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OPERATIONS DIVISION
Joint Operations Unit
LAND BORDERS SECTOR

Handbook to the Operational Plan

Joint Land Borders Operations

Approved by

.....
Signature

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Legal framework of Frontex

Frontex is an essential instrument of the European Union (EU) in the gradual establishment of the Integrated Border Management (IBM) system. It has been established with an aim to improve the IBM system and it facilitates and renders more effective the application of existing and future EU measures relating to it. However, the responsibility for the control and surveillance of external borders lies entirely with the EU Member States (MSs)¹.

Frontex was established by the Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004² on the basis of the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) establishing an area of freedom, security and justice³. In this area the free movement of persons is ensured by abolishing border control at internal borders between the EU MSs. The abolishment of internal border control requires high and uniform levels of control at the EU external borders. Frontex was thus established to improve and facilitate that task. The legal basis, objectives, tasks and responsibilities of Frontex are formulated in the Frontex Regulation and in its operational coordinated activities Frontex is subject to EU law.

1.2. Fundamental Rights in Frontex activities

1.2.1. Obligations of Frontex

Frontex is obliged to fulfil its tasks in full compliance with the relevant EU law, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the relevant international law, including the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees from 1951, the respect for fundamental rights, in particular the access to international protection, and the compliance with the principle of non-refoulement, and taking into account the reports of the Consultative Forum.

The Frontex Regulation requires Frontex to put in place an effective mechanism to monitor the respect for fundamental rights in all its activities. One of the steps to fulfil this task was to develop a Frontex Code of Conduct applicable to all persons participating in Frontex activities. The Frontex Code of Conduct (inserted under chapter 2 of this Handbook) lays down procedures intended to guarantee the principles of the rule of law and the respect for and promotion of fundamental rights with particular focus on unaccompanied minors and other vulnerable persons, as well as on persons seeking international protection, including the obligation of referral to national authorities competent for receiving asylum requests. Pursuant to the provisions of the Frontex Regulation, a Fundamental Rights Officer is appointed to assist the mechanism of monitoring the fundamental rights issues in the Frontex activities.

As regards training activities, Frontex is obliged to take the necessary initiatives to ensure that all border guards and other personnel of the MSs who participate in the European Border Guard Teams, as well as Frontex staff members, have received, prior to their participation in operational activities, a training in relevant EU and international law, including fundamental rights and access to international protection and guidelines for the purpose of identifying persons in need of protection and directing them towards the appropriate authorities and facilities.

Furthermore and pursuant to the provisions of the Frontex Regulation, Frontex has the obligation to suspend or terminate its operational activity in case of serious or persistent violations of fundamental rights or international protection obligations

¹ For the purposes of the present document, the term "Member State" includes also the States participating in the relevant development of the Schengen acquis in the meaning of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Its Protocol (No 19) on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union.

² Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004, published in OJ L 349, 25.11.2004, as last amended by Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011 of 25 October 2011 (published in OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, p. 1).

³ Articles 74 and 77 (2) (b) and (d) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

1.2.2. Obligations of all persons involved in Frontex activities

All persons involved in Frontex activities are obliged to maintain the highest standards of integrity, ethical conduct, professionalism and respect for fundamental rights. They are expected to meet obligations imposed upon them by the provisions stated in the present Operational Plan and are obliged to comply with the rules of their mandates. While taking part in activities coordinated by Frontex they are obliged to comply with European law, international law, fundamental rights and national law of the host MS. Furthermore, the home Member State of each border guard shall provide for appropriate disciplinary or other measures in accordance with its national law in case of violations of fundamental rights or international protection obligations in the course of an operational activity.

All persons involved in Frontex activities are to act responsibly and proportionately to the current operational objectives. While performing their duties they shall not discriminate against persons on grounds of sex, race or ethnic origin, religion, belief, age or sexual orientation. They are expected to treat every person with courtesy, respect and due consideration for the nature of any legitimate activity in which they are engaged. They are obliged to report all observations regarding violations of fundamental rights via the appropriate reporting channel. They shall, previously to their engagement in the JO, receive appropriate training (including on fundamental rights) provided by national authorities responsible for their deployment or by Frontex.

1.3. Operational Plan

The Operational Plan has to be agreed with the authorities of the host MS, in consultation with the authorities of the home MSs participating in the joint operation coordinated by Frontex. It covers all necessary elements for a proper and timely organization of the joint operation coordinated by Frontex.

The Operational Plan is composed of the Main part, Annexes and Handbook to the Operational Plan. The Main part, its Annexes and the Handbook are an integral part of the Operational Plan, having the same importance and legal binding character.

The Main part and Annexes of the Operational Plan contain detailed and specific information related to the particular joint operation, while Handbook to the Operational Plan encloses operational information applicable to all joint land borders operations. Annexes and Handbook complement the Main part of the Operational Plan by providing complete and comprehensive description of the implementation of the joint operation.

The Main part and Annexes of Operational Plan are marked as [REDACTED] without prejudice to the public right of access to documents as laid down in Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001, regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, while the Handbook to the Operational Plan has no classification mark indicated.

Operational Plan shall [REDACTED]

This Operational Plan may be revised at any time in order to correspond with the new operational developments. In accordance with Article 3a (2) of Frontex Regulation, any amendments to or adaptations of the Operational Plan require the agreement of the Frontex Executive Director and the host MS. A copy of the amended Operational Plan shall be immediately distributed by Frontex to the participating MS via FOSS.

2. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR ALL PERSONS PARTICIPATING IN FRONTEx ACTIVITIES

CHAPTER I GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1

Objectives, scope and subject matter

1. The present Code of Conduct aims to promote professional values based on the principles of the rule of law and the respect of fundamental rights and to establish the ethical behaviour standards that guide all persons participating in Frontex activities.
2. In this regard it sets out principles and rules which guide the conduct of all persons participating in Frontex activities, namely, Frontex staff, officers of border guard services of a Member State and other staff performing any actions in a Frontex activity.

Article 2

Definitions

For the purpose of the present Code, the following definitions apply:

- a) The term "participant" refers to any person participating in a Frontex activity.
- b) The term "Frontex activity" means any activity coordinated or led by Frontex within the framework of its tasks as described in the Frontex Regulation, including Joint Operations, Pilot Projects, Joint Return Operations, and Trainings.
- c) The term "Frontex staff" refers to the staff to whom Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants apply and includes also seconded national experts.
- d) The term "law enforcement officers" includes border guards and/or other public officials deployed from a Member State, who enjoy the prerogatives of public authority.
- e) The term "Member State" also includes the Schengen Associated Countries. As regards Joint Return Operations, the terms "home and host MSs" are understood as referring to "participating and organising MSs" respectively.
- f) The term "discrimination" means any unfair treatment or arbitrary action or distinction based on a person's sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation.
- g) The term "harassment" means any improper and unwelcome conduct that might reasonably be expected or be perceived to cause offence or humiliation to another person. Harassment may take the form of words, gestures or actions which annoy, alarm, abuse, demean, intimidate, belittle, humiliate or embarrass another or which create an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment.

CHAPTER II PRINCIPLES

Article 3

Lawfulness

1. Participants in Frontex activities serve the public interest and shall comply with international law, European Union law, the national law of both home and host MSs and the present Code of Conduct.
2. They shall also meet the obligations imposed upon them by the provisions stated in the Operational/Implementation Plan, or other similar agreed rules.

