With improving weather conditions on 1 March 2020, however, a substantial wave of migrant flows reached the northern Hotspot Islands (Lesvos, Chios and Samos). In one day approximately 1 500 arrivals were reported in 31 incidents.

Forecast

Based on operational and open source information, the following forecast can be made:

[REDACTED]

Conclusion

[REDACTED]

Commented [KB2]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Information cannot be released as it refers to details crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the European Union which is used by Frontex to conduct its operational activities and to develop risk analyses. The disclosure of this information would hamper the effectiveness of Frontex operations and jeopardise the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities at the external borders. It would thus benefit criminal networks especially those involved in people smuggling and trafficking in human beings, which would put the life of migrants in danger. Hence, the disclosure of the information pertaining to this variable would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and has to be refused based on Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and pose a hazard to the course of ongoing and future operations aimed at curtailing the activities of such networks, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as to prevent unauthorized border crossings. The disclosure would thus undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.

Commented [KB3]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

[REDACTED]

Factors that may impact the operational area

Due to the fact that, as Greece informs, [REDACTED]

Commented [KB4]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Fatalities

Crossing the Aegean Sea in winter is in itself more dangerous in harsh weather. The sudden increase of the flow from Turkey, however, may further increase the potential of casualties, as migrants may board unseaworthy dinghies and in higher number than their recommended capacities. [REDACTED]

information cannot be released as it refers to details crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the European Union which is used by Frontex to conduct its operational activities and to develop risk analyses. The disclosure of this information would hamper the effectiveness of Frontex operations and jeopardise the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities at the external borders. It would thus benefit criminal networks especially those involved in people smuggling and trafficking in human beings, which would put the life of migrants in danger. Hence, the disclosure of the information pertaining to this variable would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and has to be refused based on Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Vulnerabilities identified

[REDACTED]

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks involved in the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and pose a hazard to the course of ongoing and future operations aimed at curtailing the activities of such networks, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as to prevent unauthorized border crossings. The disclosure would thus undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.

The thorough assessment of the situation can be found in Annex 3.

4. OPERATIONAL AIM, OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES (OPERATIONAL CONCEPT)

4.1. Operational aim

The operational aim of the Rapid Border Intervention (RBI) is to enhance the security of the external EU sea border by deploying additional technical equipment at the Greek sea border with Turkey in order to increase early detections and to prevent the illegal immigration which affects this part of the external EU borders at the Eastern Mediterranean route.

[REDACTED]

To increase early detections and to prevent illegal border crossings and to ensure that no life may be jeopardised at sea, all maritime and aerial assets should patrol in the most effective way, thus ensuring the early detection of migrants' vessels.

The operational aim will be implemented in full compliance with the relevant EU and international law, guaranteeing the protection of the fundamental rights in particular the access to international protection and the compliance with the principle of non-refoulement and taking into account the recommendations of the Frontex Consultative Forum and the reports and observations of the Fundamental Rights Officer.

4.2. Operational objectives

- Enhance border security
- Technical and operational assistance in SAR
- Enhance operational cooperation
- Enhance collection and exchange of information
- Identify possible risks and threats

Detailed information regarding operational objectives is provided as Annex 4.

4.3. Operational activities (Operational concept)

The objectives of the RBI will be achieved by combining different types of operational activities, particularly:

- Border and pre-frontier surveillance at sea.
- Supporting SAR operations.
- Preventing and detecting serious crime with a cross-border dimension that is committed or attempted at, along or in proximity of the external borders with the focus on migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings, stolen vehicles, smuggling of drugs, weapons, document fraud and terrorism.
- To support national authorities and EU agencies dealing with fisheries control and environmental protection in the frame of European cooperation in Coast Guard Functions activities.
- Collection of information through operational activities.
- Providing a clear and updated situational picture related to the RBI.
- Supporting the identification of special needs of children, unaccompanied minors, persons with disabilities, victims of trafficking in human beings, persons in need of medical assistance, persons in need of international protection, and other persons in a particularly vulnerable situation.
- Referring and providing initial information to persons who are in need of, or wish to apply for, international protection.
- Facilitating the cooperation with Union agencies, bodies or international organizations, and Third Countries.

The aforementioned activities will be implemented by the deployed technical equipment and human resources, under the control and command of the operational structures of the host MS.

Data protection requirements for processing of operational personal data are defined in Annex 14.

4.3.1. Border surveillance

Border surveillance shall be carried out by using technical equipment as follows:

- Aerial assets: detection / tracking / identification.
- Maritime assets: detections / tracking / identification / interception.
- Terrestrial assets: detection / tracking / identification / interception.

