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Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949–56

Volume I

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Contents

Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56

Foreword

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), it is my pleasure to present *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56*. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the BND share a common history, because the Agency assumed responsibility for the Gehlen Organization, the BND's predecessor, from the U.S. Army in 1949. CIA held the Gehlen Organization in "trusteeship" until 1956, when the West German government established its own national intelligence structure.

With its origins in the urgent need for intelligence in the Soviet zone of Germany during the first years of the Cold War, CIA and the BND have remained steady partners in the decades after 1956. The reunification of Germany in 1990 and the collapse of Soviet Communism in 1991 are milestones in their joint struggle for freedom. To this day, American and German intelligence officers work closely together against a host of threats, ranging from terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and worldwide unrest.

This book is the companion volume to *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1945-49*, which CIA presented to the BND at the 50th anniversary celebration of the Agency's assumption of the Gehlen Organization from the U.S. Army. Like the 1999 volume (which was declassified and released to the public in 2002), we can read the history of the Gehlen Organization through contemporary documents. Drawn from the Agency's archives, these documents illustrate the many challenges that both Americans and Germans faced during these monumental years.

This volume presents a new perspective on the BND's history and its unique relationship with CIA. Until the time that this material can be released to the public, CIA wishes to commemorate the establishment of the Bundesnachrichtendienst by publishing this classified volume of historical documents. **The volume is for internal BND use only and cannot be released to other German agencies or foreign countries without the express consent of the Central Intelligence Agency.**

In December 1955, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles replied to the holiday greetings of Reinhard Gehlen, the head of the German service. The West German government had formally approved the establishment of the Federal Intelligence Service. "You can imagine with what gratification I received this news," Dulles exclaimed, "and with what hopefulness I view the future collaboration which I know will continue between our two services. During the post-war years, your relationship with us has been one of dignity and mutual respect which augurs well for the future. As I look back over the problems and difficulties which we have faced together, it is with satisfaction

in the thought that they have been successfully surmounted on the basis of our community of interest and the understanding and esteem which has developed between our respective representatives."

Fifty years later, the aspirations of Allen Dulles, Reinhard Gehlen, James H. Critchfield, and their colleagues have been realized. CIA is proud to commemorate this landmark of one of its most important liaison partners.

[redacted]
Director of the National Clandestine Service

Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56

Preface

Between 1949 and 1956, the Central Intelligence Agency held the Gehlen Organization, the nascent West German intelligence service, in "trusteeship." During the seven-year interim period, the Federal Republic of Germany emerged as a sovereign nation free from military occupation by the Western Allies. West Germany also became an increasingly important economic and military partner, while acting as the frontlines of the Cold War.

The CIA grappled with numerous issues related to how the Gehlen Organization would fit into the structure of the new West German government. In July 1949, when CIA assumed responsibility of the Gehlen Organization from the U.S. Army, the Federal Republic had formed only two months earlier. Reinhard Gehlen, the head of the German service under American auspices, became increasingly concerned with ensuring that his organization be formally designated as West Germany's intelligence service. Gehlen, however, did not win immediate concurrence for his goal of establishing the intelligence service in West Germany's new government.

The establishment of the *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BND) mirrors the development of West Germany in these formative years. Personal and political rivalries in Germany shaped the new service. At the same time, the Western Allies struggled with the mechanics of setting up an intelligence system in a country that was just emerging from the shadows of the Third Reich. As a result, CIA's oversight of the Gehlen Organization lasted seven tumultuous years.

For the first time in its history, the Agency was fully responsible for the funding and operations of a foreign intelligence service. While the CIA's "control" of the Gehlen Organization was incomplete, the American service faithfully preserved the German organization for the day when West Germany would regain full sovereignty. Just as the story of the Gehlen Organization is that of the emergence of an independent German intelligence service, it is also an account of how the CIA and its officers managed this transition. In the process, the Central Intelligence Agency developed a special bond with the new Federal Intelligence Service, which emerged from the Gehlen Organization in 1956.

