



Land Border Surveillance Officers Training GUIDELINES

 **FRONTEX** 
EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD AGENCY

EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD TEAMS
LAND BORDER SURVEILLANCE OFFICER TRAINING

Guidelines for Trainers



BORDER GUARD – DIPLOMAT IN UNIFORM

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1.

INTRODUCTION



1.1. General Information

These guidelines will explain the idea, content and structure of the course from a trainer's perspective. It will combine all elements of the Sectoral Qualification Framework, assessment and supporting documents of the training activity. The idea of these guidelines are to ensure that newly assigned trainers or activity managers are able to deliver the course with the same quality standard. It will enhance the understanding of the role as a trainer in a practical, operational and interdisciplinary training approach in a Frontex coordinated training activity.

In order to ensure professionalism of the border surveillance officers, it is essential to have high quality, standardized training. The initial developed training has therefore undergone a process of improvements during the recent years, which also takes into consideration the received feedback and recommendations from participants, who have successfully passed this course.

The aim of this document is, to provide trainers a practical guide in every step of the training, and to ensure that the training is delivered equally in every Frontex Partnership Academy location, by adopting the stipulated standards set by Frontex. In these guidelines, trainers will find all documents in order to conduct the training accordingly

This document is composed of three elements – introduction, practical guide and annexes.

For the delivery of this course it should be taken into consideration that all participants are already trained and experienced border guards on national level.

This course is about a Frontex “Joint Operation” with the emphasis on good communication in English and collaboration with team members from other Member States that may have been trained in slightly different ways. The course is about finding best practices in typical land border related activities in a Joint Team under Frontex umbrella.

Having in mind that Joint Operations are performed by border guards coming from different Member States, improving and harmonization of knowledge about the EU common rules and procedures is targeted by this training activity.

1.2. Participants of the course

By the Management board decision, No: 38/2016, a land border surveillance officer (BSO) is an official of a competent national authority of a Member State, who carries out border surveillance related tasks at the EU external land border.

Tasks and Functions of BSO is:

- to carry out border surveillance in a designated area at the EU external land
- to operate relevant technical equipment
- to apprehend persons having crossed or having attempted to cross the border irregularly
- to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors
- to refer persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation to the competent national authorities of the host Member State
- to document all relevant actions by using methods and technology (reports, videos, photos, etc.)
- to take part in identification SAR situations and apply necessary measures where SAR measures and actions must be taken.

Required Job Competences for a Border Surveillance Officer (BSO)

A BSO has a knowledge and understanding of:

- land border surveillance technology, tactics and identification methods
- specific national, EU and international legislation, policies, procedures including documentation related to carrying out border surveillance and fundamental rights.

A BSO is able to:

- conduct border surveillance, selecting appropriate methods, tactics and techniques at land or maritime borders
- have and use necessary communication skills and techniques specific to land borders
- continuously assess situation and determine the need for further actions
- operate border surveillance technology and equipment at land borders.

A BSO takes responsibility for:

- acting in accordance with the legal frameworks and the guidelines included in the operational plan
- ensuring, that interviewed persons in recognisable or claimed need of international protection or special needs as listed in art. 34 (3) of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation are identified and referred to the competent authorities.

Eligibility Criteria

To be eligible to become a Border Surveillance Officer in the European Border and Coast Guard Teams, a candidate should:

- Possess knowledge, skills and competence as described in the “Required Job Competences”
- Have an adequate knowledge of English language (equivalent to CEFR level B1)
- Prove at least 2 years of professional experience of border surveillance
- Have participated in training in relevant Union and international law, including fundamental rights and access to international protection and guidelines for the purpose of identifying persons seeking protection and directing them towards the appropriate facilities.

1.3. Trainers of the course

The EBCGT Land Border Surveillance Officer training is a simulation of a Frontex Joint Operation “in a nutshell”.

The role of the trainers should be understood as moderators during the entire learning process of the course, rather than being an “instructor”.

The trainer should keep in mind and respect during the entire activity that participants of the course are experts on national level and nominated by their national authority, fully in alignment with the eligibility criteria for this profile.

Assigned trainers should promote a practical, interactive, problem solving and participant centred approach during the entire learning process, which fits to the expertise and experience of the participants.

Eligibility Criteria for a trainer in this course

- Have an adequate knowledge of English language (equivalent to CEFR level B2)
- Experience in participating a Joint Operation - Land Border
- Knowledge, understanding and experience of work as a Team Member and ability to teach / instruct new Team Members under this profile
- Ability to work in a team
- Experience as trainer on national and international level
- Preferably participated in EBGT Land Border Surveillance Officer Training provided by Frontex in order to have an understanding of the methodology of this training
- Preferably already trained in „train the trainers“ provided by Frontex

Important tasks of a trainer

- Understand and apply in this course the role as moderator, rather than instructor
- Understand the training needs of the trainees;
- Apply suitable variations of training methods;
- Manage the work of the training group
- Arrange the training infrastructure, especially the scenarios in most realistic way
- Conduct the training within its constraints and proper time-management
- Provide a profound feedback to the performance of the trainees without “only looking for mistakes”.

1.4. Training Outline

The course consists of two phases:

- Independent learning phase
- Contact-learning week.

Independent Learning Phase

The independent learning phase starts approximately two weeks before the contact week and consists of the European border and coast guard team (EBCGT) pre-deployment online course with an additional chapter for land border surveillance officers, which takes approximately 8 working hours in total.

This independent learning phase enables participants to gain basic information to build upon during the contact phase.

Successful completion of online course is needed in order to access contact week.

The independent learning phase provides the learners with basic theoretical knowledge for their deployment. Topics like Frontex Code of Conduct, Reporting procedures, complaint mechanism and other relevant information are provided in an interactive way with an assessment.

The online course is the essential fundament for the contact-learning phase. During the contact-learning phase, the learners can apply their knowledge in a simulated Joint Operation.

Contact-learning phase

The contact-learning phase is delivered at a Frontex Partnership Academy over five consecutive working days.

This phase is delivered via scenario-based exercises as a simulation of a joint operation (from briefing to debriefing), combining theoretical knowledge and practical exercises. This contact-learning phase is established in an artificial joint operation named “Europia”.

The methodology of the contact-learning phase is going from easy to more complex tasks of the Joint Teams:

- Briefing of the Team Members
- Radio communication exercise
- Tactical training in a Joint Team
- Exercising in Joint Teams
- Exercising in a Shift with Other Joint Teams Involved
- Exercising in a Night Shift with Other Joint Teams Involved
- Debriefing

1.5 General assessment strategy and re-sit procedures

The independent learning phase and the contact-learning phase are taken into account for the assessment of the learner. The successful participation of the independent learning phase enables the learner to participate the contact-learning phase. In case the participant has not passed, or couldn't get access to the online course (technical reasons, invitation for course came late, legitimate personal reasons), the participant is allowed to finish the online course in the beginning of the contact-learning phase in exceptional case. This is in general regarded as a failure of the course and the additional time is regarded as a re-sit.

During the contact-learning phase, the theory of the online course will be brought into practice and the learner has to act in a Joint Team in order to solve typical border related tasks in an artificial joint operation.

Following aspects will be taken into consideration for the assessment during the contact-learning phase:

1. Radio communication exercise
2. Three scenarios related to exercising in a joint team
3. Exercising in a shift with other joint teams involved
4. Exercising in a night shift with other joint teams involved
5. Report writing and reporting procedures

Assessment	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Each scenario shall be assessed on both critical mistakes and minor mistakes. These are in general identified for each scenario. A single critical failure point will be an automatic scenario fail. However, a participant will be allowed to have a number of “minor faults” before they all add up to a fail. For the current scenarios three minor mistakes lead to one critical mistakes, which means failure of the scenario. 2. There should always be at least two trainer/assessors with each team of 3 to ensure that each team member is being assessed at all times. <p>The trainer/assessors will have to take care to be able to observe their designated participants at all times.</p>
Feedback	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. Feedback must be on an individual basis. <p>Team feedback is also valuable to cover general performance issues that all should receive feedback on.</p> <p>Individual feedback is essential to identify areas each individual is doing well or is failing to achieve over. It should be given immediately following each scenario so that the participant has the chance to improve in the next exercises.</p> <p>The feedback of the trainer / assessor follows following rules:</p> <p>The trainer encourage the team to discuss all positive and all negative aspects in their performance during the scenario.</p>

Each Team Member should get individually the opportunity to explain why he/she acted in the scenario in the way he/she did.

Feedback rules for assigned trainers:

The course is all about working in a Joint Team in typical border related scenarios. These scenarios are managed by the trainers and should be organized in most realistic way. After each performance of a team in a scenario, the trainers provide a feedback to the team by respecting following rules:

- I. After the scenario the team will have a few minutes to reconsider their performance and how they have managed the scenario from their perspective; about what went well and what they would do better in future in a similar case.
- II. The team presents their conclusion to the trainers without interruption of the trainers; it is important that the team detects misconduct by themselves in order to reach best learning effect.
- III. Afterwards the trainers will, based on the presentation of the team, provide the team with further tips and hints in order to improve the performance of the team.
- IV. The feedback should always end positive for a better acceptance of the learning process.