[REDACTED]

The main tasks of the assets are:

- Detect, identify, report, track and, if possible, intercept all vessels suspected of carrying persons crossing, circumventing or intending to cross the sea border in an irregular manner, circumvent checks at border crossing points or of being engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea in the operational areas, including early detections as well as detections and interceptions of the landed migrants at the disembarkation points.
- Support SAR operations.
- Provide situational awareness in the area of operation by identifying normal and abnormal navigation.
- Respond to witnessed or/and suspected unlawful activities at the maritime domain (e.g. smuggling of goods; illegal fishing; illicit drug trafficking; environmental pollution) in compliance with the applicable international and national legislation and report to the ICC/LCC all relevant information on the suspected or/and detected unlawful activity, including type of activity (e.g. illegal fishing), as well as other important information such as: position, route, track, speed, identification, allowing the national authorities' prompt reaction and predisposition of tailored countermeasures.
- Prevent and detect cross-border crime.

In compliance with national legislation, including the applicable national provisions on data protection, the assets must properly document [REDACTED] all actions (detection, tracking and interception) and submit all available materials to the ICC as soon as possible. The ICC is responsible to deal with the information received from participants and to channel it to Frontex and the respective national and/or international stakeholders. In each case, Frontex should be informed about the outcome of the actions, after the information has been submitted by participant of the RBI.

The participating assets perform their tasks under the coordination of the ICC [REDACTED]

At the local level Operational Liaison Officers for Technical Equipment (OLO-TE) of the respective Hellenic authorities are assigned to each asset executing patrols. The LCCs via OLO-TE are responsible for coordinating and commanding the overall patrolling activities.

To enhance coordination among the crews, NO and ICC, [REDACTED]

The patrolling schedule must be flexible and prepared taking into account the capabilities of the participating assets, [REDACTED]

Flexibility in the patrolling schedule is a key element: participating assets can be requested by the ICC to reschedule patrolling activities according to the operational needs. [REDACTED] will be notified and the patrolling schedule shall be adapted to the new circumstances.

[REDACTED] by each participating asset regarding the activities carried out during the previous 24 hours will be presented every day [REDACTED] The mentioned

[REDACTED]

Commented [KB5]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] to be filled out by all participating assets [REDACTED]

Maritime and aerial assets

Maritime assets should be deployed to patrol daily [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The host MS specifies the measures of control and constraints to be taken by the maritime assets of the participating MS in the frame of interceptions based on its legislation related to the control of migrants and the relevant provisions of international and EU law.

Aerial assets should be deployed [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

For the purposes of the RBI, Frontex can deploy Fixed Wing Aircrafts (Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service (FASS)) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Terrestrial assets

[REDACTED] based on the risk assessment to ensure early detections.
[REDACTED]

Minimum Operational Requirements for technical equipment

Assets deployed in the rapid border intervention should be equipped with adequate surveillance capabilities to ensure the early detection of the migrant vessels.

Prior the deployment of the aforementioned assets, an assessment will be made by the host MS in consultation with Frontex based at least on the following minimum criteria:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Moreover, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Commented [KB6]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the technical equipment deployed in the operational area by Frontex and Member States. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the exact type and capabilities of the equipment and would enable third parties, e.g. by combining this information with other sources, to draw conclusions regarding usual positions and movement patterns. This would open way for abuse, as numbers and types of equipment used in previous operations are indicative of similar numbers and types for succeeding years. Releasing such information would thus benefit criminal networks, enabling them to change their modus operandi and, consequently, result in hampering the course of ongoing and future operations of a similar nature. This would ultimately obstruct the purpose of such operations: to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of information regarding the technical equipment deployed would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

[REDACTED]

The deployment of TE not fully meeting the above mentioned criteria may be exceptionally accepted based on the consultation and approval of the host MS and Frontex.

4.3.2. Technical and operational assistance to SAR operations

Member States shall observe their obligation to render assistance to any vessel or person in distress at sea and they shall ensure that their participating units comply with that obligation, in accordance with international law and respect for fundamental rights under the coordination of the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) Piraeus. They shall do so regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is found.

4.3.3. Multinational border and coast guard teams / crews

During the RBI the multinational border and coast guard teams / crews composed of the officers from several MS may be deployed to the operational area, if agreed by the respective MS and Frontex.

The multinational coast guard crews would be deployed on the asset of the respective participating or host MS.

In addition, the European Coast Guard Functions Officers deployed by Frontex, and/or representatives of other Agencies engaged in implementation of European cooperation on coast guard functions (EMSA, EFCA) can be deployed in the International Coordination Centre (ICC) or on board of the respective assets to facilitate the implementation of the European cooperation on coast guard functions.