Pullach Operations Base

Following his review of the Gehlen Organization in late 1948, James H. Critchfield assumed responsibility for setting up the Agency's base at the Gehlen Organization's main facility in Pullach on the outskirts of Munich in the spring of 1949. Critchfield had to integrate the CIA's unpublicized presence in Pullach with the 7821st Composite Group, the U.S. Army unit responsible for administrative and logistical support for the Gehlen Organization. By October 1949, CIA's Pullach Operations Base, known as POB, consisted of nearly 50 civilian and military personnel. The number of CIA

officers assigned to Pullach remained steady until the base closed in 1956 and moved to Munich. In addition to the officers in the field, five to seven officers in Washington supported Pullach operations.

Critchfield's encountered some initial problems in dealing with his U.S. Army counterpart, Col. William R. Philp, commander of the 7821st Composite Group at Pullach. Philp, an older Regular Army officer familiar with the Gehlen Organization since 1945-46, had also held a senior position at CIA headquarters. Philp resented the fact that Critchfield, his junior in age as well as in military rank, overshadowed him as the chief of the new CIA base. Critchfield was responsible for operational and policy decisions as the Chief of Staff while Philp remained as the commander. Critchfield soon reported that this arrangement was untenable and he requested Philp's reassignment, which occurred in the summer of 1950.

The Basic Agreement

Upon his arrival in Pullach in March 1949 to prepare for CIA's takeover of Operation RUSTY, Critchfield recognized that the Gehlen Organization was in need of deep reform. Relations between Gehlen and the U.S. Army had been strained for a variety of reasons. Critchfield found it useful to write a basic agreement, which provided the CIA, as the new partner, and the Gehlen Organization with specific objectives. The Basic Agreement, sent to CIA Headquarters on 13 June 1949, stressed the "ideological motivations of this project, "including the fact that the "development of a long range and effective intelligence organization directed against Communist Russia and her satellite governments is the broader purpose of US-German cooperation."[1]

Both Critchfield and Gehlen stressed that the Organization represented a potential national intelligence service. "It is recognized," as stated in the Basic Agreement, "that as the German Government is strengthened and assumes a more independent role in internal German affairs and as Germany assumes her position as a sovereign state with reestablished normal diplomatic and trade relations abroad, the working relationship of the US and German representatives in this project will have to be periodically re-examined and modified to conform to the situation."

The Basic Agreement also outlined the working level arrangements between the Americans and the Germans. For example, Critchfield, as the chief CIA representative, would pass all directions to Gehlen, who, in turn, was solely responsible for control and authority within the Organization. The Americans in Pullach acted "in an advisory and liaison capacity," but the Gehlen Organization was required to provide them with "complete details of operational activities" as well as financial records. The Americans would provide "maximum operational and technical assistance," including reviewing all projects and budgets. The Germans were also restricted in establishing ties with foreign intelligence services without American approval or control. The Basic Agreement, as formulated in 1949, served as the foundation for CIA's relationship with the Gehlen Organization until 1956.

[1] For a copy of the Basic Agreement, see Document 93 in Kevin C. Ruffner, ed., *Forging an Intelligence Relationship: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1945-49*, vol. II (Washington, D.C. Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), pp. 231-235.

Getting Started

While the Basic Agreement provided a grand vision of the U.S.-German relationship, the CIA officers in Pullach and in Washington worked on a daily basis to make it a reality. In October 1949, Gehlen expressed some important reservations to Critchfield about the Basic Agreement. Gehlen framed his reservations to include maintaining separate contacts with the new West German government in Bonn, establishing ties with foreign intelligence services, and refusing to provide full details on operational activities. While understandable from Gehlen's standpoint because he wanted to retain a sense of independence from the Americans as he shaped his service as West Germany's future national intelligence service, Gehlen's actions were an ongoing source of strain for the next seven years.

