



Reg. No [REDACTED]

OPERATIONS DIVISION
Joint Operations Unit
Air Border Sector

Annexes of the Operational Plan

Joint Operation Alexis 2014
2014/ABS/06



European Agency for the Management
of Operational Cooperation
at the External Borders of the Member States
of the European Union

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ANNEX 1 - DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

1.1. Introduction

Joint Operation Alexis 2014 has been conceived to support EU and Schengen Associated Country airports in respect of their own perceived vulnerabilities/needs concerning operational activities.

The process by which airports have identified these and the methodology for the selection of common vulnerabilities needs to which Frontex provides the requisite operational support is described in detail in the Operational Plan.

Airports in conjunction with Frontex decided to select the following as their vulnerabilities /needs where a joint activity could be launched in participating airports with the provision of appropriate human assets:-

- Undocumented passengers
- Transit without Visa Abuse
- No shows at departure gates
- Documents Swapping in Schengen and non Schengen airports
- Interception and interviewing of inadequately documented passengers on being removed or refused entry by a non EU country

This briefing document has been created in order to provide an overview of the risks and threats presented at the external air borders of the EU in respect of the above identified vulnerabilities/needs.

The document will assess the general threat and risks as well as the more specific ones associated with the airports which have agreed to participate or are considering their participation in the operation at the time of the drafting of this document.

1.2. Airports in the operational area

The following are the airports that have agreed or are considering taking part in the operation at the time that this document was created:

- Amsterdam (AMS)
- Athens (ATH)
- Barcelona (BCN)
- Bergamo (BGY)
- Bratislava (BTS)
- Brussels (BRU)
- Bucharest (OTP)
- Budapest (BUD)
- Geneva (GVA)
- Lisbon (LIS)
- Luxembourg (LUX)
- Lyon (LYS)
- Madrid (MAD)
- Milan (MXP)
- Paris - Charles De Gaulle (CDG)

- Paris - Orly (ORY)
- Prague (PRG)
- Riga (RIX)
- Rome (FCO)
- Sofia (SOF)
- Timisoara (TSR)
- Vienna (VIE)
- Vilnius (VNO)
- Warsaw (WAW)

1.3. Data sources and measurable indicators

The following indicators can be measured by reference to Pulsar Data for all the above airports except Lyon and Timisoara which do not report in Pulsar:

- **Undocumented migrants/ Failure to detect airport of embarkation**

All Pulsar Data is taken for the whole period 01.01.2014 to 06.04.2014

The following data cannot be measured from Pulsar Data and can only be obtained by reference to operational information reported in JORA and only when an airport is taking part in an operation:

- **Transit without Visa Abuse**
- **Documents Swapping**

The source of information in relation to the above two indicators is therefore JORA.

- **No shows at departure gates**

Is not measured in the collection process, but is effectively a consequence of documents swapping and transit without visa abuse.

1.4. General overview of the external EU air border in respect to identified vulnerabilities/needs

- **Undocumented Passengers**

Migrants seek to arrive at airports undocumented in order to disguise their own nationality and routing, thereby making the ability of the border authorities and immigration services harder in seeking to identify the origin of the migrant and to seek their later repatriation when or if required.

In general the number of undocumented arrivals recorded at airports is generally low across Schengen airports with about 20 recorded a week. This is probably due to the fact that border authorities are generally good at identifying local high risk flights and using manifest profiling and surveillance activities to be able to identify passengers and the flights on which they have arrived.

- **Failure to detect airport of embarkation**

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Commented [A1]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

- **Transit without Visa Abuse (TWOV)**

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- **Document Swapping**

Involves a migrant arriving with one set of travel or identity documentation and then using another set of documentation to seek entry to the Schengen area, or instead to enter into the transit area to

use documentation that allows them to appear to be eligible for entry to another country and therefore to board a flight to that country.

Document swapping can also relate to migrants choosing to switch documentation at airports outside of the EU whilst in transit.

As mentioned, Frontex does not habitually gather statistical information from airports in respect of the phenomena essentially because it is hard to prove and is usually only apparent after debriefing of the migrant, enquiries made with Check In staff and also possible examination of visual surveillance recording in the transit area.