Article 4

Fundamental rights

Participants in Frontex activities shall:

- a) promote and respect human dignity and the fundamental rights of every individual, regardless of their sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation;
- b) promote compliance with the relevant international and European instruments regarding fundamental rights protection.

Article 5

International protection

Participants in Frontex activities shall:

- a) promote, in full compliance with the principle of non refoulment, that persons seeking international protection are recognised, receive adequate assistance, are informed, in an appropriate way, about their rights and relevant procedures and are referred to national authorities responsible for receiving their asylum requests;
- b) provide persons in their custody with proper access to health care;
- c) give special consideration to particularly vulnerable groups of people, including women, unaccompanied minors, disabled people, persons susceptible to exploitation and victims of exploitation or trafficking in human beings.

Article 6

Performance of duties

Participants in Frontex activities shall ensure that instructions, directives and required duties are carried out promptly and diligently.

Article 7

Responsibility

Participants in Frontex activities are primarily and individually responsible for their actions in their work.

Article 8

Conflict of interests

To perform their duties properly, participants in Frontex activities shall refrain from any activities which would undermine or compromise their independence and the appropriate performance of their duties.

Article 9

Confidentiality

1. Confidential or sensitive information in the possession of a participant in Frontex activities shall not be publicly disclosed, including in social media or environment, unless the performance of duty or the needs of justice strictly require disclosure or disclosure has been appropriately authorised.
2. Participants shall not express themselves regarding Frontex activities in the media unless explicit authorisation is given, in accordance with the Operational Plan or other similar agreed rules.
3. Participants are bound by the obligation to behave with discretion regarding current, past, and planned or potential Frontex activities.

Article 10

Behavioural Standards

Participants in Frontex activities whether on or off duty shall:

- a) abstain from all behaviour likely to compromise the prestige and the nature of the public mission in which they are invested or to bring discredit upon their organisation or Frontex;
- b) act with fairness and impartiality in their dealings with the public and other participants in Frontex activities, treating all with courtesy and respect, avoiding all forms of victimisation or discrimination, bearing in mind the diverse nature of all people, including backgrounds, origin and/or rank;
- c) abstain from actions contrary to the public order;

- d) refrain from using vulgar, obscene or otherwise offensive speech or gestures that could be considered abusive towards other participants in Frontex activities or the public.

CHAPTER III PROHIBITED CONDUCTS

Article 11

Abuse of authority

All improper use of a position of influence, power or authority is forbidden.

Article 12

Discrimination

All discriminatory behaviours as defined in Article 2 towards the public or other participants in Frontex activities are forbidden.

Article 13

Harassment

All forms of harassment as defined in Article 2 are forbidden.

Article 14

Corruption

1. The use of public position for illegitimate private gains as well as the acceptance of unjustified rewards for actions taken in Frontex activities is forbidden.
2. Consent to any form of corrupt activity is forbidden.

Article 15

Use of narcotics and drugs

The use or possession of narcotics and drugs, unless prescribed for medical reasons, is forbidden.

Article 16

Consumption of alcohol

1. The consumption of alcohol while on duty is forbidden.
2. The consumption of alcohol off duty shall be moderate, unless the Operational Plan or other similar agreed rules prohibit it.
3. A participant unexpectedly called out for duty is obliged, at no risk of discredit, to say that he/she has consumed alcohol and may not be fit for duty.
4. A participant shall not report for duty or appear in public in a state of intoxication.

Article 17

Sexual services

Using or soliciting any sexual services from any premises, whether public or private, is forbidden.

CHAPTER IV SPECIAL RULES AND PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS

Article 18

Personal and professional behaviour

Given the prerogatives of authority, law enforcement officers have a particular responsibility to act with fairness and impartiality in their dealings with the public or other participants in Frontex activities, treating all with courtesy and respect.

Article 19

Use of force

1. Pursuant to Article 10 of the Frontex Regulation, while performing their tasks law enforcement officers may only use force with the consent of the home Member State and the host MS, in the presence of border guards of the host MS and in accordance with the national law of the host MS.
2. The use of force shall not exceed the minimum degree necessitated by the circumstances, for the performance of duties or in legitimate self-defence or in legitimate defence of other persons.

Article 20

Use of weapons

1. Pursuant to Article 10 of the Frontex Regulation, while performing their tasks law enforcement officers enjoying Guest Officer status may only use weapons with the consent of the home Member State and the host MS, in the presence of border guards of the host MS and in accordance with the national law of the host MS.
2. The use of weapons is an exceptional measure and it shall not exceed the minimum degree necessitated by the circumstances, for the performance of duties or in legitimate self-defence or in legitimate defence of other persons.

CHAPTER V FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 21

Training

Participants in Frontex activities shall, previous to their engagement in Frontex activities, get acquainted with the content of the present Code through appropriate training provided by national authorities responsible for the deployment of the participants or by Frontex.

Article 22

Reporting

Participants in Frontex activities who have reason to believe that a violation of the present Code has occurred or is about to occur, are obliged to report the matter to Frontex via the appropriate channels.

Article 23

Sanctions

1. In the case of violation of the present Code by a Frontex staff member, the Executive Director will take adequate measures which may include the immediate removal of the Frontex staff member from the activity.
2. If the violation was committed by a person deployed by a Member State, the Executive Director may request the Member State to immediately remove the person concerned from the Frontex activity and expects that the relevant authority of the Member State will use its powers regarding the necessary disciplinary measures and, if applicable, to remove the person concerned from the respective pool for a defined period.
3. Without prejudice to paragraphs 1 and 2, in a case of serious violation of the present Code, the competent authority will adopt immediate measures that may result in the removal of a participant from Frontex activity.

3. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

3.1. General description

The responsibility for the control of the external borders remains with the Host MS. Frontex facilitates and renders more effective the application of existing EU measures related to the management of external borders, by ensuring the coordination of MS actions in the implementation of those measures, thereby contributing to an efficient, high and uniform level of control on persons and surveillance of the external borders of the MS.

All the activities shall be executed based on EU law, the relevant national legislation and existing provisions of international law, both customary and conventional and in close cooperation with the involved authorities of the MS, in particular the host MS.

All the activities are coordinated by the ICC, without prejudice to the privileges of the national operational chain of command and control specific to each participating MS. It is highly important to ensure the proper communication among the participating assets, National Officials (NO) and International Coordination Centre (ICC).

Description of the Tasks and Specific Instructions to Guest Officers and Other Participants (Rules of Engagement) are defined in the respective Annex of the Operational Plan.

3.2. Border surveillance

The main purpose of border surveillance is to prevent unauthorised border crossings, to counter cross-border criminality and to take measures against persons who have crossed the border illegally. A person who has crossed a border illegally and who has no right to stay on the territory of the Member State concerned shall be apprehended and made subject to return procedures as laid down in the applicable EU law⁴.

Border surveillance shall be carried out by using the MS offered technical equipment.

[REDACTED]

Commented [A2]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

⁴ Unless a request for asylum is submitted, thus the respective procedure shall be applied

[REDACTED]

3.2.1. Use of participating assets

The assets of the host MS will continue to perform patrolling activities at the normal level in the operational areas covering their areas of jurisdiction. Besides the host MS assets, delivering normal patrolling activities, assets from the home MS and additional assets of the host MS (if applicable) will be used to ensure an operational response in operational areas.