The Central Intelligence Agency found the Gehlen Organization in disarray in the summer of 1949.. A deep financial crisis compounded the Army's benign neglect, forcing Critchfield to tackle this as one of his first tasks as POB chief. Following the West German currency reform in 1948, the value of the American monthly subsidy dropped as much as 75 percent by July 1949. In addition, new restrictions in selling American PX-items (the so-called "incentive goods") on the black market also affected the Gehlen Organization's ability to raise extra funds. CIA held firm that there would be no additional funding to the Gehlen Organization beyond the monthly subsidy of $125,000. Consequently, the first year of the CIA's assumption brought about a significant decline in the number of Germans employed by the Organization.

In addition to the dire financial matters, the Agency pressed Gehlen to reform his operational activities. Critchfield wanted the Gehlen Organization to move away from the low-level, collection of tactical intelligence in East Germany and shift focus to more strategic intelligence targets in the Soviet Bloc. In June 1949, Critchfield ordered the conversion of all operations outside of East Germany to a project basis. This move allowed both parties to evaluate the German efforts and determine which offered the best chances of success.

Coupled with the financial constraints facing the Gehlen Organization, the project review drastically slashed the number of German operations. By mid-1950, the CIA had examined 150 operations and eliminated the vast majority; only ten projects remained active at the review's conclusion. The CIA's oversight created considerable friction in the Gehlen Organization because the Army had never fully scrutinized the operational activities of the Germans. As the Agency's review demonstrated, the bulk of the German operations were simply unsustainable.

In 1950, Critchfield ended the project review and told Gehlen that he needed to institute drastic reforms at all levels.[2] Critchfield informed the German chief that "it was high time that he recognized the fact that his organization, while viewed in a most credible light for its tactical collection and especially in its military evaluation work, was considered definitely second class in any intelligence activity of a more difficult or sophisticated nature, and that if he had any aspirations beyond that of producing a good G-2 concern for a future German Army, some drastic changes were in order."[3]

Operations

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 heightened worries that the fighting in the Far East was a prelude for the Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Whereas the CIA had previously not focused on the Gehlen Organization's intelligence collection in East Germany, this aspect soon grew in importance. In August 1950, the CIA launched a major program with the Germans to expand operations across the Inter-German border. Known as Project JUPITER, the Agency recognized that while German efforts to collect intelligence on Soviet forces were imperfect (for example, the Agency did not know the identities of Gehlen's agents in East Germany), they were important tools to identify Russian bases, lines of communications, and military units.

During this same period, the Gehlen Organization continued many of its earlier activities, which it had started while under the Army's auspices. For example, the Germans maintained close ties with numerous émigré groups in displaced persons camps throughout West Germany. In many cases, these contacts expanded on wartime ties with these anti-Soviet groups. Likewise, the Gehlen Organization had embarked on major efforts to interrogate returning German prisoners of war and scientists from the Soviet Union. The latter interrogations, known as the HERMES program, provided U.S. intelligence with considerable information about the state of Soviet technology in the first decade of the Cold War.

As the threat of war in Europe grew more ominous in the early 1950s, CIA and the Gehlen Organization devoted considerable time and attention to establishing a rear base for the German service if the Soviets invaded Germany. The Agency and the Germans also developed lengthy evacuation lists of Organization members and their families. While making plans for evacuation in the event of a "hot war," the CIA embarked on large-scale plans to develop

[2] After the cessation of the project review in 1950, the Gehlen Organization essentially had to start from scratch in terms of rebuilding its operational capacity. Rather than setting up a formal review process, the Germans worked with their American counterparts to discuss on an informal basis. When it appeared that an activity was feasible from both operational and financial standpoints, it was raised to a more formal level for approval. By working jointly from the beginning of an operation, the Americans had a better idea of the concept of the German operations and, in turn, the Germans knew that these operations would enjoy American support. The Americans, however, still did not know the identities of Gehlen's agents, or *Vertrauensmann* ("trusted man or *V-Mann*).

[3] Prompted by the project review, the Gehlen Organization instituted a number of reforms, including the establishment of area desks at Pullach and the redesignation of the General Agencies (General Vertretung or GVs). The individual GVs throughout West Germany were also assigned specific targets.

staybehind resistance groups in the western half of Germany. These groups, as well as hidden radio operators, would delay the Soviet advance. The *Bund Deutscher Jugend* (BDJ) scandal in 1952, however, greatly dampened the Agency's planning for sabotage, resistance, and paramilitary operations in West Germany.