Pass-mark

4. Participants can fail one of the scenarios and improve over the next few scenarios so that they pass at the end of the course.
5. The failure of two or more scenario assessments is recorded as a “referred pass”, (which is a kinder way of recording a fail).

Intense re-training

6. Once the “Referral” decision (fail) is given to the participant he/she shall be given targeted briefing/re-training on what they need to do in order to pass the re-sit.

Re-sits

7. Participants who fail should be able to re-sit the scenario they failed during the week’s course. There is spare time built into the course that should be used to allow this to happen.
 8. Re-sits should be about the same scenario subject area (eg smuggling, or human trafficking, or first aid, etc), but it should be a new different scenario from the one originally undertaken.
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There is a set of critical and minor mistakes designed for assessment purposes and used by the trainers during the specific scenario.

General critical mistakes related to all exercises are:

- Officers safety and security, which will lead to life endangerment (examples: transportation of an unchecked person)
- Un-safe approach to the clients
- Misuse of coercive or authority/ exceeding the use of force or violation of individual fundamental rights
- Not separating searched from unsearched persons
- No checks of ID in database

General minor mistakes related to all exercises are:

- Reporting to Command Centre in front of a client – discrete surveillance
- Un-proper reporting
- Neglecting internal and external communication
- Without delegation of tasks / division of tasks within the team
- Evidence gathering and protection
- No dialog/communication with the opponent – not explaining measures or actions to the opponent.

Trainers assess participants individually, but also take into consideration the performance of the team.

2.

PRACTICAL GUIDE



2.1 General

Joint Teams perform preventive and repressive tasks, by respecting the main purposes of the surveillance of external borders at places other than border crossing-points and surveillance of these crossing-points outside opening hours:

- to prevent, and discourage, unauthorised border crossings
- to counter cross-border criminality
- to apply or take measures against persons who have crossed the border illegally.

Border surveillance duties are performed in full compliance of the relevant EU and international law, national laws of the Host Member States, obligations related to access to international protection and fundamental rights.

As stated before, the contact-learning phase is organized over five consecutive working days as an extensive simulated joint operation, with a variety of exercises aimed to show the participants how to best perform these tasks and fulfil their duties.

During the contact-learning phase, the trainers and trainees are in national uniform, ready for border guarding (fully equipped, without real weapons, but with artificial training weapons).

Working days are organized from 9:00h to 17:00h (4x1,5 hour timeslots) with two coffee breaks and lunch break.

Due to organizational issues with availability of training logistics, the agenda could be slightly amended, but it should be announced in advance to participants.

The training is conducted at premises of a Partnership Academy. It is necessary to create and provide each team with a map of the area. When selecting locations for specific exercises, it is important that the locations are suitable to the content of the exercise and allows to achieve the respective learning outcomes.


Example of the weekly schedule:

EBCGT LBS Training

First day		Second day		Third day		Fourth day		Fifth day	
		09:00 - 10:30	Operational Briefing (only for training) - General part - National part	09:00 - 10:30	Exercising in Join Teams Specific shift schedule available	09:00 - 10:30	Exercising in a shift with other Join Teams involved-parallel feedback of reports	09:00 - 10:30	Debriefing
Coffee break									
		11:00 - 12:30	Radio communication exercise	11:00 - 12:30	Exercising in Join Teams Specific shift schedule available	11:00 - 12:30	Exercising in a shift with other Join Teams involved-parallel feedback of reports	11:00 - 12:30	Debriefing
Lunch break									
13:30 - 15:00	Arrival	13:30 - 15:30	Radio communication exercise	13:30 - 15:30	Exercising in Join Teams Specific shift schedule available	13:30 - 15:30	Compensation time off	13:30 - 17:30	Intercultural Awareness
Coffee break									
18:30	Introduction and welcome	15:30 - 17:00	Tactical training in Joint Teams	15:30 - 17:00	Exercising in Join Teams Specific shift schedule available	19:30 - 23:00	Exercising in a nightshift with other Join Teams involved	18:30 - 23:00	Official Dinner with closure ceremony and handover of certificates

Example of a training map

The non-disclosed part contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. The disclosure would undermine the protection of privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with European Union legislation regarding the protection of personal data and therefore has to be precluded pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.



2.2 Training logistics

In order to create an artificial Joint Operation in a training environment, following logistics are required for this activity:

Personal

- Minimum 7 trainers (1 in operational centre + 6 for observing the joint teams in the operational scenarios)
- 8-10 actors for scenario based role-play exercises

Premises

- Minimum 2 classrooms (1 for operational centre and 1 for report writing)
- Compound for radio communication exercise and 3 scenarios for typical border related situations
- Wider area outside of compound for exercising in a shift with other Joint Teams involved
- Premises and training area suitable for night shift, low-light exercises

Equipment

- **The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.**
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2.3 First training day

The first day is scheduled for the arrival of trainers and trainees and the introduction exercise in the evening. During the introduction exercise, the training plan and program are presented to the participants.

The intention of the introduction exercise is not only to get acquainted to each other, it is also important to get background information about each participant in order to set up the Joint Teams for the week. It should be a balance between experienced and not experienced officers in each team and it should be ensured that they are not coming from the same country or speak the same native language. This will ensure that all participants have to communicate in English the entire week. The best way to conduct this exercise is to use an “icebreaker game” (quiz, group game, interview,). Basic information, which are relevant for forming teams, are:

- country of origin
- working experience
- gender

- previous participation in Frontex training activities and / or Joint Operations

Based on received information trainers will compose 6 patrols (Alfa 1, Alfa 2.... Alfa 6). Participants will work the whole week in the same patrols in order to build a up a team spirit.

2.4 Second training day

General and national briefing

Second day of the training starts with general and national briefing like in a real Joint Operation.

The topics for the briefing are taken from an original Operational Plan and adjusted for the invented artificial country Europia.

The aim of this session is also to explain to all participants that a briefing is mandatory and after each briefing all logistical and/or legal issues should be clarified with host Member State in order to be fully operational after the briefing. For example, are there any specific procedures in the host country for using coercive? Where is the storage for the weapon organized? Who are my points of contact?

At the end of the briefing, all participant will be divided into the teams (6 patrols).

Radio communication exercise starts after the briefing. For this purpose, command center of the JO “Europia” will be established, with minimum 1 trainer as operator.

Radio communication exercise

For law enforcement officers, communication and reporting are essential tasks in daily duty to:

- inform colleagues about an incident or emergency case
- gain intelligence
- share intelligence with colleagues in order to initiate actions
- request support
- fulfil obligations to reporting procedures (Serious Incident Report, JORA, etc)
- Initiate follow-up procedures like criminal investigations, prevention actions, etc.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

For this exercise, participants are divided into six patrols (Joint Teams) – Alpha 1 - Alpha 6 – which are sent to six different locations in the training area. On four locations, trainers will supervise their activities. Two locations are without trainer.

First tasks for the patrols is to locate and move to appointed locations and to report to command centre, transmitting their location.

Second task for patrols is to reach specific locations given by the Command Centre and to complete tasks at the spot. After finishing one task, they receive the next task from command centre, and have to move to a new position. During the radio communication exercise there is the possibility to move 5 times and receive five tasks, depending on the time schedule.

After completing all tasks patrols move back to the command centre for feedback session.

Through this exercise, participants should be aware about the importance of delivering accurate information via radio and how a lack of communication could have impact in a real life situation.

Radio communication exercise is more detailed in Annex VII.

For the assessment, following aspects are of importance:

- Usage of NATO Alphabet
- Radio communication procedures
- Communication and interaction among the team

Average use of all three benchmarks is required for passing the exercise. If one of the benchmarks is continuously misconducted, it will lead to failing the exercise. Generally, radio communication exercise is considered as a minor mistake and only in combination of failing in report writing will be considered as critical mistake.

Tactical training in Joint Teams - workshop

The aim of this workshop is to enhance team spirit, exchange best practise and establish common procedures in a team for typical border related actions like establishing identity, search of a person, usage of handcuffs, etc. There is no separate assessment, but trainers will observe:

- Procedures during security search of a person in a team and usage of handcuffs
- Communication before and during the measures.

2.5 Third training day

The patrols have to work in a day shift in the Joint Operation Europa as a Joint Team. During this day, they have to pass three scenarios on three different locations. In the morning before the shift starts, they receive first their shift briefing.

The Joint Teams have to be in a specific time at a specific location where the scenario takes place. After each scenario, the trainers provide their feedback to the trainees according the feedback rules. Time for the necessary reporting procedures is foreseen between each scenario.