4.3.4. Contributing Frontex projects, products and services

The RBI will serve as a platform for implementation and integration of other Frontex activities and capacity building initiatives, after consultation and approval by the host MS.

[REDACTED]

4.3.4.2. VEGA Handbook: Children at sea borders - Children at risk on the move - Guidelines for Border Guards

More emphasis to be put on protecting children and unaccompanied minors rights at the external maritime borders as well as ensuring special needs of persons in need of international protection, persons in distress at sea and other persons in a particularly vulnerable situation. In this regard, "VEGA Handbook: Children at sea borders - Children at Risk on the Move. Guidelines for Border Guards" to be fully utilized. This Handbook focuses on how to detect children at risk of being trafficked or smuggled through seaports or following the rescue operations at sea, aiming to identify the best practices and recommendations for the border guards in this regard and to refer the respective children to welfare and child protection agencies by applying the standard operational procedures at seaports, landing points and Identification and Registration Centres.

VEGA Handbook: Children at Sea Borders (Children at Risk on the move Guidelines for Border Guards) is available on FOSS.

[REDACTED]

Commented [KB7]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.



4.3.4.3. Handbook on Risk Profiles on Trafficking in Human Beings

More emphasis to be put on victims of trafficking arriving at the external maritime borders as well as increase the possibilities of Team Members to identify potential cases of THB.

The Handbook is developed to support officers deployed to the RBI, with the early identification of victims of THB, but also perpetrators crossing an external border together with the victims. The aim is to support the identification of victims of these nationalities, and provide the overview of the trafficking process, starting with the information on the recruitment of victims, modus operandi of the criminal networks, and the victims' situation in the EU.

The Handbook on Risk Profiles on Trafficking in Human Beings is available on FOSS.

4.3.4.4. Eurosur Fusion Services

The Eurosur Fusion Services (EFS) add value to a common operational activities, provide essential components to compile the European Situational Picture (ESP) and support MS and their existing systems to enhance their situational awareness and reaction capabilities of own assets and human resources.

Aligned with operational needs, services are delivered to EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries authorities and other partners via different communication channels, including the Eurosur network and JORA Visualisation Module.

Tailored EFS package has been specially designed and tested to provide efficient support to all involved stakeholders within the operational environment.

4.3.4.4.1. Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance (MAS) service

In the broader context of European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), Frontex will continue to guarantee an appropriate level of situational awareness at the EU pre-frontier areas, by ensuring the provision of common application of surveillance tools - Eurosur Fusion Services.

Among others, one of the aims of these surveillance tools is to provide an early warning mechanism, in order to facilitate/enhance the reaction capability put in place by the adjacent JO.

One of these services with particular relevance for the pre-frontier surveillance, is the Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance (MAS) service. Using Frontex aerial surveillance capacities, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Nevertheless, in case of sighting of a distress situation and to expedite the rescue operation, the SAR Convention 1979 is applied and the responsible Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) is notified directly.

Additional information on EFS can be received via email [REDACTED] and is available in the Handbook.

5. IMPLEMENTATION

5.1. Period of implementation

Commencement	11/03/2020	12:00 (local time)
Termination	06/09/2020	11:59 (local time)

Commented [KB8]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 .

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

5.2. Operational area

Execution of operational activities will take place covering the Greek-Turkish maritime borders

Detailed information regarding operational areas is provided in Annex 5.

5.3. Host and Participating Member States, third countries, other Union bodies, offices and agencies or international organisations

Host Member State	Greece
Participating Member States	Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania
Third Countries	Not foreseen
Other Union bodies, offices and agencies	The European Commission (COM), the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA), the European Law Enforcement Agency (EUROPOL), the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), the European Union Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST)
International organisations	International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

REMARK:

Any change related to the involvement of the entities above, with the exception of the Host MS, occurred in the course of the RBI does not require the amendment of the Operational Plan. Any change will be agreed between Frontex, host MS and the respective new parties during implementation phase of the RBI.

Detailed information regarding the initial plan of deployed resources is provided in Annex 7.

5.4. Operational briefings / debriefings

All participants taking part in RBI will receive an Operational briefing (during the first days of deployment) and debriefing (last day of deployment) delivered by representatives of Frontex and national authorities of host MS.

Detailed information regarding operational briefing and debriefing is provided in Annex 8.

6. COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES, OTHER UNION BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

6.1. Cooperation with third countries

In order to foster the exchange of information with

Commented [KB9]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Commented [KW10]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Commented [KB11]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

[REDACTED]

Based on the role of the Frontex Liaison Officer (LO) [REDACTED] and in the frame of his mandate, LO receives [REDACTED]. The type of information [REDACTED] is a subject to agreement with the host MS.

In case Frontex LO receives information [REDACTED] which is relevant for the implementation of the present RBI, such information can be shared with the host MS with the view to increase the capacity to achieve the operational objectives, when agreed by [REDACTED].

In addition, LO receives general information related to the operational activities [REDACTED] that might have consequences in the conduct of operational activities or may affect Frontex cooperation with the Turkish authorities.

6.2. Cooperation with other Union bodies, offices and agencies or international organizations

Detailed information about cooperation with other Union agencies and bodies or international organizations within maritime domain is provided in Annex 9.

7. COORDINATION STRUCTURE

7.1. Partnership

Frontex coordinates the RBI via Coordinating Officer who is acting on behalf of the Agency in all aspects of the deployment of the European Border and Coast Guard teams.

The Greek authorities - Hellenic Coast Guard and Hellenic Police - are the direct partners of Frontex and responsible for all border related activities within the RBI.

The participating MS will support the achievement of operational objectives and implementation of activities by deploying their resources to the defined locations in particular periods of time.

All the activities are coordinated by the International Coordination Centre (ICC), without prejudice to the prerogatives of the national operational chain of command and control specific to each participating MS.

In case border control turns to SAR, the activities will be executed under the planning, coordination and guidance of the JRCC Piraeus according to internationally agreed SAR procedures.

7.2. Main operational structures / actors and their tasks

7.2.1. Member States

- International Coordination Centre (ICC) [REDACTED]
- ICC Coordinator - Officer of Hellenic Coast Guard (HCG)
- Central Police Coordinator (CPC) - Officer of Hellenic Police (HP)
- Intelligence Officer (IO) - Officer of HCG
- National Officials (NO) - Officers of participating MS deploying resources
- Joint Coordinating Board (JCB) - ICC Coordinator, CPC, IO, NO, FOC, etc.
- Commanding Officers (CO) - Commanders of the assets
- Team Members (TM)- Officers deployed by the participating MS

Commented [KB12]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

- Officers of the host MS - at the central and local levels
- Local Coordination Centres (LCC) [REDACTED]
- LCC Coordinators - Officers of HCG
- Local Police Coordinators (LPC) - Officers of HP
- Operational Liaison Officer for Technical Equipment (OLO - TE) [REDACTED]
- Operational Liaison Officer (OLO FOCC) - Officer of HCG deployed in the FOCC at the Frontex HQ

7.2.2. Frontex

- Frontex Coordinating Officers (FCO) - Field Deployment Unit (FDU)
- Operational Managers (OM) of FDU (OIS and OPES) and Operational Team (OT) of RBI - (FDU)
- Frontex Operational Coordinator (FOC) - in the ICC and on the islands
- Frontex Support Officer (FSO) - in the FOCC, the ICC and on the islands
- FSO for Logistics and Deployments (FSO-FLD)
- European Coast Guard Function Officer (ECGFO)
- Operational Analyst (OA) - Risk Analysis Unit (RAU)
- Frontex Operational Coordination Centre (FOCC)
- Frontex Situation Centre (FSC)
- Information Fusion Centre (IFC)
- Frontex Information Management Officer (FIMO)
- Field Press Coordinator (FPC)
- Frontex Liaison Officer in Greece
- Frontex Liaison Officer in Turkey
- Operational Liaison Officer for NATO activity in the Aegean Sea
- Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO)

Description of the tasks and specific instructions to the members of the European Border and Coast Guard Teams including Rules on Use of Force are defined in Annex 6.

The general tasks and roles of operational structures / actors are defined in the Annex 10. The general tasks and role of the Operational Liaison Officer for NATO activity in the Aegean Sea are defined in Annex 13.

Contact details of main operational actors are available on FOSS.

7.3. Coordination of the contingents deployed by the Member States

7.3.1. Coordination at the local level

The crewmembers of the respective deployed maritime and aerial assets are under the command of the Commanding Officer (CO) in accordance to the chapter 8.1 of the Main part of the OPLAN. Nevertheless, it is up to the respective authority of the participating MS to define the interdependencies between the NO and CO of the particular asset(s) deployed at the same location where the contingent is deployed.

7.3.2. Coordination at the central level

As a general rule, the MS deploying their aerial and maritime assets deploy [REDACTED] for the period the assets are deployed in the operational area. [REDACTED] of the national maritime and aerial assets in accordance to the chapter 8.1 of the Main Part of the OPLAN.