Even prior to the BDJ flap, the CIA wanted the Gehlen Organization to handle political and psychological warfare (better known as covert action). While the Organization established its own program, known as ORION, the West German political structure did not take up covert action until after the establishment of the BND.

During the 1950s, the CIA grew increasingly interested in the Organization's expansion into new spheres, including the Middle East and political reporting in West Germany itself. In particular, the Gehlen Organization's Special Connections (*Sonderverbindungen*) took up a great deal of the Agency's attention. The Organization essentially sought out Germans who could influence the new West German government as to the direction it took regarding a national intelligence service. Gehlen's Special Connections included men active in various levels of German society, including political, economic, and military. As early as 1947, Gehlen established a small staff under Horst von Mellenthin, a former Wehrmacht general, to cultivate these friendly contacts. The Organization also gained many friends because it supported former officers of the German General Staff who were unemployed in the years after the war.

The Special Connections mission is one of the most interesting aspects of the Gehlen Organization's history because of its impact on the development of the West German government, including its future military and intelligence structures. Before 1950, however, the Agency did not focus on the Special Connections until Critchfield learned that Gehlen was actively courting Konrad Adenauer, the new West German chancellor. Critchfield recognized that the Organization's political activities could complicate its standing vis-à-vis the new West German government, the other Western Allies, and even the CIA's position within the American structure in Germany. Critchfield, in turn, tasked a newly assigned CIA officer in Pullach to examine the Special Connections effort. This collaborative project provided the Agency with a fascinating look at the influential men in West Germany in the early 1950s. By 1954, the Organization's use of the Special Connections had gradually diminished and, consequently, Pullach Operations Base also reduced its coverage.

Counterintelligence

Even prior to the Agency's assumption of the Gehlen Organization from the Army in 1949, CIA officers expressed considerable concern about the counterintelligence vulnerabilities of the German service. In fact, many American intelligence officers opposed the CIA's takeover because the Gehlen Organization exercised poor operational tradecraft and had been badly exposed between 1946 and 1948. Their concerns remained valid during the years that the CIA was responsible for the Gehlen Organization. The Agency devoted a considerable amount of time and effort to collect counterintelligence

information on the personnel and activities of the Gehlen Organization. And, at the same time, the CIA remained concerned that the Soviets had penetrated the Organization.

Following the uprisings in East Germany in the summer of 1953, the Soviets and East Germans made a concerted effort to destroy the Gehlen Organization. In late November 1953, the Communists announced that they had rolled up networks of West German agents in the East. Three cases, Wolfgang Hoeher, Hans Joachim Geyer, and Werner Haase, led to the exposure of hundreds of other assets behind the Iron Curtain. By the end of 1954, over 200 Organization agents had fled to West Germany to avoid arrest. The 1953 cases were in addition to several other CI cases that plagued the Gehlen Organization during these early years. The arrests of Heinz Felfe and Hans Clemens, two BND officers, in 1961 unraveled one of major Soviet penetrations of the Cold War and forced a major shakeup in the German service.

Almost from the beginning, the Communists labeled the Gehlen Organization as a tool of the Americans and as a shelter for Nazis. The latter charge, in fact, became an integral part in the Soviet and East German efforts to undermine the German service and, in fact, brand the entire Federal Republic as a fascist criminal legacy of the Third Reich.[4] The Soviets exploited the Gehlen Organization's employment of former SS officers, especially those who worked in the outlying General Agencies (in particular, GV L, the Organization's counterintelligence element in Karlsruhe). In the aftermath of the Felfe/ Clemens scandals, it is believed that over 200 BND officers resigned or were dismissed in the 1960s because they had concealed their wartime pasts.