There are three scenarios for each team

- Vehicle checkpoint - trafficking in human beings,
- Rucksack at the border line – intelligence gathering, smuggling case
- First aid – asylum seeker

Every team will go through every scenario. All scenarios were developed in close cooperation with Frontex Operational Response Division. A team of two trainers manages every scenario.


FRONTEX 
 EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD AGENCY **Shift schedule**

	<u>Scenario 1</u>	<u>Scenario 2</u>	<u>Scenario 3</u>
<u>Patrol 1</u>	09:00 – 09:45	11:00 – 11:45	14:00 – 14:45
<u>Patrol 2</u>	14:00 – 14:45	09:00 – 09:45	11:00 – 11:45
<u>Patrol 3</u>	11:00 – 11:45	14:00 – 14:45	09:00 – 09:45
<u>Patrol 4</u>	09:45 – 10:30	11:45 – 12:30	14:45 – 15:30
<u>Patrol 5</u>	14:45 – 15:30	09:45 – 10:30	11:45 – 12:30
<u>Patrol 6</u>	11:45 – 12:30	14:45 – 15:30	09:45 – 10:30

Duty time Patrol 1, 2 and 3: **08:30 – 16:00 (reports submitted to Command Centre) at 08:30 at the HQ conference room for briefing**

Duty Time Patrol 4, 5 and 6: **09:00 – 16:30 (reports submitted to Command Centre) at 09:00 at the HQ conference room for briefing**

16:30 hrs all patrols are at BG HQ (conference room)

Tips for trainers for the management of the scenarios

Choose a proper location for the scenario, which reflects reality as much as possible.

Create a check-list for the necessary equipment and ensure that the equipment is maintained and functional.

Arrive early. Give yourself time to arrange and to check all logistics with your scenario and get yourself mentally geared up for the training session.

Ensure that you brief the involved actors and that they fully understand the scope of the training.

Explain the participants what you're going to cover. Introduce your exercise with a brief overview of the training subject's main points, or simply start the exercise with arrival of the Joint Team (depends on the scenario).

Ensure that participants understand the influence of stress in this particular exercise and how it can have impact on their decision making process.

Do not stop or influence a running exercise / scenario! The scenario shall run without any interruption by trainers. Therefore, it is necessary that the trainers do their notes about their observations for the feedback afterwards.

2.6 Fourth training day

Exercise in a shift with other Joint Teams involved – Complex Scenario

On the fourth day a more complex exercise is foreseen, which involves three patrols in one scenario. The location of the scenario should reflect the reality as much as possible. The exercise should be conducted in real populated area, with all security measures ensuring the safety of participants, trainers, actors and civilians.

This scenario focuses on communication and interaction between Joint Teams, but also on:

- Closing an area (border guard tactic skills)
- Searching an area (border guard tactic skills)
- First aid skills
- Initiating asylum procedures

Exercise in a night shift with two other Joint Teams involved – Complex Scenario

The evening of the fourth day is dedicated for an exercise in night shift with three joint teams involved. This too is a complex exercise which involves three teams in one scenario. Location of the scenario should demonstrate reality as much as possible.

Topic is border crossing of a group of people with transport organized by facilitator.

This scenario focuses on communication and interaction between joint teams in condition of low light, but also on:

- Closing an area (border guard tactic skills)
- Searching an area and premise (border guard tactic skills)
- First aid skills

Patrols are assigned to patrol in the green border area and to carry out surveillance duties. In a case of any irregularities, patrol should take necessary actions immediately

Risk assessments indicate attempts of illegal border crossings in the area, especially clandestine entry and some smuggling cases of goods (cigarettes, alcohol). Several times during the last week local citizens informed BG authority about the presence of unknown people in the area.

During the fourth training day and the more complex scenarios it is essential that one patrol is taking the lead on the spot as multi-patrol leader.

2.7 Fifth training day

The fifth training day is dedicated for the debriefing like in a real joint operation. Trainers and trainees will have an opportunity to give personal feedback about the training. The trainees can state their opinion and propose further improvements of the course and how the course meets their expectations.

Inventory of all equipment, which was used during the course.

After debriefing and closing of official part of training, time is dedicated for team building and cultural awareness workshop.

At the last evening the official common dinner with closure ceremony and handover of certificates takes place.

ANNEX I

OPERATIONAL PLAN

Field Deployment Unit (FDU)

Operational Plan

ONLY FOR TRAINING PURPOSE

LBS Joint Operation EUROPIA

The non-disclosed part contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. The disclosure would undermine the protection of privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with European Union legislation regarding the protection of personal data and therefore has to be precluded pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Prepared by

Approved by

.....
Signature

██████████
Operational Manager

.....
Signature

██████████
Deputy Executive Director

Attention

This Operational Plan is only for training purposes. It indicates an invented Joint Operation as part of the training methodology of the EBCGT Land Border Surveillance Officer Training. It is a supporting document and should be regarded as training material. Therefore this document is leant on an original Operational Plan, but the content is for supporting the training course. The invented country EUROPIA is ██████████

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Operational Plan has been agreed with the authorities of the host Member State¹, in consultation with the authorities of the home Member States participating in the joint operation coordinated by Frontex. It covers all necessary elements for a proper and timely organization of the joint operation coordinated by Frontex.

The Operational Plan contain detailed and specific information related to the particular joint operation, while the Annexes enclose operational information applicable to all joint land borders operations. Annexes complement the Main part of the Operational Plan by providing complete and comprehensive description of the implementation of the joint operation. *(This training document has no Annexes)*

The Main part and Specific Annexes of Operational Plan are marked as “Limited” without prejudice to the public right of access to documents as laid down in Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001, regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, while the General Annexes to the Operational Plan have no classification mark indicated.

Operational Plan shall only be made available to the authorities referred in each MS as “Law Enforcement”. This document shall be made available to other interested parties only on a need-to-know basis and in accordance with European and national rules on the protection of sensitive/classified information. Such dissemination of this document shall be done only on a case-by-case basis.

This Operational Plan may be revised at any time in order to correspond with the new operational developments. A copy of the amended Operational Plan shall be immediately distributed by Frontex to the participating MS via FOSS.

2. DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

EUROPIA is a country, which has joined the European Union in 2014 and has fully implemented the Schengen Acquis.

During the last months a significant increase of irregular migration has been detected from neighbouring country USANSKI, which is used as transit. Irregular migrants were crossing the green border mainly in the south-east. Due to political crises in North African countries, further increase of irregular migration is expected in near future.

EUROPIA has therefore reinforced border control measures at the border to USANSKI and detected in coherence to these measures criminal activities an increased number of trafficking of human beings and smuggling as well.

¹ For the purposes of the present document, the term “Member State” includes also the States participating in the relevant development of the Schengen acquis in the meaning of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and its Protocol (No 19) on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union.

In order to tackle the current situation, EUROPIA has requested human support for border control from the European Union.

3. OPERATIONAL AIM AND OBJECTIVES

3.1. Operational aim

The operational aim of the joint operation is to implement coordinated operational activities at the EU external land borders in order to control irregular migration flows towards the territory of the MS of the European Union (EU) and to tackle cross border crime.

The operational aims will be implemented in full compliance with the relevant EU law, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the relevant international law, including the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees from 1951, the respect for fundamental rights in particular the access to international protection and the compliance with the principle of non-refoulement and taking into account the recommendations of the Frontex Consultative Forum.

3.2. Operational objectives

- Enhance border security
- Enhance operational cooperation
- Enhance exchange of information
- Identify possible risks and threats
- Establish and exchange best practices

4. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

- Provide support to local authorities in border surveillance activities at land borders;
- Share experiences and exchange expertise as well as to constantly update knowledge on the irregular migration trends in order to adopt countermeasures to tackle the phenomena;
- Collect and assess information in order to improve the detection of human smuggling and trafficking in human beings facilitation by individuals and/or criminal networks and assist wherever possible identification and detention of facilitators;
- Provide a clear and updated situational picture concerning the operational areas, modus operandi, main trends and possible rapid changes in this respect;

5. IMPLEMENTATION

5.1. Period of implementation²

Commencement		18:00
Termination		24:00

5.2. Additional information

A detailed duty schedule will be provided before the activity and updated on daily base.

5.3. Operational Briefings / Debriefings

All participants taking part in joint operation will receive the operational briefing and debriefing delivered by representatives of Frontex and national authorities of host MS. The operational briefing will take place on Tuesday morning in the operational area; the debriefing will take place on Friday at HQ conference room.

6. COORDINATION STRUCTURE

6.1. Partnership

Frontex is the EU coordinator, initiating, promoting and facilitating the EU MS synchronized efforts to control the external borders.

The local authorities are the direct partners of Frontex and responsible for all border related activities within the joint operation.

The home MSs will support the achievement of operational objectives and implementation of activities by deploying their resources to the defined locations in particular periods of time.