3.2.1.1. Aerial assets

[REDACTED]

3.2.1.2. Terrestrial assets

[REDACTED]

The participants of Frontex coordinated joint land borders operations besides border control tasks should be ready to respond safely while witnessing or/and suspecting unlawful activities (e.g. smuggling of goods;

Commented [A3]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the technical equipment deployed in the operational area by Frontex and Member States. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the exact type and capabilities of the equipment and would enable third parties, e.g. by combining this information with other sources, to draw conclusions regarding usual positions and movement patterns. This would open way for abuse, as numbers and types of equipment used in previous operations are indicative of similar numbers and types for succeeding years. Releasing such information would thus benefit criminal networks, enabling them to change their modus operandi and, consequently, result in hampering the course of ongoing and future operations of a similar nature. This would ultimately obstruct the purpose of such operations: to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of information regarding the technical equipment deployed would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Commented [A4]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

illegal fishing (river or lake); illicit drug trafficking; environmental pollution) in compliance with the applicable international and national legislation and agreements.

[REDACTED]

3.3. Border checks

The deployed Guest Officers are increasing the host MS national authorities' capacity and capability for thorough border checks of persons, in particular of third country nationals, as well as of their means of transportation and items in their possession. The Guest Officers will provide and use their know-how and expertise and provide any other relevant assistance. [REDACTED]

Commented [A5]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Commented [A6]: Debriefing interviews carried out during Joint Operations aim at enhancing operational activities involving Frontex and participating Member States. The information collected, e.g. in regard to routes, modus operandi and involvement of facilitators and traffickers in human beings, contributes to enhancing situational awareness and supporting criminal investigations in Member States. The disclosure of information provided by the interviewees in confidence may lead to the possible identification of individual migrants by specific criminals who have been facilitating those migrants' travel from the country of origin to the embarkation points/the sea crossing. In addition, this could create the perception that participation in debriefing interviews would put the interviewee or their relatives at risk. Ultimately, the participation in debriefing interviews would decrease which, in turn, would impede planning and implementation of Frontex operational activities dependent on access to this source of intelligence. Lastly, disclosing the content of the interviews would be equivalent to the disclosure of operational information which forms the base for planning and implementation of current and future joint operations. Consequently, disclosing these documents would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and hence, access is refused pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

3.5. Screening activities

Screening activities are performed by screening experts from MS as defined in the profile of a screening expert.

A Screening Expert means an officer of a competent national authority of a MS who interviews and establishes assumptions on the nationality of an undocumented person having crossed, or having attempted to cross, an external border irregularly

Screening experts will perform screening interviews at the request of the host MS authorities. If required an interpreter will be provided either by the host or a home MS.

For the purpose of supporting host MS developing screening activities, the screening interviews carried out by deployed screening experts should, as a general rule, only be performed in close cooperation with a screening expert from the host MS.

The screening experts will be deployed to meet operational needs. It may become necessary to redeploy Guest Officers from one location to another.

The Guidelines for screening activities are defined in chapter 5 of this Handbook.

Commented [A7]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

4. GUIDELINES FOR DEBRIEFING ACTIVITIES

4.1. Introduction

[REDACTED]

Commented [A8]:
The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

4.2. Debriefing

[REDACTED]

4.3. Tasks of Debriefing Experts

[REDACTED]

4.3.1. Preparation for Debriefing

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Commented [A10]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

4.3.3. Conducting Debriefing Sessions

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Commented [A11]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

4.3.4. Reporting

[REDACTED]

⁶ "... the Agency shall be limited to personal data regarding persons who are suspected, on reasonable grounds, by the competent authorities of the Member States of involvement in cross-border criminal activities, in facilitating illegal migration activities or in human trafficking activities as defined in points (a) and (b) of Article 1(1) of Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence (1)."

[REDACTED] be

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Commented [A12]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

4.4. Use of Interpreters

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4.5. Status of Experts

Debriefing Experts enjoy Guest Officer Status and therefore, the rights and obligations set forth in the Frontex Regulations, in particular Article 10, 10(a), 10(b) and 10(c), apply to them. All participants in debriefing activities conducted within the framework of an operation coordinated by Frontex should act according to the Frontex Code of Conduct.

5.6. Conducting screening interviews

[Redacted text block]

Commented [A14]:
The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

***Vulnerable groups:**

Special consideration should be given to persons susceptible to exploitation and victims of exploitation or trafficking in human beings such as vulnerable groups, including women, unaccompanied minors, people in need to health care and disabled people.

[Redacted text block]

5.7. Working as a team with Interpreters

[Redacted text block]

[REDACTED]

Commented [A15]:
The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

5.8. Results of screening interviews

After conducting a screening interview the screening expert will presume the nationality and fill in the presumed nationality in the screening form. He/she should forward the screening form to the responsible officer of the host authority.

The screening expert has no mandate to decide if an irregular migrant, according to the presumed nationality, is returnable or not.

At the end of the working day the screening expert will circulate the screening results in line with the reporting procedure set out in the Handbook.

5.9. Status of Experts

Screening Experts enjoy Guest Officer Status and therefore, the rights and obligations set forth in the Frontex Regulation, in particular Article 10, 10(a), 10(b) and 10(c), apply to them. All participants in screening activities conducted within the framework of an operation coordinated by Frontex should act according to the Frontex Code of Conduct.

6. STANDARD PLAN FOR OPERATIONAL BRIEFING AND DEBRIEFING

6.1. Operational briefing

During the first days of the deployment all participants taking part in joint operation will receive an Operational Briefing in accordance with the respective chapter of the Operational Plan. This briefing integrates core elements of the former EBGIT Induction training in order to guarantee best preparation in the right time to all deployed staff.

The Operational Briefing is composed of 2 parts:

- General briefing - delivered by Frontex
- National briefing - provided by National Briefers assigned by the host MS

During the **General Briefing** all participants should be introduced to the main aspects of the Operational Plan, in particular:

- Legal framework of Frontex (including role, tasks and current structure of Frontex)
- Fundamental rights in Frontex activities
- Code of Conduct
- Description and assessment of the situation in the area (if applicable, also specific cross-border crimes like THB, unaccompanied minors etc.)
- Operational aim and objectives
- Information on implementation (period, briefing/debriefing, operational areas, participation) of the relevant operational activity
- Operational concept
- Main aspects of the Rules of Engagement
- Cooperation with 3rd countries other EU bodies and international organisations in the operational area (if applicable)
- The tasks of participants
- Command, control, communications, contact details of Frontex staff
- JORA, FOSS
- Reporting (incidents, SIR, reports of participants and Frontex, etc)
- Information flow including the information to be exchanged with other EU bodies and international organisations
- Organizational arrangements and logistics
- Evaluation (reports)
- Press communication rules

The **Joint Debriefing Teams/ Second Line Interview Experts** (if applicable) will be introduced also to:

- State of play including the current migration situation within the JO
- Purpose of debriefing and intelligence gaps
- Debriefing activities according to the Operation Plan
- Procedure of the Host MS related to interviewing migrants/ access to migrants' belongings
- Guidelines for debriefing activities
- Use of Interpreters
- Safety rules before/during the debriefing activities
- Evidence collection

During the **National** part of Operational Briefing all participants should be introduced to the following topics in accordance with the **Common Briefing Pack**, in particular:

7.1.2. ICC Coordinator

[Redacted text block]

Commented [A18]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.