A result of the fact that data is not habitually obtained means that it is not possible to clearly identify the extent or level of the threat posed by the phenomenon. In general most cases where a forged or counterfeit passport is used or documents abuse takes place may be an indicator that document swapping has taken place.

Where incidents have been detected, information suggests that large hub airports outside of the EU have been associated with migrants being provided with alternative documentation whilst in transit to board flights to the Schengen area. This

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▪ **Tour groups**

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▪ **Interception and interviewing of inadequately documented passengers on being removed or refused entry by a non EU country**

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1.5. Airports

▪ **Amsterdam (AMS)**

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▪ Athens (ATH)

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▪ Barcelona (BCN)

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▪ Bergamo (BGY)

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▪ Bratislava (BTS)

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▪ **Brussels (BRU)**

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▪ **Bucharest (OTP)**

[Redacted]

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▪ **Budapest (BUD)**

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▪ **Geneva (GVA)**

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▪ **Lisbon (LIS)**

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▪ Luxembourg (LUX)

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▪ Lyon (LYS)

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▪ Madrid (MAD)

[Redacted text]

▪ Milan (MXP)

[Redacted text]

▪ Paris - (CDG) Charles De Gaulle

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▪ Paris - Orly (ORY)

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▪ Prague (PRG)

[Redacted text]

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[Redacted]

▪ Riga (RIX)

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▪ Rome (FCO)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

▪ Sofia (SOF)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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▪ Timisoara (TSR)

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▪ Vilnius (VNO)

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
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ANNEX 2 - OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND INDICATORS

Under the umbrella of the Frontex Programme of Work 2014 this activity is going to contribute to the following corporate goals and prioritized key objectives, as set in the Frontex' Strategy and Multi Annual Programme 2014 - 2017 as well as in concrete in Programme of Work 2014:

- Goal 2: Supporting response, Key Objective nr. 1: *Coordinate activities sustaining an operational presence in areas at the external borders exposed to specific and disproportionate pressure as well as facing significant uncertainties; including the implementation of procedures for operational response based on the impact levels on EUROSUR;*
- Goal 3: Emergency response, Key Objective nr. 1: *Develop operational contingency modules to shorten the response time in case of emergency situations;*

The objectives of the activity are, as follows:

1. Enhance exchange of knowledge among officers (Frontex and MS & SAC)
2. Enhance border security (Frontex and MS & SAC)
3. Enhance efficiency of border security (Frontex and MS & SAC)
4. Enhance operational cooperation (Frontex and MS, SAC & Third Countries)

This activity is expected to deliver the following main benefits:

- Tailored operational support and capacity building strengthening MS/SAC operational capabilities at perceived vulnerabilities/needs
- Effective and efficient operational response at perceived vulnerabilities corresponding to European Situational Awareness indications (existing threats) enhancing security of external air borders
- Increased response capacity to emergency situations

The objectives are meant to be achieved by the following activities:

Goals/Key objectives	Objectives of the activity	Activity	Indicators of achievement
Supporting Response Key Objective nr. 1	1,2,4	Deployment of officers with specific profile ¹	Number of man-days deployed during the operation
		Deployment of SGOs	Number of man-days deployed during the operation
		Deployment of TC observers	Number of man-days deployed during the operation
	2	Supporting targeted response focusing on perceived vulnerabilities/needs	Number of reinforcing actions (e.g. gate check, doc checks with Ref Man experts or any other action what the particular vulnerability requires)
3	Implement coordinated operational actions according to the operational plan	Number of airports participating	

¹ Corresponding to the tackled vulnerabilities and in line with the MB decision nr. 11/2012.

Emergency Response Key Objective nr. 1	4	Further develop quick response elements	Number of new quick response elements learned with the use of SGO mechanism
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ANNEX 3 - STANDARD OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES (SOP) ON THE BASIS OF VEGA HANDBOOK

The aim of JO Alexis I 2014 is to enhance capabilities of EU airport border guards to detect and react on abuses made by irregular passengers and facilitators within the transit areas of Schengen and non-Schengen airports (Third Country airports inclusive) by applying Alexis I Standard Operational Procedures according to the needs.