² Foreseeable duration of the joint operation as indicated in the Article 3a (1) (b)- of the Frontex Regulation.

6.2. Main operational structures / actors and their tasks

7.2.1. Member States

- Members of the teams
- Local staff of the hosting MS

7.2.3. Frontex

- Frontex Operational Coordinator (FOC)

7. COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATION AND REPORTING

7.1. Command and control


Command and control of members of the team remain with the competent national authority of the host MS.

7.2. Operational communication

Communication plan Joint Operation Europa:



Communication Plan Europa



7.3. Communication with Press

Frontex is strongly committed to the principle of transparency, therefore, as a general rule, media should be granted access to operational areas.

Members of the teams are allowed to talk to the media only within the limits set by specific guidelines for the participating officers below. Each team member taking part in the operation shall receive a laminated card with the specific guidelines.

The communication strategy on the Border Control Operational Actions is common for Frontex and the Host Members States.

7.4. Reporting

7.4.1 Reports from participants

During Joint Operation Europaia all patrols are requested to prepare and submit following reports according to Annex 1 and 2 of the EBCGT Land Border Surveillance Officer Handbook of best practice:

- Incident reports
- Shift report

Command Centre will daily announce deadline for submission.

7.4.2 Serious incident reporting

A Serious Incident Report (SIR) is an alert message aimed at informing Frontex, and other relevant stakeholders, as soon as possible (within 2 hours after recognition), about the occurrence of a SI as defined in the “Frontex Serious Incident Catalogue”³. The production and timely dissemination of a SIR contribute to improve situational awareness and increase the reaction capabilities of Frontex related to incidents occurred in the frame of activities coordinated or led by Frontex.

Type of report	Description	Responsibility
Serious Incident Report	<p style="color: red;">The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.</p>	All participants of the JO
³ Serious Incident Catalogue		

combination thereof, including any allegation of =violation of Fundamental Rights.

8. ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGMENTS AND LOGISTICS

8.1. Composition of the teams

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8.2. Transport and lodging

All transportation will be provided by the host MS Europia. All deployed staff will be accommodated at HQ in Europia.

8.3. Safety and Security Rules

- All communication will be in English language
- All participants will follow strictly the Frontex Code of Conduct
- Trainers will be visible by vests "Frontex Trainer"; all orders by trainers shall be strictly followed
- Participants will wear their proper national uniform; personal equipment is allowed after consulting trainers; NO WEAPONS

8.4 Legal aspects of EUROPIA

International Protection:

People who are in need of International Protection will be referred to the reception centre of the national office for asylum seekers. As a first measure the border authority establish identity and takes evidence before referring to reception centre.

Trafficking in Human Beings:

EUROPIA has recently launched its national program in preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, which is based on the EU Directive 36/2011. Victims of trafficking receive, after establishing identity, legal status for staying in EUROPIA till

the case is closed by court. The border authority takes all measures for proper investigation against traffickers.

9. EVALUATION

Evaluation of the Joint Operation will be done with all participants during the debriefing on Thursday.

ANNEX II

HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICE FOR LAND BORDER SURVEILLANCE OFFICERS

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As law enforcement, you must first know the law!

Introduction

A Border Surveillance Officer is facing daily challenging and demanding tasks. The spectrum of action and reaction has to be adopted to the situation, environment and local circumstances. In this regard, a Team Member deployed to any Frontex Joint Operation or Pilot Project has to rely on certain standards in cooperation with host Member State officers and vice versa.

This handbook is not replacing any national law or regulation; it should be understood as best practice in various typical Border Guard situations in order to facilitate, on one hand the enforcement of the national law of the host Member State, but also to ensure self-protection of deployed Guest Officers and their colleagues.

Worst case scenarios occur by the combination of avoidable minor mistakes, for example the misinterpretation of information received, improper use of equipment, insufficient equipment check prior to the start of duty, lack of proper briefing of the staff involved.

Diplomat in Uniform

You are the first impression a foreigner receives by entering your or the host country! We expect behavioral standards aligning the Frontex Code of Conduct and this reflects appearance, communication and professionalism in all your measures.

The respect of Fundamental Rights¹ is the main approach of this handbook and, as mentioned in the headline: “As law enforcement you must first know the law!”. The enjoyment of Fundamental Rights entails responsibilities and duties with regard to other persons, to the human community and to future generations. In order to show you how much the Charter of Fundamental Rights affects your work, here is an example of a border related case:

Example:

Your patrol stops a vehicle close to the border and you check the identity of the driver. You recognize a forged document presented by the driver and you decide to bring the person for further clarification about his identity to the nearest field office. After one hour at the field office you have established the real identity and by checking the database you have found out an existing European Arrest Warrant issued by German authorities. The reason for the arrest warrant is that the person has been sentenced for trafficking in human beings.

Task:

Discuss and try to find out which articles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union are applicable to this case³.

¹ Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union


² Taken from the Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

³ Example: To stop the person and transfer to the field office; to keep the person at the field office for one hour; arrestment due to arrest warrant – Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Establishing identity, and check with database – Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Using forged documents by the person as criminal act – Article 47 and Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. European Arrest Warrant by court decision – Article 47 and Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

There is no need to commit the whole law to memory, but if you follow some general rules within all your actions, you will comply with general legal requirements:

- adapt the use of force according to the situation;
- follow the principle of proportionality in all your actions and measures, especially when using force or dealing with vulnerable people;
- any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by the Charter of Fundamental Rights must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms.⁴

Use of Force Model⁵



The officer continuously assesses the situation and selects the most reasonable option relative to those circumstances as perceived at that point in time.

Proportionality

In all your measures you should respect proportionality between the aim you want to achieve and the means you are using. Simply spoken, **do not use a sledgehammer for cracking a nut!**

⁴ Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

⁵ Ontario Use of Force Model (2004). 2nd July 2014, 12:23 hrs, taken from internet: <http://ottawa.ca/calendar/ottawa/citycouncil/opsb/2008/02-25/item7.htm>



Keep proportionality of all your measures!

Chapter 1 – Border surveillance basics

Principles of green border surveillance

Within the border surveillance duties along the EU external land borders joint teams comprising officers from the border guard services of the host MSs and guest officers (EBGTs) perform preventive and repressive tasks, which are carried out following the operational plan by respecting the main purposes of the surveillance of external borders at places other than border crossing-points and surveillance of these crossing-points outside opening hours⁶:

- to prevent, and discourage, unauthorised border crossings;
- to counter cross-border criminality;
- to apply or take measures against persons who have crossed the border illegally.

Border surveillance duties are performed in full compliance of the relevant EU and international law, national laws of the Host Member States, obligations related to access to international protection and fundamental rights.⁷

The surveillance of the land borders may be carried out by⁸:

- patrolling
- stationing at places known or perceived to be sensitive

⁶ Schengen Handbook, Brussels, 06/XI/2006, C (2006) 5186 final, p. 75

⁷ Schengen Borders Code (SBC), Art. 3a.

⁸ Schengen Handbook, Brussels, 06/XI/2006, C (2006) 5186 final, p. 75

Joint Team's tasks are done practically through various forms of work, most frequently as patrolling, observation, intensified control and ambush (stationary and mobile units).⁹

Patrolling

Patrolling is a form of work usually done in motor vehicles and other means of transport at those operational areas (sections) of the EU external land borders where local border guards and GOs presence is required due to the operational needs, defined base on the risk assessment.¹⁰

The main tasks of patrolling are:

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Stationing

The main tasks of stationing are to:

- observe the places which are perceived to be sensitive to illegal border crossing or smuggling
- stop and bring to the nearest border guard's station persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally

Observation

Observation is a form of work the purpose of which is to spend a short or long period of time observing certain operational area(s) and it is usually done on foot by use of different technical means. Observation is carried out in places where illegal crossings of the EU external borders and other criminal activities related to THB are more frequent or where they can be expected based on risk assessment and previous operational findings.

Intensified control

Intensified control is the form of work where, according to the risk assessment, joint teams carry out tasks in a certain area at a certain time based on a common plan. In surveillance of the land border, intensified control is performed in order to detect and prevent illegal crossings, to detect forged or altered passports and abuse of genuine documents, to detect and prevent trafficking in firearms, to detect and prevent illicit drug trafficking and to detect stolen vehicles.

Ambush

Ambush is a form of work where, according to the risk assessment, joint teams carry out tasks at designated place(s) in order to detect illegal crossings with the main aim to apprehend the facilitators involved in people trafficking. Areas for ambushes are predefined and selected based on the risk assessments and relevant information provided.

Combined border surveillance operational activities include various forms of work and activities presented above (as example: patrolling + observation + intensified control) based on the threat and risk assessment for the particular border area with the aim to perform preventive and operative tasks related to with the main purpose to prevent unauthorised border crossings and to counter cross-border criminality at EU external land borders.