It is up to the respective authorities of the participating MS to define if [REDACTED] can represent both, assets and contingent, at the central level.

Commented [KB13]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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[REDACTED]

8. COMMAND AND CONTROL

8.1. Technical equipment

[REDACTED]

The [REDACTED]

In case of requested support from JRCC Piraeus during a SAR event, the coordination of the participating units is transferred from the ICC to the JRCC. The participating units shall inform ICC as soon as possible about any contact with the JRCC and actions taken by them. If the SAR event occurs outside the Hellenic Search and Rescue Region [REDACTED] JRCC Piraeus will contact the competent MRCC to assume coordination of the incident accordingly.

[REDACTED] based in the ICC in relation to the deployment of the maritime and aerial assets in the operational area are under the command and control of the respective participating MS.

8.2. European Border and Coast Guard Teams (Team Members and other relevant staff)

Command and control of TM remain with the competent national authority of the host MS. TM will carry their duties under the instructions of the officers of the host MS, who have the operational responsibility for the teams assigned.

[REDACTED]


8.3. Command and control scheme

Due to the fact the RBI is implemented [REDACTED] in accordance with the scheme below.

Frontex Operational Coordination Centre (FOCC) is established at Frontex HQ and it is integrated in the overall coordination of all operational activities. FOCC may be supported by the deployment of an FSO.

Commented [KB15]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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9. COMMUNICATION

9.1. Operational communication

Communication flows for RBI activities in the operational area are [REDACTED] communication flow is as follows:

- Communication between the ICC and Frontex is accomplished via videoconference, e-mail, mobile and fixed line phones as well as radio and satellite phones.
- Communication between all participants of the JO is accomplished via e-mail, mobile and fixed line phones and video-conferences.
- Communication between the actors within the central (ICC) and local authorities (LCC) is accomplished via e-mails, mobile and fixed line phones and video-conferences.
- Communication between all assets deployed as well as between the assets and operational structures is accomplished in accordance with the International Radio Procedure. Furthermore, any other available tool enabling communication among all participants and coordinating structures are used.
- [REDACTED] Access to the respective JO area on FOSS is granted according to FOSS access procedure:
 - TM receive access to FOSS after their registration in Opera;
 - other participants, who are not registered in Opera, receive access after submission and authorization of the FOSS User Access Request Form;

Detailed information about communication and FOSS is provided in the Handbook.

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9.2. Communication with Press

Frontex is strongly committed to the principle of transparency. Therefore, as a rule, media should be granted access to operational areas.

Participants of the RBI are allowed to talk to the media only within the limits set by specific guidelines for the participating officers and following a briefing by Frontex Media and Public Relations Office. Each participant taking part in the operation shall receive a laminated card with the specific guidelines.

A network of responsible press officers of all involved authorities will be established and all contact details shall be sent to the press.office@frontex.europa.eu mail address. A compiled list will be distributed to all parties involved.

The approach to communication on border control activities on the territory of Greece is common for Frontex and the host MS.

Frontex and Greece shall nominate Press Officers, who will be entirely responsible for coordination of all matters related to interview requests, press visits to the operational area and any other press-related matter related to JO. Press visits of international media will be facilitated by Frontex in coordination with the Hellenic authorities following established procedures with the respective Greek authority. Frontex Media and Public Relations Office may arrange, upon agreement with the host MS, the deployment of a Field Press Coordinator.

Embedment of journalists on board of Frontex assets will be planned in advance between Frontex Media and Public Relations Office, respective Greek authority and RBI Aegean Operational Team, giving priority to the operational needs.

Frontex communication policy, rules and guidelines for handling media requests are available in the Handbook.

The contact details of Frontex Media and Public Relations Office members (Spokesperson and Frontex Field Press Officer) and the relevant press officers of national authority of the host MS are available on FOSS.

10. REPORTING

10.1. Reporting in JORA

The information is collected within the framework of the rapid border intervention via the JORA structure by officers assigned by the host MS or deployed in the operation by other participating MS, as follows:

- Border-related incidents occurred in the operational areas are reported via the Incidents template.
- Preventions of departure.

All reported incidents also undergo the JORA validation process executed by the FSC.

In case the system is unavailable to users, the ICC shall immediately report the unavailability to the FSC. A decision will be promptly made in Frontex and communicated back to the users.

JORA actors, reporting structure and timelines are described in Annex 11.

JORA incident template attributes list, comprehensive information on JORA and the examples of reporting templates are provided in the Handbook.

JORA Guidelines and the reporting templates in Microsoft Office Word format are available on FOSS.