7.1.3. Joint Coordinating Board (JCB)

[Redacted text block]

7.1.4. National Official (NO)

[Redacted text block]

[Redacted]

7.1.5. Guest Officers and Officers of the host MS

[Redacted]

Commented [A19]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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7.1.6. Interpreters/Cultural Mediators

[Redacted]

7.1.7. Local Coordination Centre (LCC)

[Redacted]

7.1.8. LCC Coordinator

[Redacted text block]

Commented [A20]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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7.1.9. Focal Point (FP)

[Redacted text block]

7.1.10. FP Local Coordinator

[Redacted text block]

7.1.11. Coordination Point (CP)

[Redacted text block]

7.1.12. CP Local Coordinator

[Redacted text block]

[Redacted]

7.1.13. Liaison Officer (LO)

[Redacted]

7.1.14. Intelligence officer

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Commented [A21]:
The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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[Redacted text block]

7.1.15. Local staff of the host MS

[Redacted text block]

Commented [A22]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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7.2. Frontex

7.2.1. Operational Manager and Operational Team

[Redacted text block]

[Redacted text block]

7.2.2. Frontex Coordinating Officer (FCO)

[Redacted text block]

Commented [A23]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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7.2.3. Frontex Operational Coordinator (FOC)

[Redacted text block]

[Redacted]

7.2.4. Frontex Support Officer (FSO)

[Redacted]

Commented [A24]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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7.2.5. Operational Analyst (OA)

[Redacted]

7.2.6. Special Advisor for debriefing activities

[Redacted]

Commented [A25]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

7.2.7. Frontex Situation Centre (FSC)

[Redacted]

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.

7.2.7.2. Senior Duty Officer (SDO) Service in FSC

[Redacted]

FSC Senior Duty Officer - Contact Information

Landline	[Redacted]
Mobile	[Redacted]

Email [REDACTED]

7.2.7.3. Deployed Support Officers to FSC

[REDACTED]

FSC Support Officer - Contact Information

Landline [REDACTED]

Email [REDACTED]

7.2.7.4. FSC roles concerning Frontex One Stop Shop (FOSS)

[REDACTED]

FOSS Contact Information

Landline [REDACTED]

Email [REDACTED]

7.2.7.5. FSC roles and responsibilities concerning JORA

[REDACTED]

FSC JORA Product and Service Management
Contact information

Landline [REDACTED]

E-mail [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Frontex Liaison Office [REDACTED]

The Frontex Liaison Office (FLO) is located [REDACTED]

Commented [A26]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

[REDACTED]

General tasks of FLO:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Commented [A27]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

A constantly updated evaluation between operational activities and training is necessary in order to react immediately to latest trends of cross-border crime and to detect training gaps.

The participation in EBGT training will be documented by TRU via the OPERA system.

7.2.10. Pooled Resources Unit (PRU)

PRU develops and manages pooled experts and technical equipment of MS and supports JOU in providing resources for joint operations.

The unit assists JOU in liaising with MS and ensures that all information related to the EBGT members or technical equipment is updated in the Opera system as well as acts as the contact point for queries related to the use of the software. PRU is responsible for the timely issuance of the accreditation cards for the Guest Officers and participant cards for other participants which is distributed (together with the armbands) in the operational area by JOU.

The unit is one of the key actors regarding the management of the Seconded Guest Officers (SGOs) deployed to Frontex coordinated operational activities: it monitors the application of the Standard Operating Procedures governing the missions of the SGOs and ensures their coherent and consistent application at the Agency level as well as it distributes the "Deployment Guidelines" to the deployed SGOs. The initial correspondence prior to deployment of SGOs from Frontex to the respective MS is also done by the unit.

PRU is responsible for the transitional storage, allocation and overall monitoring of Frontex operational assets.

[REDACTED]

Commented [A29]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

7.2.11. Seconded Guest Officers (SGO)

The Seconded Guest Officers (SGO) are border guards from the MSs, with the tasks and powers of the Guest Officers as defined in Article 10 of the Frontex Regulation and are seconded as defined in accordance with Articles 3b and 17 of the Frontex Regulation. Therefore the tasks, powers and roles described in the respective chapters of this Handbook are also applicable for the SGOs.

The SGO are selected by Frontex and will be considered as a Frontex contribution to the European Border Guard Teams. The secondment of an SGO must not exceed six months within a period of 12 consecutive months. Equally, the secondment period may not be shorter than one month.

8. COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTING

8.1. Command and control

[REDACTED]

Commented [A30]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

8.2. Communication

Communication flows for operational activities in the operational area [REDACTED]

Commented [A31]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

8.3. Reporting

8.3.1. Incidents reporting

Reports regarding all border-related incidents that have occurred in the predefined operational areas are prepared by the local officers or experts and sent via JORA. [REDACTED]

The JORA Guidelines will be stored on FOSS with the aim that all participants who gather, insert, validate or analyze any data or information contained in JORA have a common understanding and clear definitions

of the data-collection attributes and values. Frontex may update the JORA Guidelines at any time with proper notification of the participants.

Specific information and guidance related to the management and use of JORA are available below (Chapter 11 of this Handbook).

8.3.2. Incident management process




Commented [A32]: The blanked out text contains detailed sensitive information about organisation, communication and operational activities, in particular regarding the tactics and modus operandi of law enforcement forces. Disclosure of such information would harm the performance of future operational tasks taking place at the related area and would facilitate performance of illegal activities such as human trafficking and drug smuggling, therefore it would harm the public interest as regards public security. In this regard the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.



8.3.3. Serious Incident Reports

A Serious Incident Report is an alert message that shall be reported immediately [redacted] and the host MS' authorities in case a relevant incident occurs that needs urgent attention as the incident may affect or be relevant to, the Frontex mission, its obligation, image, the safety and security of participants in activities coordinated or led by Frontex, or any combination thereof, having special regard to any violation of Fundamental Rights (see chapter 12 of this Handbook).



Commented [A33]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and pose a hazard to the course of ongoing and future operations aimed at curtailing the activities of such networks, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as to prevent unauthorized border crossings. The disclosure would thus undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.



8.3.3. Reporting templates

All actual and tailored templates are published on FOSS on the website of the respective joint operation. In the course of the preparation phase for the JO, additional templates might be developed. In such cases participating MS will be notified and additional templates will be uploaded on FOSS.

Commented [A34]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and pose a hazard to the course of ongoing and future operations aimed at curtailing the activities of such networks, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as to prevent unauthorized border crossings. The disclosure would thus undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.

9. FRONTEX ONE-STOP-SHOP (FOSS)

9.1. FOSS general information

[REDACTED]

Commented [A35]:
The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

9.2. FOSS access procedures

FOSS users are divided into "User Groups", with each group being granted a specific access level enabling its members to view or upload information, depending on their specific operational need.

[REDACTED]

9.2.1. FOSS access authorization

Access to FOSS is given upon request. It is granted if the requestor meets the following conditions: has an operational need, provides the required details and is authorized by the relevant authority.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Access authorization procedure [REDACTED]

When OPERA⁷ is used the process of requesting and authorizing access to FOSS is fully performed through this system, by completing the section "Additional information", under the "Personal registration" form in the "Resources Deployment Tool" page.

[REDACTED]

9.3. Roles & Responsibilities

9.3.1. FOSS National User Coordinator

This function is assigned to the relevant MS's NFPOC. His/her responsibilities include gathering user data, validating access and providing user data to the "Area of Interest Owner" (Operational Manager).