Technical equipment for successful land border surveillance

Different technical equipment for successful surveillance of the land borders is used by local authorities and GOs during Joint Operations. Technical means¹¹ which are mainly used for land border surveillance during the Joint Operations at land borders - with the aim to apprehend individuals crossing the land borders illegally - are:

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Security and safety aspects of border surveillance

Security and safety aspects of the border surveillance as such shall be also taken into account, due the fact that the irregular migrants are often put into dangerous situations while trying to cross the EU external land borders since the terrain (landscape as such, woods, areas without inhabitants) and other circumstances (severe weather conditions, flooding, etc.) at the border areas are quite often putting them in situations requiring search and rescue measures to be taken from local authorities. Measures taken for purpose of the border surveillance shall be conducted in the way that does not put at risk of safety of the persons apprehended or rescued.

Joint Teams

Joint Teams (comprising officers from the border guard services of the host MSs and Team Members (EBCGTs) - are obliged to maintain the highest standards of integrity, ethical conduct, professionalism and respect for and promotion of

fundamental rights. While patrolling at the EU External land borders they are obliged to comply with the European, international law, fundamental rights and national law of the Member State. While performing their duties at EU external land borders (observation, patrolling) they shall not discriminate persons on grounds of sex, race or ethnic origin, religion, belief, age or sexual orientation and they are expected to treat every person with courtesy, respect and due consideration for the nature of any legitimate activity in which they are engaged.

Chapter 2 – Communication/Reporting

The Four Communication Skills



The strongest weapon for law enforcement is communication!

In this chapter we will focus on communication and reporting as one of the most important tasks of law enforcement. We will generally distinguish between internal and external communication. As “**internal communication**” we regard the communication between Border Guards and within the respective Border Guard authority, which could be used, but not limited to:

- inform colleagues about an incident or emergency case;
- gain intelligence;
- share intelligence with colleagues in order to initiate actions in border control;
- request support;
- fulfil obligation to report (Serious Incident Report), so that senior management can react accordingly;
- prepare criminal investigations; etc.

The main language in any Frontex activity is English¹⁴, therefore it is necessary for the staff deployed to be familiar with common standards in reporting and communication.

As “**external communication**” we regard the communication between the law enforcement authority (in this case you as Border Guard) and any other member of the public who could be a traveler, perpetrator, victim of trafficking, witness, irregular migrant or anybody else approaching you in respective situations.

Always adjust your behavior and communication to the situation and the person in front of you.

Examples:

- communication with children differs from communication with adults;
- communication with victims differs from communication with perpetrators.

Internal communication in practice

Radio communication skills

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International phonetic alphabet (NATO/ ICAO):

A	Alpha
B	Bravo
C	Charlie
D	Delta
E	Echo
F	Foxtrott
G	Golf
H	Hotel
I	India
J	Juliette
K	Kilo
L	Lima
M	Mike
N	November
O	Oscar
P	Papa
Q	Quebec
R	Romeo
S	Sierra
T	Tango
U	Uniform
V	Victor
W	Whisky
X	X-Ray
Y	Yankee
Z	Zulu

General instruction for transmitting messages¹⁵:

- Decide in advance what you are going to say, ensuring it will be clear and brief.
- Make sure no one else is speaking on the net when you start.
- Remember to divide your message into sensible phrases, make pauses and maintain a natural rhythm to your speech.
- Avoid excessive calling and unofficial transmissions.
- Use standard pronunciation. Emphasize vowels sufficiently.
- Avoid extreme pitch, speak in a moderately strong voice, do not shout.
- Keep a distance of about 5 cm between the microphone and your lips.

- Shield your microphone from background noises and wind

Radio procedure words¹⁶

PROWORD	MEANING
ACKNOWLEDGE!	Confirm that you have received my message and will comply.
AFFIRMATIVE	Yes/Correct
NEGATIVE	No/Incorrect
ALL AFTER ...	Everything that you (I) transmitted after ... (Keyword)
ALL BEFORE ...	Everything that you (I) transmitted before ... (Keyword)
CORRECT (THAT IS CORRECT)	What you have transmitted is correct.
CORRECTION	An error has been made in this transmission. It will continue with the last word (group) correctly transmitted. An error has been made in this transmission. The correct version is... That which follows is a correct version in answer to your request for verification.
WRONG	Your last transmission was incorrect. The correct version is ...
DISREGARD THIS TRANSMISSION –OUT	This transmission is an error. Disregard it.
SILENCE – SILENCE – SILENCE	Cease all transmissions on this net immediately. Will be maintained until lifted.
SILENCE LIFTED	Silence is lifted. The net is free for traffic.
END OF MESSAGE – OVER (OUT)	This concludes the message just transmitted (and the message instructions pertaining to a formal message).
END OF TEXT	The textual part of a formal message ends. Stand by for the message instructions immediately following.

FETCH the shift-leader!	I wish to speak on the radio to that person (in this case the shift-leader)
...SPEAKING	Requested person is now using the radio by him or herself.
FIGURES	Numerals or numbers will follow.
MESSAGE	I have a message for you.
OVER	This is the end of my turn of transmitting. A response is expected.
OUT	This is the end of my transmission to you. No answer or acknowledgment is expected.
SAY AGAIN!	Repeat all of your last transmission.

SEND YOUR MESSAGE!	Go ahead with your transmission.
SPEAK SLOWER!	Reduce the speed of your transmission.
SPELL	I shall spell the next word, group or equivalent phonetically. (Normally used in connection with request for repetition)
RELAY TO ...	Transmit the following message to all addressees or to the address designation immediately following.
MESSAGE PASSED TO ...	Your message has been passed to ...
ROGER	I have received your message, understand it and will comply.
ROGER SO FAR?	Have you received this part of my message satisfactorily?
WILCO	I have received your last transmission satisfactorily.
UNKNOWN STATION	The identity of the station calling or with whom I am attempting to establish communication is unknown.
VERIFY	Verify entire message (or part indicated) with the originator and send correct version. To be used only at discretion of or by the addressee to which the questioned message was directed.
I VERIFY	That which follows has been verified at your request and is repeated.
WAIT – OUT	I must pause for a few seconds

Example of radio conversation¹⁷:

The proword THIS IS or FROM is used to indicate the calling station.

- ALFA – THIS – IS – CHARLIE – MESSAGE – OVER
- FROM – ALFA – SEND – OVER
- THIS-IS-CHARLIE-WATCH-FOR-FALLEN-ROCKS-ON-ROAD-BIRKET-I
-SPELL-BRAVO-INDIA-ROMEO-KILO-ECHO-TANGO-BIRKET-OVER
- FROM – ALFA – WILCO – OUT

Report writing

A report is a key element in the Border Guard work. It is a documentation of your performance and could be the basis for follow-up decisions like criminal investigations, preventative measures, risk assessment, etc. A report also ensures gathering of intelligence for your authority.

In general, a report should provide answers to following questions:

- Who?
- What?
- When?

- Where?
- How?
- Why?

In the Annexes of this handbook you can find examples of a case and shift reports.

Serious Incident Report (SIR)¹⁸:

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Template with requested content if available:

Serious Incident Report

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

1. Fact of the case

What happened; when and where did it happen; who was involved/affected; why did it happen; how did it happen; with what did it happen (which means were used);

Source of information

2. Measures

Actions taken: Frontex actors and actions from Host/Home MS or others (intended, initiated, completed)

3. Assessment

Brief description of possible consequences, effects, reactions, further comments

Example:

Serious Incident Report

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

1. Fact of the case

00.10 a.m.

- An emergency call from people in distress in the area of Kraynovo was received on the emergency number 112.
- Immediately after receiving the call, 4 border police patrols (1 TVV) were dispatched in the area of BPU Bolyarovo.

09.15 a.m.

- An emergency helicopter was launched.

10.10 a.m.

- A group of 5 persons (irregular migrants) was detected north of BM219 in the area of Kraynovo village by the helicopter.

10.45:

- A patrol from BPU Bolyarovo arrived at the spot and found a group consisting of 3 children and 2 women.
- One of the women was found lifeless.

11:15:

- After an initial medical examination, the death of the person was confirmed by the alerted doctor.
- The body of the woman was transported for an autopsy to Yambol hospital.
- The reason for the death is under examination.
- The migrants claimed to be from Syria.

2. Measures

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The autopsy


External communication in practice

Basics:

- present friendly and appropriate appearance;
- build trust;
- show empathy;
- explain the reason for your measures;
- be patient;
- listen actively;
- always reduce own dominant behavior to a minimum;
- be clear to avoid any misunderstanding;
- communicate constantly to gain information about the situation, and for your personal risk assessment;
- be attentive;
- use your body language;
- follow tit-for-tat strategy/survivability.

Being attentive is a corner stone in the behavior of law enforcement officers. Obviously harmless situations could lead to an unexpected reaction of the person addressed, with serious consequences for you or your colleagues.