10.2. Operational reports of participants

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [KB18]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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10.3. Daily reporting package

The Daily reporting package, [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] responsible for the dissemination of the Reporting Package [redacted]
[redacted]

Commented [KB19]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

10.4. Serious incident reporting

The reporting of serious incidents (SI) must be in line with the reporting structure of the operation.

Type of report	Description	Responsibility
Initial Serious Incident Report	<p>A Serious Incident Report is an alert message that shall be reported to FSC as soon as possible [redacted] in case an event or occurrence, natural or caused by human action, may negatively affect, or be relevant to a particular Frontex activity, the safety and security of participants in Frontex activities, the Agency's mission and reputation, or any combination thereof.</p> <p>SIs also include situations of possible violations of European Union (EU) acquis or international law, in particular related to Fundamental Rights (FR) and international protection obligations. Finally, SIs include any violation of the Frontex Code of Conduct (CoC) applicable to all persons participating in Frontex operational activities</p>	All participants of the RBI

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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A formal SIR shall be reported in JORA and sent as soon as possible [redacted]
[redacted]

The Serious Incidents Reporting procedure including Serious Incidents Catalogue is available in the Handbook.

[REDACTED]

10.5. Frontex reports

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Shall be sent to Frontex [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Shall be sent to Frontex [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Shall be sent to Frontex [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Shall be sent [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Shall be sent [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [KB20]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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The non-disclosed part contains personal data, in particular, the name of an individual. The disclosure would undermine the protection of privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with European Union legislation regarding the protection of personal data and therefore has to be precluded pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

11. WORKING CONDITIONS AND LOGISTICS

11.1. Working conditions and working environment of the operational area

The working conditions and environment vary according to the place of deployment (ICC or the islands that are within the operational area). Participants of the RBI perform their tasks on board of the deployed technical equipment.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Frontex Liaison Officer in Greece provides working places [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Frontex Liaison Officer acts as the manager of the premises according to the relevant ED Decision.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Other useful information available at the following websites:

- Hellenic Center for Disease Control & Prevention: <http://www.keelpno.gr/en-us/home.aspx>
- Ministry of Interior / General Secretariat for Civil Protection: <http://civilprotection.gr/en>

Detailed information on each of the workplace of all main locations within the operational area of the JO is available at FOSS

11.2. Working time

11.2.1. Team Members

The working time of the Team Members (TM) of the RBI is managed by the host MS, which is in charge of issuing instructions to the participants of the RBI during their deployment to the operational area, according to the Regulation. The working time rules shall be in full compliance with the relevant EU legislation.

Host MS prepares the duty rosters or equivalent defining the working time and the days off and keeps the relevant records. These records shall be made available to Frontex and the respective participating MS upon request in accordance with the relevant data protection provisions.

Taking into account the nature and scope of the RBI, the deployed TM are requested to acknowledge the need for flexibility in case of unprecedented migratory flows or other unforeseen operational needs.

Commented [KB21]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.

11.3. Safety and health

11.3.1. Frontex “Occupational health and safety - deployment information”

Basic sanitary behaviour is crucial especially for avoiding the exposure to infectious diseases. Therefore, each participant of the RBI should follow the eight ‘Golden Rules’ defined in Frontex provided brochure “Occupational health and safety - deployment information” available on FOSS. Participants of the RBI are expected to show up on duty physically and mentally fit for duty, in order not to jeopardise the safety and health of themselves or others.

Frontex closely monitors any developments in the field of safety and health and will provide additional information in case of need.

Frontex brochure “Occupational health and safety - deployment information” available on FOSS.

11.3.2. Usage of Frontex provided sanitary Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

While on duty, participants of the RBI should use Frontex provided sanitary Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) including basic First Aid kit. Each participant of the RBI has to be aware about their personal responsibility as a last resort of ensuring proper occupational safety and health protection, including the usage of PPE and service gear.

11.3.3. Vaccination

Vaccination is a basic tool in the prevention of contagious and infectious diseases. Based on the epidemiological situation, international recommendations and experience gathered from operational areas, vaccination against the following diseases is highly recommended for all participants of the JO: Poliomyelitis, Diphtheria, Tetanus, Pertussis, Hepatitis A, Hepatitis B, seasonal Influenza, Measles/Mumps/Rubella, Varicella/Chickenpox and Neisseria meningitis ACWY. For duties with increased risk of contact with Tuberculosis (e.g. hotspots, mass-migration-management settings) also vaccination against Tuberculosis is recommended.