9.3.2. Area of Interest Owner

This function is assigned to the Operational Manager in charge of the Joint Operation. His/her responsibilities include establishing the structural design and layout of the Joint Operation's specific area (FOSS Area of Interest), uploading content in the Joint Operation's specific area, authorizing user groups and permissions levels, providing all necessary information to the User Administrator.

9.3.3. User Administrator's █████ - FOSS Service Manager


This function is assigned to █████. His responsibilities include creating, updating and removing user accounts, assigning users to a respective group, assigning groups to the Joint Operation's specific area.

Commented [A37]:

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.


9.4. Navigation in FOSS

After logging into FOSS, by clicking on the section 'Operational Activities' authorized users will be able to access the relevant Joint Operation page, directly from the FOSS homepage:



After having entered the 'Operational Activities' section, the user will then be able to select the page of the Joint Operation of his/her deployment, either from the left hand side menu, or from the central pane. As an example, in the image below the user has been granted access rights to JO Focal Points 2013 Land:

Commented [A38]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.



Commented [A39]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

10. COMMUNICATION WITH THE PRESS

10.1. Introduction

All Frontex activities are financed from public funds (EU budget) therefore it is Frontex' obligation to maintain a high level of transparency and openness in its activities. Operations held at the external borders experiencing a high level of migratory pressure often draw a large numbers of international journalists.

It is Frontex policy to facilitate media coverage of all its activities, including operations. Consequently the press office facilitates media visits to the operational areas and organises media interviews with officers deployed by Frontex.

All press visits are closely coordinated with host MS authorities and are carried out according to procedures defined in the Press Communication Rules in the sub-chapter below.

Press rules may vary depending on the operation; therefore the differences will be reflected in the main part of the Operational Plan.

Openness cannot hinder or jeopardise operational activities, therefore several general rules apply.

No information should be released to the media prior to the beginning of the operation.

Operational details, such as operational area, details of technical equipment deployed, shift schedule etc. are considered sensitive information and are not to be shared with the media.

All participants in the joint operation are obliged to contact the Frontex press office before giving an interview.

10.2. Press communication rules

10.2.1. General

The communication strategy regarding the Frontex mission and activities in general is under the auspices of the Agency.

In order not to jeopardise the outcome of the operation, no information about the operation should be released to the public prior to its beginning. National authorities deploying border guards to the Joint Operation should also limit their public statements to the general objectives of the operation, numbers and profiles of experts.

Press Offices of Frontex and the host MS/Third Country press office represented by the Dedicated Press Officer are entirely responsible for coordination of all matters related to interview requests, press visits to the operational area and any other press-related matters related to the Joint Operation.

Press lines regarding joint border control operational issues and actions as well as specific incidents that might occur, are agreed by Frontex and the host MS/Third Country press office represented by the Dedicated Press Officer.

10.2.2. Tasks of press offices in the context of Joint Operations

Press visits to the Joint Operation will be organised by the host MS authorities in cooperation with the Frontex Press Office.

Tasks of the Frontex press office will include:

- Informing the media on Frontex' mission and activities, as well as on the activities of the Joint Operation. Providing background information and statistical data on migratory movements.
- Being the point of contact for international media requests.
- Media monitoring and analysis of media tendencies (neutral, positive, negative).
- Drafting and distributing press releases, statements and other communications in close cooperation with the competent host MS/Third Country authorities.

Tasks of the Host MSs press office represented by the Dedicated Press Officer

- Arranging interviews with representatives of the host MS authorities.
- Being the point of contact for national media.
- Arranging filming opportunities in the operational area
- Drafting and distributing press releases, statements and other communications in close cooperation with Frontex.

10.2.3. Management of Press Requests

Given that journalists need to obtain authorisation from the host MS authorities to visit the operational area, the following procedures must be followed:

- Individual and on-the-spot media requests must be directed to the Frontex Press Office and the Dedicated Press Officer in the host MS electronically.
- The Frontex Press Office and the Dedicated Press Officer from the host MS will inform each other about media requests on a regular basis.
- The Frontex Press Office will coordinate the flow of international press requests received, collect information about their needs and direct requests to the Dedicated Press Officer in the host MS.
- The Dedicated Press Officer will process the necessary authorisations, coordinate the flow of national press requests received and inform the Frontex Press Office about the planned presence of the media in the operational area and provide them with necessary assistance on the ground.
- The Dedicated Press Officer will process the necessary authorisations for participation of journalists in patrols and visits to restricted operational areas. The Dedicated Press Officer will inform the interested parties and the Frontex Press Office about the decision.
- The Dedicated Press Officer will host media representatives. Media representatives will be asked to present their press credentials before participating in any activity and to sign a written statement that the host MS or other involved countries' authorities will not bear any responsibility should anything happen to the media representatives and/or their equipment.

10.2.4. Specific guidelines for participating officers if approached by the media:

Participants are allowed to talk to the media only within the limits set by specific guidelines indicated below.

All participants need to contact the Frontex Press Office before agreeing to an interview.

[REDACTED]

Commented [A40]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

10.2.5. Contact details

The contact details of the Frontex Press Office members (Spokesperson and Press Officer) and Dedicated Press Officers of the National Authority of the Host MS are indicated in the respective Annex of the Operational Plan "Contact Details".

11. JOINT OPERATIONS REPORTING APPLICATION (JORA)

11.1. JORA General Information

11.1.1. JORA product & service management

The FSC JORA Product and Service Management is responsible for the JORA Service Operations, in accordance with the JORA policy and processes. The Product and Service Managers are listed in the JORA Actors Annex.

The Product and Service Managers are the stewards of the system: their primary role is to ensure that the system runs properly, in line with the end-users needs and, if necessary, to manage the further developments or readjustments of the system.

The Product and Service Managers also support the correct use of JORA, review quality, efficiency and user-satisfaction of the system in accordance with the needs.

The JORA Product and Service Management is responsible for the following tasks:

- To coordinate and carry out the activities required in order to ensure the daily operational management of the system;
- To communicate with external customers and Frontex entities;
- To manage and maintain the Service-Level Agreement with Frontex ICT;
- To manage the content and the structural design of the application;
- To manage the Requests for Change;
- To identify and assess the training needs, and to plan, coordinate, organize and deliver the relevant training activities, where possible;
- To report risks, statistics and issues to the Business Owner;
- To initiate and coordinate the execution of new developments;
- To provide their expertise to new activities related to the product development;
- To initiate quality checks.

In order to maintain the required operational support, the JORA Product and Service Management provides daily expertise, consultancy and assistance to its stakeholders and customers.

Suggestions and feedback are part of the adopted Continual Service Improvement orientation. Thus, the JORA Product and Service Management welcomes any feedback received from the end users: suggestions, recommendations and Requests for Change are assessed and analyzed by the JORA Change Advisory Board. The standard Feedback Form is available on FOSS.

11.1.2. JORA roles and responsibilities

11.1.2.1. JORA Administrator

- Staff member nominated by the Frontex Situation Centre Head of Unit (listed in the JORA Actors Annex);
- Authorized to manage all the roles and processes in JORA;
- May define, modify and delete operations in JORA;
- Acts as the Incident Template Approver, thus validating and publishing an incident template in JORA.

11.1.2.2. JORA Frontex Access Manager

- Operational Manager of the Joint Operation, as listed in Annex of the Operational Plan;
- Creates the operation and its structure in the JORA system according to the Operational Plan;
- Selects and assigns the incident template creator in the JORA system, and approves the relevant incident template;

- Manages the access requests coming from members of the EU Institutions, from Frontex, and from other authorities who take part to the operation;
- Assigns and manages the National Access Managers appointed to the operation in the JORA system, in accordance with the JORA Actors Annex;
- Selects delegated Operational Manager(s) in the system when a new operation is created;
- Acts as the Incident Template Verifier;
- Manages users concerning this operation.