Sample pictures – Body language/non-verbal communication



Hands during conversation: **in front and ready for action**, depending on behaviour and reaction of the interlocutor.

Chapter 3 – Preparation for duty/team briefing

Equipment Check

The professional use of your equipment is a prerequisite for a successful operation. This includes means of communication as well as means of coercion.

Before starting your duty, you should check your equipment properly:

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Patrolling by vehicle

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Please be aware:

The meaning of a weapon could be, from legal perspective, interpreted in different ways in certain Member States, with different legal consequences (i.e. for obligatory warning procedures or storage of a weapon)!

Belt Configuration

- equipment always available according to graduation of force;
- attention: protection of backbone!

First Aid/hygiene

Always use hand gloves!

Are you aware on how to react in case of



- i.e. how to treat person in shock?
- How to use first aid kit? Is it available?
- Do you have number of ambulance available?

Team briefing

A proper preparation for each operation requires a thorough briefing by the team leader. The following aspects should be the minimum taken into consideration for a briefing prior each shift/patrol:

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Chapter 4 – Personal safety and security while imposing Border Guard measures

General rules

If you discover traces of illegal activities (e.g. footprints indicating illegal border crossing):

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Check of a person

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Check of a vehicle

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

A. *Vehicle check at a post*



The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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Three options for a safeguard's position



The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

B. Vehicle check with a patrol car

1. Patrol car behind of the controlled vehicle



The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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
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2. *Patrol car in front of the controlled vehicle*




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


3. *Car bootcheck*



The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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Search tactics and techniques – general approach

1) Person

- a) man – man;
- b) woman – woman;
- c) woman (if possible) – child.

2) Equipment

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

3) Types of reaction

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

4) Engagement protocol

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

5) Tactical variations to consider

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

7) Be aware about:

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.



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
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ANNEX III

SCENARIO I PACK

Checkpoint – trafficking in human beings



1. General information
2. Situation/order
3. Imaginary history
4. Material and personnel needs
5. Assessment checklist

1. General Information

Topic	Suspicious case of THB
Aims of Training	Communication <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Safety and security measures • Lawful BG measures • Detecting case of THB • Reporting
Personnel needs	1 patrol 2 actors (male/female)
Material needs	<p>The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.</p>
Locality	Training area at the compound
Communication	According to communication plan

2. Situation / Order

General Information	<p>The patrol is assigned to perform intensified control at check point B.</p> <p>Risk assessments indicate attempts of illegal border crossings in the area especially clandestine entry and some smuggling cases of goods (cigarettes, alcohol).</p>
Specific Information	<p>In the last week several times local citizens informed BG authority about the presence of unknown vehicles in the area.</p>
Orders	<p>The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.</p>

3. Imaginary history

Description of situation	Expected Measures	Behaviour of opponent / remarks
<i>Announcement of specific safety rules</i>	Following the Trainer's safety rules	Following the Trainer's safety rules
<p><u>Description of Situation:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The patrol is stationary at the check point B • The suspicious vehicle is moving on the road in the vicinity of the border line towards the patrol • The passenger is in the back seat of the car 	<p>The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.</p>	

Patrol Number:

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

AIMS	Performance		
	Name:	Name:	Name:
<u>MINOR POINTS</u>			
Using proper equipment in proper way (i.e. stop signal, reflector vests, etc)			
Delegation/Division of tasks			
Reporting to CC in front of the client - discrete surveillance			
Communication with the opponent			
Internal and external communication			
Finding evidence / gathering and protection			
Separating facilitator from victims			
Explaining measures			
Proper reporting			
<u>CRITICAL POINTS</u>			
<p>The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.</p>			

ANNEX IV

SCENARIO II PACK

Rucksack – smuggling case

1. General information
2. Situation/order
3. Imaginary history
4. Material and personnel needs
5. Assessment checklist

1. General Information

Topic	Left suitcase with smuggled goods, intelligence gathering
Aims of Training	Communication <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Safety and security measures • Lawful BG measures • Reporting
Personnel needs	1 patrol (by foot) 1 actor
Material needs	<p style="color: red; border: 1px solid red; padding: 5px;">The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.</p>
Locality	Training area at the compound
Communication	According to communication plan

2. Situation / Order

General Information	Risk assessments indicate attempts of illegal border crossings in the area especially clandestine entry and some smuggling cases of goods (cigarettes, alcohol).
Specific Information	In the last week several times local citizens informed BG authority about the presence of unknown people in the area.
Orders	<p style="color: red; border: 1px solid red; padding: 5px;">The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.</p>

3. Imaginary history

Description of situation	Expected Measures	Behaviour of opponent / remarks
<i>Announcement of specific safety rules</i>	Following the Trainer's safety rules	Following the Trainer's safety rules
<u>Description of Situation:</u> - patrol finds a luggage / suitcase with smuggled goods inside close to the border - Person appears walking around the area	<p style="color: red;">The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.</p>	

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Patrol Number:

AIMS	Performance		
	Name:	Name:	Name:
<u>MINOR POINTS</u>			
Delegation/Division of tasks			
Finding evidence / gathering and protection			
Communication with the opponent			
Proper reporting/ In time in order to initiate follow-up measures			
Internal and external communication			
Reporting to CC in front of the client - discrete surveillance			
Identifying the umbrella as a possible threat			
Explaining measures			
Implementation of structure			
<p>The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.</p>			

ANNEX V

SCENARIO III PACK

Asylum seeker – first aid

1. General information
2. Situation/order
3. Imaginary history
4. Material and personnel needs
5. Assessment checklist

1. General Information

Topic	Asylum Seekers
Aims of Training	Communication <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Safety and security measures during ID Check • First Aid • Lawful BG measures • Communication skills • Reporting • Initiating Asylum procedures
Personnel needs	1 patrol (by foot) 1 actor
Material needs	<p>The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.</p>
Locality	Training area at the compound
Communication	According to communication plan

2. Situation / Order

General Information	Risk assessments indicate attempts of illegal border crossings in the area especially clandestine entry and some smuggling cases of goods (cigarettes, alcohol).
Specific Information	<p>The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.</p>
Orders	

3. Imaginary history

Description of situation	Expected Measures	Behaviour of opponent / remarks
<i>Announcement of specific safety rules</i>	Following the Trainer's safety rules	Following the Trainer's safety rules
<p><u>Description of Situation:</u></p> <p>Patrol is approaching following situation: One person (irregular migrant) is trying to give first aid to another person on the ground (dummy). When the migrant see the patrol he is calling them for help.</p>	<p>The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.</p>	

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Patrol Number:

AIMS	Performance		
	Name:	Name:	Name:
<u>MINOR POINTS</u>			
Following the MARCH protocol [M – Massive Bleeding; A – Airway; R – Respirations; C – Circulation; H – Head]			
Using gloves			
Identity of injured people			
Communication with the opponent			
Internal and external communication			
Delegation/Division of tasks			
Reporting to CC in front of the client - discrete surveillance			
Following asylum procedures (reporting to CC)			
Knowledge about doctor/hospital the people are transported to			
Explaining measures			
<u>CRITICAL POINTS</u>			
<p>The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.</p>			

ANNEX VI

COMPLEX SCENARIO PACK

Asylum seekers with first aid

1. General Information

Topic	Border crossing of a group with the need of first aid / medical support for one person. Group is seeking for asylum.
Aims of Training	<p>Communication skills</p> <p>Closing an area (border guard tactic skills)</p> <p>Searching an area (border guard tactic skills)</p> <p>First aid skills</p> <p>Initiating asylum procedures</p>
Personnel needs	<p>patrols (needed for closing and searching an area) 1 actor as an injured irregular migrant</p> <p>actors as irregular migrants</p>
Material needs	<p>The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.</p>
Locality	Green border training area
Communication	According to communication plan

2. Situation / Order

General Information	Risk assessments indicate attempts of illegal border crossings in the area especially clandestine entry and some smuggling cases of goods (cigarettes, alcohol).
Specific Information	Last two weeks, this area has been identified as an illegal border crossing hotspot for irregular migration. Several groups of 3-6 migrants crossed the border illegally.