11.3.4. Access to health care and public health events

Sick and/or injured Frontex deployed personnel shall have equal access to all necessary medical and psychological support, regularly facilitated by the European Health Insurance Card scheme (EHIC) or equivalent, as equally provided to the host MS officers. Participating MS/TC are responsible for adequate insurance coverage for their respective deployed personnel, while Frontex covers such costs via the applicable financing scheme based on daily rates/unit costs, in accordance with chapter 11.3.6 below. For seconded Team Members the European Commission complementary mission insurance is applicable (CIGNA/AIG policy No 2.004.760).

Host MS shall guarantee that in case of any potential public health event, also Frontex deployed personnel is taken into account for any envisaged measure (e.g. vaccination campaigns, health risk awareness campaigns).

11.3.5. Medical evacuation

Medical evacuation of the deployed personnel falls under the responsibility of the participating MS/TC. Participating MS/TC are responsible for adequate insurance coverage for their respective personnel, covering medical evacuations. For seconded Team Members the applicable European Commission complementary mission insurance (CIGNA/AIG policy No 2.004.760) is covering medical evacuation.

11.3.6. Safety and health related costs

The daily rates paid by Frontex to the participating MS include *inter alia* the costs for health care, insurance and additional vaccinations. Participating MS are, therefore, encouraged to utilise them also for this purpose.

11.4. Logistics

Prior arrival, crew members deployed by the MS, via the respective NFPOC, are advised to contact their colleagues already deployed in the operational area to arrange the transfer to the hotel. If this solution is not possible the NFPOC should contact the respective FSO and ask for support. [REDACTED]

11.4.1. Registration of deployed resources in Opera

Prior to the deployment the participating MS shall introduce all information required for issuing identification document for participants as well as relevant information for the deployment of TC in the Operational Resources Management System (Opera). In addition, when deploying assets, NO, CO, crewmembers and BSO for terrestrial assets have to be registered in Opera, too (in respective HR and TE pools).

More information about Opera can be found in the Handbook.

11.4.2. Field visits

Prior to the deployment of aerial and maritime assets, it is recommended for the participating MS to perform a field visit to get familiar with the operational area, local authorities and service providers. The field visit should be approved by the Operational Manager and agreed with the ICC Coordinator in advance.

The LCC Coordinator and Frontex coordinating officer on the spot will support the field visits.

The field visit delegation of two persons will be co-financed by Frontex.

11.4.3. Heavy equipment, firearms and ammunition

The weapon permits are issued by the competent authorities of the host MS and received at the points of entry or, in exceptional cases, at the places of deployment (last minute information, etc.). [REDACTED]

The above mentioned information is also required in the cases of replacement of officers and when the weapon permits are received at the deployment locations.

In particular upon arrival [REDACTED] and following disembarkation from the aircraft, the officers can address the Police Lost and Found office located on the ground floor of the arrivals hall, which is located opposite to the baggage claim area (belt No. 5) and can also be reached on the phone (+30) 2103530515. [REDACTED]

Commented [KB22]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Commented [KB23]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Commented [KB24]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

[REDACTED]

During departure, the officers will have to return this document to the Duty Officer, responsible for extra Schengen Departure, located left to counter n. 54 of the Departure Area (1ST floor) and before the Extra Schengen Area. [REDACTED]

In case of a need, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
In regard to the heavy equipment, it is highly recommended that the equipment would [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Detailed information regarding transportation of firearms and ammunitions can be found in the Handbook.
Clearance request form for VFR flights at night is available on FOSS.

11.4.4. Crew related issues

Prior to deployment participating MS have to provide Operational team [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The same rules, for the exception of the NO, applies to the CO and crews (BSO) of the terrestrial assets (TVV).

The Operational team shall be immediately informed in case of any changes related to the crew or the deployment of the asset itself.

Before executing the change of crew of asset deployed, the participating MS shall inform Operational Team in due time to ensure delivery of the operational briefing / debriefing for the crew members upon their arrival to the operational area.

Prior the deployment the respective assets, NO, CO and crewmembers including BSO for TVVs have to be registered in **Opera** (HR available in Pool and TE available in TEP).

11.4.5. Diplomatic clearance, Night flights under VFR ATC clearance and airports with access restrictions

The participating MS deploying aerial assets shall make the necessary arrangements well in advance to obtain the Diplomatic clearance to allow the state aircraft to enter the airspace of host MS (sometimes diplomatic clearance issuance may take up to one month).

The participating MS should respect the time needed for issuance of flight clearance according to the national procedures and submit request for the diplomatic clearance in time in order not to jeopardise the timely start of the mission.

In addition to diplomatic clearance, according to GR AIP ENR 1.2., VFR flights shall not be operated during night without a clearance from the appropriate ATC unit.