Pullach Operations Base played no role in the vetting of the Organization's staff members or agents because Gehlen refused to reveal the true names of his staff personnel and those of his agents. The Agency simply knew the cover names used by the Organization's officers and the V-numbers for the agents. Using a variety of collection techniques, POB and Headquarters slowly assembled tidbits of information about the Organization's members, but it was not a complete record. CIA efforts to introduce polygraph testing in the Organization proved futile; consequently, the Agency was never satisfied with the security of the Organization's recruitment procedures and modus operandi.

While Critchfield adamantly opposed the meddling by Organization members in debating the war crimes trials in Germany, it became more difficult for the Agency to involve itself in internal personnel matters as the Organization moved closer to joining the West German government. And, in retrospect, the Gehlen Organization was not the only West German agency to hire former NSDAP members or war criminals. The historical amnesia that settled over the Federal Republic in the 1950s had long-ranging impact on all levels of German society.[5]

[4] For example, see National Council of the National Front of Democratic Germany, Documentation Centre of the State Archives Administration of the German Democratic Republic, *Brown Book: War and Nazi Criminals in West Germany: State, Economy, Administration, Army, Justice, Science* (Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1965)
[5] The ongoing debate over the role of Nazis in German society can be seen in Carsten Fiedler, "Red-Green Government Arguing Over Appraising Nazi Past of Federal Ministries," Berlin *Die Welt*, 17 May 2005, p. 2.

From the Gehlen Organization to the BND

The Gehlen Organization's transformation into the Federal Intelligence Service is as much of an account of Gehlen's interaction with the key figures in West Germany, as it is the story of his relationship with the Americans. As the Cold War expanded, the Western Allies sought to unify the occupation zones to face the Soviet threat. With the outbreak of the Korean War, the defense of Germany became a leading military and political issue. This ultimately involved the "remilitarization" of West Germany, its integration into NATO, and the end of the West's occupation stature.

While the U.S. government moved forward on these broader fronts, Reinhard Gehlen expanded his contacts with the new West German government in Bonn, with the state level governments (especially in Bavaria), and with the major West German political parties. Just after the CIA had assumed responsibility for the Organization in 1949, Critchfield saw Gehlen moving in new directions without American knowledge or concurrence. For the next seven years, Gehlen's political activities would create considerable consternation among CIA officials.

As the new West German government took shape, the question soon arose as to its own internal security. In March 1950, Gehlen's name was raised as a possible candidate for the position of chief of West Germany's new internal service, *Verfassungschutz* (it soon became the *Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz*, BfV, or Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution). Opposition at several levels, including among the other Allied powers and in West Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD), ruled out this proposal. While the Agency did not promote Gehlen's nomination, Critchfield tried to persuade him to refrain from meddling in political matters after he was turned down for the VS position.

With the appointment of Hans Globke as advisor to Chancellor Adenauer in 1950, Gehlen's fortunes in Bonn took a new dimension. In May 1950, the United States High Commissioner to Germany briefed the West German leader on the U.S. sponsorship of the Gehlen Organization. In late June, Gehlen (with the Agency's approval) met with Globke to discuss the Organization; Globke noted that Adenauer supported the German intelligence service. To facilitate communications between Pullach and Bonn, Globke acted as Adenauer's intermediary. Later in September, Gehlen had his first meetings with the West German chancellor, and then met with SPD chairman Kurt Schumacher to discuss the Organization. These meetings went a long way to establishing political goodwill for the Gehlen Organization as the future West German intelligence service.

Gehlen's goal of making the Organization the dominant foreign intelligence service in West Germany was not without critics. As early as 1950, Gehlen was concerned about various rivals that threatened the Organization. He suspected many of these men, including several West German politicians, of harboring Communist tendencies. Gehlen grappled with several individuals in particular, including Adenauer's first unofficial military advisor, Count Gerhard von Schwerin; Schwerin's intelligence advisor and later chief of intelligence in the embryonic West German ministry of defense, Friedrich

Wilhelm Heinz; and Otto John, the BfV's first president. Gehlen's rivalry with Theodor Blank, Adenauer's Coordinator for the Billeting of Occupation Troops, lasted for years and involved several other individuals prominent in the West German government, such as Globke, Gehlen's supporter in the Chancellery, and Globke's nominal supervisor, Otto Lenz, who backed Blank.