1.1. Transit area abuses at Schengen and non-Schengen airports

▪ Undocumented passengers

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Commented [A29]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding document abuse at Schengen and the non-Schengen airports with detailed data on modus operandi of criminal networks. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

▪ Transit

[Redacted text block]

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▪ No Shows

[Redacted text block]

Commented [A31]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding document abuse at Schengen and non-Schengen airports and non-Schengen airports with detailed data on the modus operandi of criminal networks. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

▪ Swapping

[Redacted text block]

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[Redacted text block]

▪ Interview [Redacted text block]

1.2. Basic Indicators

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Commented [A34]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding criteria to identify migrants' facilitators and traffickers of human beings. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

[Redacted text block]

Alexis I Standard Operational Procedures (SOP)

Whatever type of border control is carried out, it should be done fully respecting human dignity.

Based on the VEGA handbook (uploaded in FOSS) the following recommended operational procedures and countermeasures enhance capabilities to detect the above listed transit area abuses in the short term period.

2.1. Pre-arrival checks

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www.checkmytrip.com

[Redacted text block]

Commented [A35]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border control at the air borders. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

² **Legal Basis:** Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data. At this stage, it should be highlighted that since the Council Directive required Member States to enact legislation in order to adopt and bring this Directive into force, its implementation may vary from Member State to Member State.

[Redacted text block]

Commented [A36]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border control at the air borders. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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[Redacted text block]

Equipment

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on

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- [Redacted list item]

and

[Redacted text block]

[Redacted text block]

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[Redacted] out [Redacted]

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Commented [A41]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border control at the air borders. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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Commented [A43]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border control at the air borders. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Cooperation [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Commented [A44]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border control at the air borders. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

[Redacted]

Cooperation [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Referral of vulnerable groups and people in need of international protection

GOs and SGOs should refer persons in need of international protection to the respective authorities mandate to deal with asylum procedures in each airport. They should also familiarize themselves with the procedures in place to refer vulnerable persons to the adequate authorities in charge of providing protection and assistance to unaccompanied minors, victims of trafficking or other forms of serious violence, pregnant women, etc.

Commented [A45]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border control at the air borders. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

³ A person who is refused entry in to, or transit through the Territory of a State by the authorities of that Stat.

⁴ Airline Liaison Officers

ANNEX 4 - OPERATIONAL BRIEFING

During the first days of deployment all participants from MS and observers from Third Countries will receive the Operational Briefing delivered by Frontex and national authorities of the host MS.

General briefing delivered by Frontex

The General briefing is a part of Operational briefing carried out by Frontex.

All participants of the joint operation will be briefed by an Air Border Sector team member at the beginning of their deployment. In exceptional cases, if respective participants are not available for the centralized Operational briefing, the briefing will be delivered on the spot.

National briefing delivered by host MS and host TC

The National briefing is a part of Operational briefing carried out by national authorities of host Member State and Third Country (airport representatives) based on the deployment overviews provided by Joint Operations Unit (JOU).

The National briefers (airport representatives) are responsible for carrying out National briefings, based on the Common Briefing Pack, for all participants deployed within JO. The content and the structure of the Common Briefing Pack are provided by Frontex Training Unit. The National briefers should deliver the National briefing at their airport to the guest officers, seconded guest officers and observers from Third Countries during the first day of the deployment

National briefer shall:

- Deliver briefings as requested by the deployment overviews
- Report to the project manager (Frontex Training Unit) any irregularities regarding briefings carried out;
- Support the development process of training courses, tools and materials, including the implementation process of such activities;
- Prepare Report of National Briefer after each activity and submit it to the project manager (Frontex Training Unit);
- Assist in preparing assessments and evaluations of the operational activities.

Standard plan for operational briefing and debriefing is available in Handbook.

ANNEX 5 - COMMAND AND CONTROL SCHEME

Operational Management and Operational team

Operational Manager (OM): [REDACTED] (Air Border Sector)

Operational Team (OT): [REDACTED]

Frontex Coordinating Officer (FCO): [REDACTED]

Operational Analyst (OA): [REDACTED]

Pooled Resources: OPERA team

Frontex Situation Centre (FSC)

- Senior Duty Officer (SDO)
- Frontex Support Officer (FSO FSC)
- FOSS Service Managers
- JORA Service Managers

Commented [A46]: The blanked out part contains personal data. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission Documents.