Orders	<p>The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.</p>
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1. Imaginary history

Description of situation	Expected Measures	Behaviour of opponent / remarks
<p><i>Announcement of specific safety rules</i></p>	<p>Following the Trainer's safety rules</p>	<p>Following the Trainer's safety rules</p>
<p><u>Description of Situation:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Patrol will detect injured irregular migrant somewhere near the border. • person is injured and cannot walk 	<p>The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.</p>	

- group of 4 irregular migrants in short distance to the accident place; moving towards inside of the country

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

<u>NEEDS</u>	<u>INFORMATIONS FOR THE COMMAND CENTRE</u>	<u>INFORMATIONS FOR THE ACTORS</u>	<u>INFORMATIONS FOR THE POLICE OFFICERS</u>	<u>PLACE WHERE THE SCENARIO IS</u>	<u>END OF THE SCENARIO</u>
<p>The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.</p>					

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

AIMS	Patrol:	Name:	Name:	Name:
Briefing/Divided tasks				
INJURED				
Proper approach/ Safety-Security measures				
Providing First Aid March Protocol				
Report to C.C./Request medical support/Transportation				
Search irregular migrant and bags				
Collect info/ Share info/Pass to C.C.				
Following Asylum procedure				
GROUP				
Find group-treated as necessary -/ Report to C.C.				
Safety-Security search separately				
Internal-External communication				
Find map/Connection with facilitator				
Multi-patrol leader				
FACILITATOR				
Find him/Stop properly/C.C./Find map/Connection with group				
Critical points <div style="border: 1px solid red; padding: 5px;"> <p>The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.</p> </div>				

ANNEX VII

RADIO COMMUNICATION EXERCISE PACK

Patrol	Location I	Location II	Location III	Location IV	Location V	Location VI
Patrol 1 (Alpha 1)	Radio check exercise	5 (16:10 – 16:25)	2 (14:25 – 14:40)	3 (14:50 – 15:05)	1 (14:00- 14:15)	4 (15:15 – 15:30)
Patrol 2 (Alpha 2)	4 (15:15 – 15:30)	Radio check exercise	3 (14:50 – 15:05)	1(14:00- 14:15)	5 (16:10 – 16:25)	2(14:25 – 14:40)
Patrol 3 (Alpha 3)	5 (16:10 – 16:25)	1(14:00- 14:15)	Radio check exercise	2(14:25 – 14:40)	4 (15:15 – 15:30)	3 (14:50 – 15:05)
Patrol 4 (Alpha 4)	1(14:00- 14:15)	3 (14:50 – 15:05)	4 (15:15 – 15:30)	Radio check exercise	2(14:25 – 14:40)	5 (16:10 – 16:25)
Patrol 5 (Alpha 5)	3 (14:50 – 15:05)	2(14:25 – 14:40)	5 (16:10 – 16:25)	4 (15:15 – 15:30)	Radio check exercise	1(14:00- 14:15)
Patrol 6 (Alpha 6)	2(14:25 – 14:40)	4 (15:15 – 15:30)	1(14:00- 14:15)	5 (16:10 – 16:25)	3 (14:50 – 15:05)	Radio check exercise
	Trainer		Trainer	Trainer		Trainer

Radio exercise starts at 13:30 till 14:00:

First tasks for the patrols task will be to move to appointed locations and report to command centre when they arrived.

Second task will be to contact each other and see if they can reach all locations.

After this they will return to command centre for feedback.

Radio communication exercise will start at 14:00 till 17:00:

Patrols have to go randomly to locations, send by command centre and fulfil tasks at the spot. After finishing the task, they will receive the next task from command centre to move to a new position. When they reached the position they will receive a new task. During the radio communication exercise there is the possibility to move 5 times and receive 5 tasks depending on the time schedule.

Patrols continue with moving and tasks as explained before, at 16:35 all patrols will move back to command centre for feedback session.

Trainer 1

Task location I in combination with location II, which is without trainer.

Patrol 4 (Alpha 4) (14:15-14:30) Contact with patrol 3 (Alpha 3)

- Alpha 3 – here Alpha 4:
Alpha 3 can you pass the following information to the command Centre ...
The registration plate and type, colour of a car ... (up to trainer)
- Alpha 3 have to pass this information to CC
- CC will answer that the car is not in the system
- Alpha 3 send to Alpha 4 that car is clean

Patrol 6 (Alpha 6) (14:40 – 14:55) Contact with patrol 5 (Alpha 5)

- Alpha 5 – here Alpha 6:
Alpha 5 can you pass the following information to the command Centre ...
The registration plate and type, colour of a car ... (up to trainer)
- Alpha 5 have to pass this information to CC
- CC will answer that the car is not in the system
- Alpha 5 send to Alpha 6 that car is clean

Patrol 5 (Alpha 5) (15:30 – 15:45) Contact with patrol 4 (Alpha 4)

- Alpha 4 – here Alpha 5:
Alpha 4 can you pass the following information to the command Centre ...
The registration plate and type, colour of a car ... (up to trainer)
- Alpha 4 have to pass this information to CC
- CC will answer that the car is not in the system
- Alpha 4 send to Alpha 5 that car is clean

Patrol 2 (Alpha 2) (15:55 – 16:10) Contact with patrol 6 (Alpha 6)

- Alpha 6 – here Alpha 2:
Alpha 6 can you pass the following information to the command Centre ...
The registration plate and type, colour of a car ... (up to trainer)
- Alpha 6 have to pass this information to CC
- CC will answer that the car is not in the system
- Alpha 6 send to Alpha 2 that car is clean

Patrol 3 (Alpha 3) (16:20 – 16:35) Contact with patrol 1 (Alpha 1)

- Alpha 1 – here Alpha 3:
Alpha 1 can you pass the following information to the command Centre ...
The registration plate and type, colour of a car ... (up to trainer)
- Alpha 1 have to pass this information to CC
- CC will answer that the car is not in the system
- Alpha 1 send to Alpha 3 that car is clean

Trainer 2

Task Location III

Patrol 6 (14:30 – 14:45)

- Alpha 6 have to send the passport number to CC and ask if the document is in SIS
- CC will ask back to Alpha 6 were the passport was issued
- CC will say that documents is not in the system

Patrol 1 (14:55 – 15:10)

- Alpha 1 have to send the first name, last name and date of birth (from pp) to CC and ask if the person is in the SIS
- CC will ask again for the given names
- CC will say that the person is not in the system

Patrol 2 (15:20 – 15:35)

- Alpha 2 have to send the first name, last name and date of birth (from pp) to CC and ask if the person is in the SIS
- CC will ask again for the given names
- CC will say that the person is not in the system

Patrol 4 (16:55 – 16:20)

- Alpha 4 have to send the passport number to CC and ask if the document is in SIS
- CC will ask back to Alpha 6 were the passport was issued
- CC will say that documents is not in the system

Patrol 5 (16:30 – 16:45)

- Alpha 5 have to send the first name, last name and date of birth (from pp) to CC and ask if the person is in the SIS
- CC will ask again for the given names
- CC will say that the person is not in the system

Trainer 3

Task location IV

Patrol 2 (14:30-14:45)

- Alpha 2 has to give a description from the person you see on the picture to the command centre
- CC will ask all stations to look out for this person because he was probably irregular passing the border

Patrol 3 (14:55 – 15:10)

- Alpha 3 has to give a description from the person you see on the picture to the command centre
- CC will ask all stations to look out for this person because he was probably irregular passing the border

Patrol 1 (15:20 – 15:35)

- Alpha 2 has to give a description from the person you see on the picture to the command centre
- CC will ask all stations to look out for this person because he was probably irregular passing the border

Patrol 5 (16:05 – 16:20)

- Alpha 2 has to give a description from the person you see on the picture to the command centre
- CC will ask all stations to look out for this person because he was probably irregular passing the border

Patrol 6 (16:30 – 16:45)

- Alpha 2 has to give a description from the person you see on the picture to the command centre
- CC will ask all stations to look out for this person because he was probably irregular passing the border

Trainer 4

Tasks location VI in combination with location V, which is without trainer

Patrol 5 (Alpha 5) (14:30 – 14:45) Contact with patrol 1 (Alpha 1)

- Alpha 1 – here Alpha 5:
Alpha 1 can you pass the following information to the command centre: There is a tractor coming from the forest in the direction of the border. On the tractor are three persons.
- Alpha 1 forward this to CC
- CC is answering that the farmer has informed the CC about his work on that day and the number of workers. No further action needed
- Alpha 1 forward this info to Alpha 5

Patrol 2 (Alpha 2) (14:55 – 15:10) Contact with patrol 4 (Alpha 4)

- Alpha 4 – here Alpha 2:
Alpha 4 can you pass the following information to the command they see 20 people in the forest near the border with green uniforms.
- Alpha 4 forward info to CC
- CC was informed about an exercise of Border guard school near the border. No further action
- Alpha 4 forward this info to Alpha 2

Patrol 3 (Alpha 3) (15:20 – 15:35) Contact with patrol 6 (Alpha 6)

- Alpha 6 – here Alpha 3:
Alpha 6 can you pass the following information to the command centre a there are three trucks going in the direction of the border, the trucks are not following the official road but going through the field
- Alpha 6 forward info to CC
- CC was informed that some workers forester / forest guards cleaning the area around the border
- Alpha 6 forward the info to Alpha 3

Patrol 1 (Alpha 1) (16:05 – 16:20) Contact with patrol 3 (Alpha 3)

- Alpha 3 – here Alpha 1:
Alpha 3 can you pass the following information to the command centre we saw a helicopter crossing the border from Usanski to Europa
- Alpha 3 pass info to CC
- CC answers that it was a medical flight and there was a permission
- Alpha 3 forward the info to Alpha 1

Patrol 4 (Alpha 4) (16:30 – 16:45) Contact with patrol 2 (Alpha 2)

- Alpha 2 – here Alpha 4:
Alpha 2 can you pass the following information to the command centre a group of 10 people moving towards the border from Usanski.
- CC answers that they will send three patrols cars to the position of the people
- Alpha 2 pass the info to Alpha 4

ANNEX VIII

SIRIOUS INCIDENT REPORT Template

Serious Incident Report no.