11.1.2.3. Delegated JORA Frontex Access Manager

The same set of roles and responsibilities Listed in Annex of the Operational Plan applies to the assigned to the Delegated Frontex Access Manager.

11.1.2.4. FSC Support Officers

The FSC delivers the necessary training for JORA, in accordance with the role and the responsibility of the Support Officers.

FSC ensures that all the support officers having appropriate user rights in the JORA system to perform their tasks during their deployment.

11.1.2.5. JORA National Access Manager

National Access Managers are nominated by their MSs / National Authorities and are listed in the JORA Actors Annex.

Responsibilities:

- To approve or reject the Initial Access Requests from member of national entities participating in Frontex operations and to define the operational access rights;
- To manage the users' accounts for the operation.

11.1.2.6. JORA Incident Reporter

A Member of BCP or surveillance unit is responsible for incident reporting.

Hosting country officer(s) or deployed officer(s) are responsible for the incident reporting depending on the organization of the daily operational activities. In case deployed officers are involved into the incident reporting working flow it is strongly advised that the hosting country authorities appoint a local officer for the coordination of the incident reporting in the JORA system (such as incident verifier).


The incident reporters' main responsibilities are to create, modify, and forward incident reports to the next validation level, in accordance with the Operational Plan.

11.1.2.7. JORA Local Incident Verifier

A Member of a Local Coordination Centre is responsible for the validation of incidents at a local level. Local incident verifiers' main responsibilities are to verify, modify and forward incidents to the next validation level, in accordance with the Operational Plan.

11.1.2.8. JORA International Incident Verifier

A Member of International Coordination Centre or a member of other authorities responsible for the validation of incident reports at the international level. The ICC incident verifiers' main responsibilities are




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11.2.2.3. System User



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The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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11.2.2.4. Login Requirements

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11.2.2.5. Password Requirements

[Redacted]

11.2.2.6. User Details

[Redacted]

11.2.3. Access Request to specific operation in the JORA system

[Redacted]

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Commented [A46]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

11.3. Contact Details

In case of assistance, users may contact the JORA Service Management of the Frontex ICT Helpdesk via e-mail or telephone as shown below:

[Redacted]

12. SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORTING

12.1. Introductory information

The purpose is to define the steps and actions to be taken in the frame of the reporting of serious incidents, in accordance with the "Frontex Serious Incident Catalogue". Given the seriousness of the incident reported, as well as the urgency in taking immediate action within Frontex, it is crucial that all actors¹⁰ in activities¹¹ coordinated or led by Frontex are acquainted with the procedural steps and understand the importance of "Serious Incident Reports" (SIRs) due to the impact these "Serious Incidents" (SIs) could have on Frontex work, responsibilities and reputation.

12.2. Definition

12.2.1. Serious Incident

SI is an event or occurrence, natural or caused by human action, which may affect, or be relevant to, the Frontex mission, its obligation, image, the safety and security of participants in activities coordinated or led by Frontex, or any combination thereof. SI includes situations of alleged violations of Fundamental Rights and of European Union acquis (EU) or international law, particularly related to international protection obligations and of the Frontex Code of Conduct for all persons participating in Frontex activities and for Joint Return Operations coordinated by Frontex.

12.2.2. Serious Incident Report (SIR)

[REDACTED] the occurrence of a SI as defined in the "Frontex Serious Incident Catalogue" (12.9.). The production and timely dissemination of a SIR contribute to improve situational awareness and increase the reaction capabilities of Frontex related to incidents occurred in the frame of activities coordinated or led by Frontex. The issuance of a SIR is the first internal step for possible follow-up measures and eventual official statements to be taken by Frontex Senior Management if needed.

Commented [A47]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

12.3. Roles and responsibilities

In order to ensure the immediate information flow after the occurrence of a SI and to enable that Frontex and all involved parties take appropriate action, it is crucial that all actors in activities coordinated or led by Frontex understand their role within the SIR procedure (Chapter 12.6.).

The actors involved in the SIR mechanism are:

[REDACTED]

¹⁰ All persons participating in activities coordinated or led by Frontex

¹¹ Frontex activity means any activity coordinated or led by Frontex

12.5.2. Formal SIR

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12.5.3. Updated SIR

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12.5.4. Final SIR

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12.6. Reporting of SI with possible violation of fundamental rights

In case of sensitive SI involving violation of FR, the reporting is subject to a specific extraordinary procedure as described below.

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12.8. Serious Incident Catalogue

12.8.1. Serious Incident Categories


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
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Commented [A52]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

12.10. Annex 6 List of potential fundamental rights violations within Frontex activities

Commented [A53]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.



13. ARRANGEMENTS OF DEPLOYED RESOURCES

13.1. Operational Resources Management System (OPERA)

The Operational resources management system (Opera) is an integrated web-based system for the management of the operational resources pooled and deployed in Frontex coordinated activities. Information related to the availability and deployment of the resources is stored in the application and is available for the generation of statistics, and for automated reporting.

The main functions of the Opera system are the following:

- To manage contributions to the HR and TE Pools: personal data (including deployment history, profiles, participation in Frontex training, etc) of officers nominated to the HR Pools is stored in the HR Pools database. MS nominate officers and update the information in real time by using Opera. The content is fully searchable and available for the other functionalities of the application. The same applies to the TE Pool database (CRATE).
- To manage and allocate resources to joint operations and other activities by:
 - Creating and storing operational details such as duration, location, type of operation, operational needs in terms of HR and TE;
 - Supporting the generation of Frontex requests for availability of resources to the MS;
 - Managing the contribution and allocation of MS resources to a given Frontex coordinated activity;
 - Managing the Running Expenses of Means templates;
 - Monitoring and registering the deployed resources.
- To issue secure accreditation documents: information on the allocation of HR gives the Operational Team the possibility of easily creating requests for accreditation documents for joint operation. Opera foresees also the possibility of sending a PDF document directly to the NFPoC when the document is created.
- To generate reports: opera gives Frontex and the MS the possibility of generating different types of report in a fully automated way such as composition and statistics on Pools, overviews on deployments and registration for officers, Key Performance Indicators, reports on the deployed resources in a given operation, other customisable reports.

Users, according to the instructions received during the Opera Training and procedures discussed and agreed in the Opera workshops, input information concerning the available/deployed resources, Running Expenses of Means related financial data, and officer registration details (necessary for issuing accreditation/participant's documents) directly through the Opera dedicated interface.

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
The previous version of the Excel-based Accreditation form is replaced by the Opera system with the following input interface:



Under "Travel Details", MS shall input information about the arrival and departure dates (including indication of approximate time of arrival), Flight details if travelling by airplane, Mean of Transportation, Route, Arrival Airport, Entry BCP/Airport and Accommodation. In the event of Accommodation being provided by the host MS and being unknown at the time of registration, MS shall indicate this in the Accommodation box by the text "accommodation provided by Host MS".

The Expiry date of the Accreditation Document is automatically set as the date of departure from the operational area. In the event of any particular need (e.g. transportation by car, etc) MS can manually extend the date in order to have the Accreditation Document valid until the arrival of the officer in his/her MS.