ANNEX 6 - JORA

1. JORA Actors

Role	Name	FX/MS	Entity	E-mail	Phone
JORA Administrator / Service Management	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Frontex Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Delegated Frontex Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Template Creator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A47]: The blanked out parts contain the names and contact details of actors participating in Frontex activities. The disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the privacy and the integrity of the individuals, in particular in accordance with EU laws regarding the protection of personal data. In this regard those parts are not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.

The blanked out parts contain detailed information related to means of communication used by law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would lead to possible abusive usage and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

	[REDACTED]			[REDACTED]	
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager		[REDACTED]			
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

NOTE: Detailed roles and responsibilities of the different actors are described in the JORA Policy and Process business documentation

2. JORA Incidents Reporting Structure

AUSTRIA	[REDACTED]
BELGIUM	[REDACTED]
BULGARIA	[REDACTED]
CZECH REPUBLIC	[REDACTED]
FRANCE	[REDACTED]

Commented [A48]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the reporting mechanisms of law enforcement officials. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials engaged in the operation and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

GREECE	[REDACTED]
HUNGARY	[REDACTED]
ITALY	[REDACTED]
LATVIA	[REDACTED]
LITHUANIA	[REDACTED]
LUXEMBURG	[REDACTED]
The NETHERLANDS	[REDACTED]
POLAND	[REDACTED]
PORTUGAL	[REDACTED]
ROMANIA	[REDACTED]
SLOVAKIA	[REDACTED]
SPAIN	[REDACTED]
SWITZERLAND	[REDACTED]

3. JORA INCIDENT TEMPLATE ATTRIBUTES' LIST

JORA Attribute	Required	Description
[Incident Number]	(*)	Data set by the JORA
[Reporting Unit]	(*)	Information set by the JORA
[Date of Reporting]	(*)	Date set by the JORA
[Date of Activity]	YES (*)	Corresponds to the date of the actual activity performed
[Guest Officer Involved]		To be selected when a GO/SGO/TC Officer/Observer was deployed
[Comments]		Free text for comments
[Modus Operandi]	YES (*)	Free text (mandatory) for Modus Operandi and operational data
[Activity Performed Information]	YES (*)	Collection of attributes for all the <u>8</u> reporting points
[Attachments]		To upload documents, pictures and other files (TAB)

ANNEX 7 - CONTACT DETAILS - FRONTEX

1. General

Authority	Address	Email address
Frontex (HQ)	Rondo ONZ 1, 00-124 Warsaw, Poland	frontex@frontex.europa.eu
Frontex Situation Centre	Rondo ONZ 1, 00-124 Warsaw, Poland	[REDACTED]
Alexis Operational Team	Rondo ONZ 1, 00-124 Warsaw, Poland	[REDACTED]
OPERA team	Rondo ONZ 1, 00-124 Warsaw, Poland	[REDACTED]
JORA team	Rondo ONZ 1, 00-124 Warsaw, Poland	[REDACTED]
FOSS team	Rondo ONZ 1, 00-124 Warsaw, Poland	[REDACTED]

Commented [A49]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information related to means of communication used by law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would lead to possible abusive usage and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

2. Frontex

Role	Name	Phone number	Email address
Operational Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Frontex Coordinating Officer	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Operational Analyst	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Spokesperson	Izabella Cooper	+48 667667292	izabella.cooper@frontex.europa.eu
Press Officer	Ewa Moncure	+48 785001374	ewa.moncure@frontex.europa.eu

Commented [A50]: The blanked out parts contain the names and contact details of actors participating in Frontex activities. The disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the privacy and the integrity of the individuals, in particular in accordance with EU laws regarding the protection of personal data. In this regard those parts are not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.

REMARK:

Any changes related to the contact details of the participants in the course of the joint operation do not require the amendment of the Operational Plan. The updated contact details will be available and shared with the participants during implementation phase on a need to know basis.