1. **Reporting date:**

Reporting person:

Last modification date:

Last modification done by:

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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Fact of the case

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Measures

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Assessment

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ANNEX IX

SHIFT REPORT

Template

SHIFT REPORT

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

ANNEX IX

SQF Alignment

Single Module Course Design Template

Course Title: EBCGT Land Border Surveillance Officer Training
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Aim of the course: Preparing EBCGT pool members for their deployment as Border Surveillance Officers – Land Operation
--

Target group and entry requirements:

Officially assigned as Team Member by national authority to the EBCGT pool as Border Surveillance Officer – Land Operation

Constraints:

Financial resources: Frontex training project
--

Time: Approx 8 hours of independent learning and 5 working days of contact learning phase
--

Participants: 18 students from MS/SAC; in exceptional case also from Third Countries

Approx: 7 trainers are necessary to run the course

Logistics: This course requires vehicles, radios, maps, actors, personal equipment (handcuffs, batons, etc.), first aid training dummy, etc.

Facilities: 1 conference room, outdoor training environment, preferable Border Guard Training Institution
--

Job Competences (JC): On completion of this course, participants will:

Have a <u>knowledge</u> or <u>understanding</u> of:
--

(L5)

- | |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ethical codes, values and professional standards during Frontex organised Joint Operations |
|--|

SQF JC:		SQF Level 5
---------	--	----------------

JC:

- | |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data handling together with procedures such as form filling; |
|--|

SQF JC:		SQF Level
---------	--	-----------

JC:

- | |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A defined range of EU and international policies and procedures related to land border surveillance |
|---|

SQF JC:		SQF Level 5I
---------	--	-----------------

...

Be <u>able</u> to:

JC:

Search persons, vehicles and objects in their possession in joint teams according to legal regulations whilst respecting each individual's fundamental rights		
SQF JC:		SQF Level 4
JC: Demonstrate situational awareness in an operational border control context as part of a joint team		
SQF JC:		SQF Level 4
JC: Communicate effectively with individuals and groups in predictable land border surveillance contexts.		
SQF JC:		SQF Level 5
JC: Conduct border surveillance in a joint team, selecting appropriate methods, tactics and techniques of best practices at land border		
SQF JC:		
Take responsibility for:		
JC: Completing duties safely and responsibly		
SQF JC:		SQF Level 4
JC: Identify and report misconduct during mission		
SQF JC:		SQF Level 4
JC: Ensure that individual and tactical responses to threat during mission are fully compliant with international and European conventions and fundamental rights.		
SQF JC:		SQF Level
...		

Learning Outcomes: On completion of this course the learner will be able to...		SQF Level
K S RA ⁴	Demonstrate effective communication skills and techniques as part of a joint team during a Frontex operation and apply them in an articulate coherent detailed and accurate manner, in all written and oral interactions	
SQF LO: Demonstrate effective communication skills and techniques and apply them in an articulate coherent detailed and accurate manner, in all written and oral interactions in a range of border guarding contexts.		L5 GBG
K S	Demonstrate land border surveillance tactics and techniques to gather information,	

⁴ Responsibility and autonomy, according to European Qualifications Framework (EQF). In the SQF for BG still under the title Competence (following the EQF 2017). SQF for BG will be updated and will follow the same.

RA	prevent and detect illegal border crossing, cross-border criminality and irregularity as a member of a joint team	
SQF LO: Demonstrate border surveillance tactics and techniques to gather information, prevent and detect illegal border crossing, cross-border criminality and irregularity.		L4 BC
K	Apply land border procedures in order to ensure security and safety of persons and objects in their possession in compliance with fundamental rights during a joint operation.	
S		
RA		
SQF LO: Apply a range of skills to ensure security and safety of persons and property in compliance with fundamental rights.		L5 BC
K	Apply rules and procedures according to operational plan relevant to a land border surveillance officer.	
S		
RA		
SQF LO: Apply a broad range of national, EU and international law, rules and procedures relevant to a range of border guarding activities.		L5 BGB
Course SQF Level: : 5		

Cross Reference Table
Job competences vs. Learning outcomes

JC	LO	LO1 Demonstrate effective communication skills and techniques as part of a joint team during a Frontex operation and apply them in an articulate coherent detailed and accurate manner, in all written and oral interactions	LO2 Demonstrate land border surveillance tactics and techniques to gather information, prevent and detect illegal border crossing, cross-border criminality and irregularity as a member of a joint team	LO3 Apply land border procedures in order to ensure security and safety of persons and objects in their possession in compliance with fundamental rights during a joint operation	LO4 Apply rules and procedures according to operational plan relevant to a land border surveillance officer
JC1 ethical codes, values and professional standards during Frontex organised joint operations					
JC2 data handling together with procedures such as form filling;					
JC3 a defined range of EU and international policies and procedures related to land border surveillance.					
JC4 search persons, vehicles and objects in their possession in joint teams according to legal regulations					

whilst respecting each individual's fundamental rights;				
JC5 demonstrate situational awareness in an operational border control context as part of a joint team;				
JC6 communicate effectively with individuals and groups in predictable land border surveillance contexts;				
JC7 conduct border surveillance in a joint team, selecting appropriate methods, tactics and techniques of best practices at land border.				
JC8 take responsibility for completing duties safely and responsibly;				
JC9 identify and report misconduct during mission;				
JC10 ensure that individual and tactical responses				

to threat during mission are fully compliant with international and European conventions and fundamental rights.				
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Learning Strategy:

This programme’s teaching, learning and assessment strategies are designed to support the trainees in attaining the required standard to achieve the course outcomes through a formative assessment and a blended approach to learning which uses learning instruments such as practical exercises, workshops, case studies and simulations.

The learning strategy follows two inter-connected phases of learning and combines the learning of the theoretical knowledge with the development of the practical skills and competences. The pre-reading phase (online-course) enables the participants to gain the foundation information on which the skills and competences will be built during the contact phase. The contact phase develops and enhances the skills and competences described in the learning outcomes as well as the participants’ social and interaction skills, while integrating an array of training and learning methods and techniques with opportunity for critical, yet constructive, peer-review and feedback.

The learning strategy is focused mainly on practical exercises, scenario-based exercises, simulation of a joint operation to facilitate the skills /competence development in a practical training approach. The simulation of a joint operation is based on three phases: preparation including briefing, operational phase and debriefing.

The practical exercises will offer an opportunity for peer learning and feedback (continuous formative feedback as part of learning).

Feedback will be provided by peers and trainers after each scenario. There will also be a summary feedback at the end of each training day including feedback concerning individual reports.

Assessment Strategy:

The course assessment strategy is designed to support the trainees in acquiring the required standards through their learning. There will be an on-going assessment strategy offering trainees a formative feedback during the week.

The formative feedback aims to highlight the weaknesses, knowledge gaps in order to help trainees strengthen their understanding and improve performance.

The assessment instruments include individual report writing, problem-solving exercises, peer

evaluation and group work.

The assessment aim is to evaluate all the learning outcomes, hence contributing to the learning process.

As entry requirement for the contact learning phase, all participants have to pass the current version of the pre-deployment online course and its own assessment strategy.

During the contact-learning phase the trainee has to undergo three different scenarios (1x as team leader; 2x as Team Member). Each scenario is following its own assessment in terms of minor mistakes and critical mistakes, which are in general stipulated for respective scenario.

Three minor mistakes will lead to a critical mistake. One critical mistake will lead to a failure of the scenario. Two failed scenarios will lead to a “referred pass” of the course and a re-sit, which will be organized after a profound feedback. The re-sit is a similar scenario in which the trainee has failed and should give the learner the possibility for presenting the achievements of the learning outcomes.

Assessment Method	Weighting
Summative assessment	70%
Formative assessment	30%

Curriculum Outline with Indicative Content:

Indicative References:

EBCGT Land Border Surveillance Officer Handbook of best practice
 Frontex Code of Conduct
 Guidelines for Trainers

Approximate Calculation of ECTS	Hours
Contact	
• Lecture	4
• Seminar	0
• Workshop	0
• Practical exercise	32
• Other	
Experiential (workplace) Learning	
Independent Learning	8
Assessment	
• Revision	
• Assessment procedures	After each scenario approx. 15 – 20 Minutes feedback and assessment of the scenario.
Total Learning Hours	44