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Under "*Personal Equipment\Weapons*", MS shall indicate if the officer is travelling to the operational area carrying weapons or not. If yes, MS shall also register the weapon and indicate the amount of ammunition. This field is mandatory.



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Under “*Technical Equipment*”, MS shall indicate if the deployed officer is linked to a specific item of Technical Equipment requested and deployed through Opera (e.g. helicopter, vessel, etc), or if he is carrying with him/her any other item of Technical Equipment.



Commented [A57]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Under Additional Information, MS shall indicate if the officer shall have access to FOSS, and the type of access requested (including duration). More information about FOSS is provided in chapter 9. MS shall also indicate the Daily Gross Wage and Daily Subsistence Allowances of the deployed officer for that specific operation.

13.2. Technical equipment deployed by MSs

Technical equipment deployed by the MS in the operational areas to foster the border control activities may include Helicopters, Fixed Wing Airplanes (FWA), Term Vision Vans (TVV), patrol cars, Dog Teams and any other type of equipment preliminary agreed and confirmed by Frontex and the MS.

The technical equipment deployed by the MS can form a part of the overall minimum number of technical equipment (OMNTE) or can be considered as additional technical equipment (beyond OMNTE). The OMNTE is identified by Frontex based on the risk analysis and the operational needs and it is foreseen to ensure sufficient operational response within Frontex coordinated joint operations. The additional technical equipment will supplement OMNTE, in case that any operational needs occur.

13.3. Management of the operational assets¹³ deployed by Frontex

PRU and JOU deal with the distribution and retrieval of operational assets in the operational areas, according to the procedures in place. The EBGT members / representatives of the national authorities receive operational assets based on a pre-conducted needs assessment and are responsible for the maintenance in good conditions of the equipment while in their possession.

The EBGT members / representatives of the national authorities having received an operational equipment item have the obligation to return the item to the Frontex representative in charge with the distribution / retrieval of the operational assets, according to the conditions laid down in the handover forms.

¹³ Frontex owned assets

In case the operational equipment is being damaged / misplaced / stolen while under the responsibility of an EBGT member / representative of a national authority, the person to whom the equipment was handed over has the obligation to immediately inform the Operational Team about the occurrence.

14. FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

In accordance with the decision of the Frontex Executive Director, Frontex will co-finance the joint operation. Frontex will reimburse eligible costs incurred by participating MS authorities in relation to deployments of experts and technical equipment provided that the Framework Partnership Agreement is in place.

The host MS is also eligible for co-financing the eligible costs for additional means/activities and staff deployed in accordance with the Strategic Guidelines for financing of Frontex operational activities.

Frontex will be responsible for the preparation of all necessary financial commitments and the preparation of the legal commitments. Funds are allocated by means of issuing Specific Financing Decision with Estimated Budget and calculation for Running Expenses of Means (if applicable). The Estimated Budget and REM are to be submitted by the partner authority.


Once the SFD is issued by Frontex, the MS authority is obliged to send back Acknowledgement of Receipt and is entitled to request pre-financing up to 50% of SFD budget. Frontex strongly recommends partner authorities to claim the advance payment.

In accordance with Article II.17 of the Framework Partnership Agreement, payment of the balance, which may not be repeated, is made after the end of the operational activity on the basis of eligible costs actually incurred in carrying out the operational activity. The request for final payment shall be submitted within 75 days after the end of the joint operation.

Accordingly, Frontex will co-finance the deployments of Third Country observers within the joint operation, provided that Third Country has the Working Arrangement with Frontex. For the purpose of legal and financial commitment, Frontex and the Third Country partner authority mutually sign the Grant Agreement along with the Estimated Budget and General Conditions. Further co-financing details, eligible costs and payment rules for Grant Agreements are analogical to the SFD scheme for EU MS (if applicable).


15. TEMPLATES (EXAMPLES)

All actual and tailored templates are published on FOSS on the website of respective joint operation. In the course of the preparation phase for the JO, additional templates might be developed. In such cases participating MS will be informed and additional template will be uploaded on FOSS.




Commented [A58]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

15.2. Interview Template



Commented [A59]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.


The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.



Commented [A60]:


The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.




Commented [A61]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate Irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.



The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.




Commented [A62]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.



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


Commented [A64]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.




Commented [A65]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

15.6. Document Alert Template



Commented [A66]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.




Commented [A67]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

Commented [A68]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.




Commented [A69]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

15.8. User Access Request Form - FOSS



Commented [A70]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.



Commented [A71]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Commented [A72]:
The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

15.10. Report from Participant

All participants of the joint operation are kindly requested to fill in this template and to revert it to Frontex via functional email account within 7 calendar days after termination of the deployment.

The aim of the report is to gather feedback from the participants in order to support improvements for future operational activities.

Data about deployment
Name of the joint operation
Name of the participant
Profile
Member State / Authority
Period of deployment
Location of deployment

1. The pre-deployment preparation was properly arranged?				
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither agree or disagree	Agree Strongly	Agree

To be filled in by the participant

- What kind of preparation took place?

2. Did you receive the Operational Plan before your deployment?	Yes	No

I found the Operational Plan useful for my deployment.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither agree or disagree	Agree Strongly	Agree

To be filled in by the participant:

- Did you receive the Operational Plan before your deployment?
- Who provided it to you?

3. Did you have access to FOSS?	Yes	No

I found FOSS useful for receiving information during my deployment

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither agree or disagree	Agree Strongly	Agree

To be filled in by the participant:

4. I had no difficulties to start working in BCU/ BCP

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither agree or disagree	Agree Strongly	Agree

To be filled in by the participant:

- Please give your comments regarding important aspects (tasking, information, cooperation/team work implementation of activities)

5. My accommodation and logistical support was satisfactory

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither agree or disagree	Agree Strongly	Agree

To be filled in by the participant:

6. I had clear objectives during my deployment

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither agree or disagree	Agree Strongly	Agree

To be filled in by the participant:

7. My daily/shift's tasks/duties were clearly set out and properly communicated

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither agree or disagree	Agree Strongly	Agree

To be filled in by the participant:

8. I was able to apply my professional knowledge and experience

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither agree or disagree	Agree Strongly	Agree

To be filled in by the participant:

9. My daily/shift's tasks/duties were clearly set out and properly communicated

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither agree or disagree	Agree Strongly	Agree

To be filled in by the participant:

10. I was able to apply my professional knowledge and experience

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither agree or disagree	Agree Strongly	Agree

To be filled in by the participant:

11. During my deployment I gained new insights / knowledge

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither agree or disagree	Agree Strongly	Agree

To be filled in by the participant:

12. Was communication with Frontex and local authorities regular and sufficient for effective cooperation? Have you had sufficient feedback during the course of implementation of the JO?

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither agree or disagree	Agree Strongly	Agree

To be filled in by the participant

13. During my deployment, communication with officers of the host country took place mainly in language. I did NOT face any difficulties in this regard

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither agree or disagree	Agree Strongly	Agree

To be filled in by the participant:

14. Did you use the SIR system for obligatory reporting on incidents that fall under the SIR catalogue or were related to the Frontex Code of Conduct?