Participating MS have to send clearance request [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Clearance request form for VFR flights at night is available in the Handbook and on FOSS.

11.4.6. Transport and accommodation

Rental cars shall be approved in advance by the Frontex Coordinating Officer and related expenses to be included in the respective financial documents for crew members and BSOs TVV.

Commented [KB25]: The non-disclosed part contains personal data, in particular, the name of an individual. The disclosure would undermine the protection of privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with European Union legislation regarding the protection of personal data and therefore has to be precluded pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.



Officers deployed in the ICC Piraeus are not entitled to rent cars.

Each participant is strongly advised to bring his/her driving licence since he/she could be assigned as a second driver within the car rental contract, if such need occurs.

All deployed TMs should arrange their accommodation as close as possible to the working place (the list of suggested accommodation is available on FOSS).

Frontex will not make any bookings or reservations of flights, accommodation, etc.

Recommended accommodation is available on FOSS.

11.4.7. Frontex distinctive flags and insignias for the technical equipment

Without prejudice to a Decision of Executive Director of Frontex on the use of distinctive insignias in operational activities coordinated by Frontex, distinctive flags and insignias are affixed to technical equipment (TE) deployed by MS where such deployment is (co)financed by Frontex as well as TE (co)owned or leased by Frontex as follows:

- Frontex flag and insignia to be fixed to the maritime assets
- Frontex insignia to be fixed to the terrestrial assets

Distinctive flags and insignias will be provided by Frontex in the operational areas.

12. EVALUATION

12.1. Member States and Third Countries

Reports	Deadlines
	Shall be submitted to Frontex within 7 calendar days after deployment via email: Relevant sections of the report will be distributed to TRU,
Final Operational Report from Member State	Shall be submitted to Frontex within 15 calendar days after the end of the set of deployments of the HR and/or light and heavy TE financed under the Grant Agreement. The Report shall be submitted via email address indicated in the Grant Agreement for a given MS. <i>Template of the reports is available on FOSS and Handbook</i>

The final payment will not be processed as long as the Final Operational Reports from MS and TC are not submitted to Frontex.

Commented [KB26]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operation, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.



12.2. Frontex

Reports	Deadlines and Benchmarks
Frontex Evaluation Report	<p>The results of the RBI will be evaluated and Frontex Evaluation Report (FER) will be transmitted within 60 calendar days after the termination of the RBI to the Management Board together with the observations of the Fundamental Rights Officer referred to in Article 47 of the Regulation.</p> <p>FER will be accomplished in line with the indicators of objectives defined in Annex 4 of the OPLAN and uploaded on FOSS.</p>

13. FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

In accordance with the applicable legal framework, Frontex will co-finance the rapid border intervention. Frontex will reimburse eligible costs incurred by participating MS authorities in relation to deployments of human and technical resources.

Frontex will be responsible for the preparation of all necessary financial commitments and the preparation of the legal commitments on the basis of the outcome of the RBI open call. Funds will be allocated by means of Grant Agreements (GA) of short duration (duration of the activity) for the deployment of technical resources.

Once the grant agreement is issued by Frontex, the grant beneficiary is obliged to countersign it and send it back to Frontex. It is then possible to request pre-financing of 60 % of the estimated budget. Interim payment may be requested after consuming 70 % of the pre-financing. The request for final payment is submitted within 75 days after the end of the activity covered by a grant agreement. Payments shall be made by Frontex within 60 days from the receipt of the request for final payment, notwithstanding any suspension period due to incomplete or incorrect information provided by the beneficiary.

14. CONTACT DETAILS

The contact details of Frontex and host MS staff involved in the coordination, command and control of the RBI are integral part of the Operational Plan. Due to evolving nature of the information included, the constantly updated document is stored on FOSS.

[Redacted contact details]

Commented [KB27]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.



ANNEXES

Annex 1	Code of Conduct applicable to all persons participating in Frontex operational activities
Annex 2	General instructions on how to ensure the safeguarding of Fundamental Rights during the operational activity including complaints mechanism
Annex 3	Thorough assessment
Annex 4	Operational objectives
Annex 5	Operational area
Annex 6	Description of the tasks and specific instructions to the members of the European Border and Coast Guard Teams including Rules on Use of Force
Annex 7	Initial plan of deployed resources
Annex 8	Operational briefing and debriefing
Annex 9	Cooperation with other Union bodies, offices and agencies or international organisations
Annex 10	Coordination structure
Annex 11	JORA
Annex 12	Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for the cooperation between NATO activity and Frontex coordinated operation in the Aegean Sea
Annex 13	Data protection requirements for the rapid border intervention