As Gehlen gained support in Bonn, the Agency recognized that it needed to revise its position on the Organization. Critchfield pushed Gehlen to institute reforms within the Organization to make it more efficient and better able to handle the increased demands for intelligence collection on the Soviets. The Agency, in particular, decided to promote the Gehlen Organization as the nascent national intelligence service pending its acceptance by the West German government. The American decision, however, was challenged by Gehlen's independent actions, which frustrated CIA officials in Germany and in Washington. At various points in 1950-51 and again in 1953, CIA officers discussed removing Gehlen as the head of the Organization. While Critchfield, Gordon Stewart, and Richard Helms, in particular, debated Gehlen's personal future as German intelligence chief, they ultimately decided to work with him to overcome their disagreements.

The legalization of the Gehlen Organization as the national intelligence service eventually hinged on West Germany's military status. Between 1952 and 1955, Chancellor Adenauer waited for the right time to move forward with planning for the Organization. Hans Globke, Adenauer's primary advisor, remained a steadfast supporter of the Organization, which helped to defeat efforts to undermine the Organization. Gehlen, meanwhile, developed friends on both sides of the Atlantic. In the fall of 1952, Gehlen's deputy, Horst von Mellenthin, was the first Organization official to visit Washington to meet with Walter Bedell Smith, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

The following year, however, Theodor Blank and Adolf Heusinger, a former German general, former senior Organization official, and now an advisor to the "Amt Blank," also visited Washington. In meetings with DCI Allen Dulles and other CIA officials, the two men warned that Gehlen had obstructed intelligence support to West Germany's nascent ministry of defense. In addition, Blank informed the Americans that the Organization was still meddling in political affairs. In the summer of 1953, shortly after the Soviets had crushed the East German uprisings, the Agency and Gehlen again faced yet another crisis in their relationship.

Yet, almost as soon as matters were coming to a head between the CIA and Gehlen, the situation took several twists. Following the West German elections in the fall of 1953, Blank dismissed Heinz and relations between Blank and Gehlen gradually improved. In December 1953, Gehlen made his first appearance before a special committee of the Bundestag and successfully defended the Organization in the face of the East German security scandals. Gehlen's relations in Bonn and with the CIA remained steady throughout 1954 and into 1955. In May 1955, West Germany became a sovereign nation and joined NATO. On 12 July 1955, the West German cabinet approved the formation of the BND subordinate to the Chancellor. Owing to continued

political opposition and for budgetary reasons, the new Federal Intelligence Service was not established until February 1956.

The Legacy

The legalization of the Gehlen Organization as the new BND on 1 February 1956 brought to a close the CIA's unique relationship with the German service. Because of the lengthy period preceding the BND's actual establishment in 1956, the Agency moved its liaison section from Pullach to Munich prior to the BND's establishment. In addition to its regular infusion of funds to support the Organization's activities, the Agency transferred large quantities of vehicles, office equipment, and buildings to the BND. By early 1956, the Agency had worked out the details with the BND on the conduct of future relations.

More than the mechanics of the turnover, the Agency developed solid ties with the Germans between 1949 and 1956. There were moments of deep frustration on both sides, yet both sides achieved their objectives: the establishment of a national intelligence service in a democratic West Germany. The BND's formation remains one of the unheralded hallmarks in the history of the Cold War.

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Notes on Sources

This volume of historical documents pertaining to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Gehlen Organization from 1949 to 1956 is drawn from original records in the possession of the Central Intelligence Agency. The documents include cables and dispatches to and from CIA officials in Germany and Headquarters discussing the Gehlen Organization and its eventual transfer to the Federal Republic.

The documents have been organized into three sections. Part I provides a general overview of what the CIA knew about the Gehlen Organization in the 1950s, including operations, personnel, organization, and history. Part II deals with the CIA base at Pullach that supported the Gehlen Organization during this seven-year period. In addition, Part II examines the lengthy transformation of the Gehlen Organization into the West German BND. Part III, the book's final section, looks at some of the operations conducted by the Gehlen Organization and the counterintelligence problems that the nascent West German intelligence service encountered at the hands of the Soviets and East Germans.

Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56 is an overview of the CIA's "trusteeship" of the Gehlen Organization. Given the sheer number of CIA records from this period, the book contains selected material to describe the Agency's interaction with the Germans. With the passage of the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act in 1998, the CIA and other agencies and departments in the U.S. Government have declassified and transferred thousands of pages of documents to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Many of these records contain information pertaining to the Gehlen Organization and its members.

Some of the documents in the book have been "sanitized," or had some words or passages removed to protect intelligence sources and methods. Likewise, the quality of the documents reproduced in this book varies greatly. Some documents are copied from typed or printed originals, but others are faint carbon copies or reproduced from microfiche. Thus, we may have a poor copy to work from and its reproduction for this volume further reduces its legibility. Over the years, classification stamps and other extraneous markings have also marred the records. Some of these markings have also been redacted.

All of the documents, with the exception of a few newspaper or magazine articles, have been classified as "Secret/Release to Germany Only." Consequently, this volume and the individual documents are still classified. The Central Intelligence Agency retains ownership of the original material. The Agency must review and approve any further dissemination of this volume to other countries or intelligence services as well as its release to the general public.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

Abwehr	German military intelligence service in World War II
ADSO	Assistant Director for Special Operations (CIG and CIA)
AIS	American Intelligence Service
CI	Counter Intelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (1947-)
CIC	Counter Intelligence Corps (U.S. Army)
CIG	Central Intelligence Group (1946-47)
CIS	Communications Intelligence Service (U.S. Army)
COPS	Chief of Operations (CIG and CIA)
DAD	Department of the Army Detachment (CIA)
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence (CIG and CIA)
DDCI	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (CIG and CIA)
DD/P	Deputy Directorate for Plans (CIA 1952-)
DoD	Department of Defense
EE	Eastern European Division (CIA)
EE/FIG	Eastern European Division, Germany (Foreign Intelligence) (CIA)
EE/FIZ	Eastern European Division, ZIPPER Desk (Foreign Intelligence) (CIA)
EUCOM	European Command
FBM	Foreign Branch M or Central European Branch (CIG and CIA)
FDM	Foreign Division M or Central European Division (CIA)
FHO	German Fremde Heer Ost, or Foreign Armies East
FI	Foreign Intelligence
G-2	Intelligence section
GIS	German Intelligence Service

HICOG	Office of the US High Commission for Germany
ICCG	Intelligence Coordinating Committee Germany
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
KOB	Karlsruhe Operations Base (CIA)
KUBARK	CIA
MIS	Military Intelligence Service (U.S. Army)
MISC	Military Intelligence Service Center (U.S. Army)
MOB	Munich Operations Base (CIA)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIA	National Intelligence Authority (interdepartmental)
NSC	National Security Council
OAD	Operational Aids Division (CIA)
ODEUM	CIA term for the Gehlen Organization (1950-51)
OFFSPRING	CIA term for the Gehlen Organization (1949-50)
OMGUS	Office of the Military Government for Germany (U.S.)
OPC	Office of Policy Coordination (CIA)
OSI	Office of Scientific Intelligence (CIA)
OSO	Office of Special Operations (CIG and CIA)
OSS	Office of Strategic Services (1942-45)
PM	Paramilitary
POB	Pullach Operations Base (CIA)
PP	Political and Psychological
REG	Returnee Exploitation Group (CIA)
RSHA	Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Main Security Office)
RSHA VI	Department VI (foreign intelligence) of the RSHA

RUSTY	U.S. Army term for the Gehlen Organization (1946-49)
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe
SRFRAN	Senior Representative, Frankfurt (CIA)
SSU	Strategic Services Unit, War Department (1945-47)
TSS	Technical Services Staff (CIA)
UPGROWTH	CIA term for the West German government
UPSWING	CIA term for the BND
USFET	United States Forces in the European Theater
UTILITY	CIA term for Reinhard Gehlen
ZIPPER	CIA term for the Gehlen Organization (1951-56)

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