To be filled in by the participant:

15. Did you receive enough information about JO from Frontex during General

Briefing?				
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither agree or disagree	Agree Strongly	Agree

To be filled in by the participant:

16. Did you receive enough information about JO from <u>host MS</u> during the National Briefing??				
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither agree or disagree	Agree Strongly	Agree

To be filled in by the participant:

17. What in your opinion were the strong and weak points of the JO

To be filled in by the participant:

- remarks regarding professional and important aspects of the work (Information, tasking, deployment, travelling, equipment, etc.), benefit of deployment, profiles of deployed experts, coordination management, FSO performance (if applicable), operational procedures/processes in the area of deployments to be improved, etc.

18. Are there any comments/suggestions you would like to add?

To be filled in by the participant

15.11. Report from National Briefer

All National Briefers are kindly requested to fill in this template and to revert it to Frontex via [REDACTED] within 5 calendar days after delivery of National Briefing to the participants of the joint operation.

The aim of the report is to gather feedback from the National Briefers in order to support improvements for future Frontex coordinated activities.

Name of the joint operation

Name of the National Briefer

Member State / Authority

Date

Location

1. Description of performance (what was done, methods used, achieved results and etc)

To be filled in by the National Briefer

2. Feedback on what has/has not been achieved, but foreseen within the Briefing Package

To be filled in by the National Briefer

3. Challenges identified

To be filled in by the National Briefer

4. Recommendations

To be filled in by the National Briefer

Commented [A73]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

15.12. Final Report from Member State

Each MS hosting and contributing to the JO and claiming for the final payment are requested to elaborate the Final Report and to revert it to the Frontex via functional email account within **7 calendar days after termination of the deployment**. (The report can be produced by each participating authority separately).

The template of the Final Report provides the minimum requirements for the report. The MS authorities are encouraged to include any additional information considered to be important to report.

Data about deployment
Name of the joint operation
Member State
Authority
Period of deployment
Location of deployment

1. Coordination and cooperation
<i>Assessment of the coordination structure established during the JO: performance of Frontex (FX) and the hosting MS (ICC/LCC, Focal Points, Police Stations, BCPs, etc)</i>
<i>Level of cooperation between FX, hostand home MS during the JO</i>
<i>Interagency cooperation (EASO, Europol, etc)</i>
To be filled in by MS

2. Information flow
<i>Assessment of the information flow between all actors involved in the JO (FX/ICC/experts/assets/NO/MS/FX feedback to the MS about ongoing JO and etc)</i>
<i>JORA, FOSS usage</i>
To be filled in by MS

3. Deployed resources
<i>Participating authorities</i>
<i>Technical equipment: total number, type, periods of deployment, operational areas covered, patrolling hrs performed, etc</i>
<i>Experts: names, total number, periods, locations of deployment, activity performed by of different profiles' experts, etc</i>

To be filled in by MS

4. Practical arrangements and logistics

Positive and negative aspects identified prior and during the implementation of JO OPERA

To be filled in by MS

5. Additional information

Any additional information MS considers to be reported, including concerns related to fundamental rights during JO

To be filled in by MS

6. Recommendations

From MS point of view

To be filled in by MS

15.13. Final Report from Third Country

Each Third Country participating as Observer in the joint operation and claiming for the final payment are requested to elaborate the Final Report and to revert it to Frontex via functional email account within 7 days after termination of the deployment.

This report is not dedicated to evaluate host MS.

Data about deployment
Name of the joint operation
Third Country
Authority
Period of deployment
Location of deployment
Observations
To be filled in Third Country (free text)

15.14. JORA End-user Feedback Template

To report an issue, proposal a suggestion or provide any recommendation, please fill in the following template and send it to the JORA Product and Service Management by e-mail [REDACTED]

If you are reporting an error message that appeared while you were logged on to JORA, please save the relevant log and send it to us as an attachement along with this form. Thank you.

Commented [A74]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Name of the JORA user	
Frontex Unit / Sector	(if applicable)
Members State	
Duty station	
¹⁹Name of the operation	
²⁰User role (in JORA)	Frontex Access Manager <input type="checkbox"/> Frontex Template Creator <input type="checkbox"/> National Access manager <input type="checkbox"/> BCP/BCU Incident reporter <input type="checkbox"/> LCC incident verifier <input type="checkbox"/> ICC incident verifier <input type="checkbox"/> FSC incident approver <input type="checkbox"/> No specific role in the system <input type="checkbox"/>

Reported Issue			
Login problem <input type="checkbox"/>	²¹ Error message <input type="checkbox"/>	Attribute ²² <input type="checkbox"/>	Drop-down list <input type="checkbox"/>
Data Input <input type="checkbox"/>	Validation Process <input type="checkbox"/>	Data Modification <input type="checkbox"/>	Data Loss <input type="checkbox"/>
Export Function <input type="checkbox"/>	Attachments <input type="checkbox"/>	Dashboard <input type="checkbox"/>	Development <input type="checkbox"/>
User Friendliness <input type="checkbox"/>	Other <input type="checkbox"/>		

[Please describe the situation in detail on the reported issue. In case an error message appeared, please describe the sequence of actions taken before it appeared].

¹⁹ As defined in the JORA system

²⁰ Please mark the box according to your role

²¹ If an error message appears in JORA, please save the log and send it as an attachment.

²² Attribute: it is the field shown in the Incident Template that contains a drop-down menu or its category (i.e.: Type of Incident = category; Irregular Border Crossing = one value of the drop-down menu).

16. ACRONYMS

Abbreviation	Spelling
B	
BCP	Border Crossing Point
BCU	Border Crossing Unit
C	
CFPOC	Central Frontex Point of Contact
CP	Coordination Point
D	
DSR	Daily Situation Report
E	
EASO	European Asylum Support Office
EBGT	European Border Guard Teams
EU	European Union
EUROSUR	European External Border Surveillance System
F	
FAM	Frontex Access Manager
FCO	Frontex Coordinating Officer
FER	Frontex Evaluation Report
FOC	Frontex Operational Coordinator
FOSS	Frontex-One-Stop-Shop
FP	Focal Point
FSC	Frontex Situation Centre
FSO	Frontex Support Officer
FRO	Fundamental Rights Officer
Frontex	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the MSs of the European Union

FWA	Fixed Wing Airplane
G	
GIS	Geographic Information System
GO	Guest Officer
GSM	Global System for Mobile Communications
H	
HF	High frequency
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Resources
I	
IBM	Integrated Border Management
ICC	International Coordination Centre
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IO	Intelligence Officer
J	
JCB	Joint Coordinating Board
JO	Joint Operation
JORA	Joint Operations Reporting Application
JOU	Joint Operations Unit
JRO	Joint Return Operation
L	
LCC	Local Coordination Centre
LO	Liaison Officer
LO Piraeus	Liaison Office (Piraeus)
M	
MS	Member State

N	
NAM	National Access Manager
NCC	National Coordination Centre
NFPOC	National Frontex Point of Contact
NO	National Official
O	
OA	Operational Analyst
OM	Operational Manager
Opera	Operational Resources Management System
OPLAN	Operational Plan
OT	Operational Team
P	
POB	People on board
PRU	Pooled Resources Unit
R	
RAU	Risk Analysis Unit
RDU	Research and Development Unit
RoE	Rules of Engagement
S	
SAC	Schengen Associated Countries
SAR	Search and Rescue
SDO	Senior Duty Officer
SGO	Seconded Guest Officer
SI	Serious Incident
SIR	Serious Incident Report
T	

TE	Technical Equipment
TL	Team Leader
TRU	Training Unit
TVV	Term Vision Van
V	
VHF	Very high frequency
W	
WAR	Weekly Analytical Report
WAU	Weekly Analytical Update

